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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
KAREN C. MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JESS M. MARTINEZ,

Case No. 880189-SC

Defendant/Petitioner,

Priority No. 13
•ooOoo-

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/PETITIONER

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This

case

arises

from a divorce action

filed

in Davis

County, State of Utah, pursuant to the provisions of Section 303-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953) .

An appeal was filed with the Utah

Supreme Court, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court.

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule

4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, this matter was
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.

The Utah Court of

Appeals issued its opinion in connection with the original appeal
on April 19, 1988, in the case of Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d
69 (Utah App. 1988).
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed
in the Utah Supreme Court by Defendant/Petitioner.

That Petition

was granted and the Utah Supreme Court now has jurisdiction
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 48 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case.
in this matter,

The wife, the Plaintiff/Respondent

filed a Complaint against her husband, the

Defendant/Petitioner.

Subsequently, the parties entered into a

written Stipulation and Settlement Agreement which was signed by
both parties and filed but, evidently, never implemented (R. 10).
The

Plaintiff

Complaint

then,

seeking

a

through
Decree

new
of

counsel,

filed

Divorce, asking

an

Amended

for custody,

alimony, child support, a property award of the home, furniture,
a cash settlement for a portion of the husband's medical degree,
and attorneys1 fees.

The Defendant secured counsel, answered,

counterclaimed and asked for, among other things, an award of
joint custody, an equitable distribution of the real and personal
property and debts of the marriage, and an order requiring him
not to pay alimony.
The case was tried before the Honorable Rodney S. Page on
May 31, 1985.

Each side was represented by counsel and presented

documentary evidence, as well as their own testimonies.

In

addition, the Plaintiff presented the testimony of two witnesses
in

connection

degree.

with

her

position

on the

Defendant's

medical

After hearing closing arguments, the trial court issued
2

its ruling.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a

Decree of Divorce were signed and filed on October 7, 1985, after
the Defendant had objected to portions of the Findings and Decree
as prepared by Plaintiff's counsel and the trial court had ruled
on the same.

No post trial motions were filed by Plaintiff nor

did she object to any of the findings made by the Court at trial.
The Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal on November 6, 1985. No
cross-appeal was filed.
On April 19, 1988, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its
opinion.

On May 17, 1988, Defendant/Petitioner filed a Petition

for Writ of Certiorari with this Court seeking a review of the
Court of Appeals decision related to the doctrine of equitable
restitution, its sua sponte increase of the trial court's alimony
and

child

support

exemptions.

awards

and

its

award

of

the

dependency

On September 7, 1988, this Court granted that

Petition as to the equitable restitution issue only.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant/Petitioner

seeks an order from this Court

vacating that portion of the opinion in Martinez v. Martinez, 754
P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988), which pertains to the creation of the
doctrine

of

equitable

restitution

and

affirming

the

trial

court's overall support, property and debt awards, except as may
have been modified
alimony,

child

by

the Court

support

and

of Appeals

dependency
3

related to the

exemption

issues,

Defendant/Petitioner's

Petition

for Writ

of

Certiorari

having

been denied as to those issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marital History and Respective
Contributions of the Parties
The parties married on June 6, 19 68, when Defendant was an
E-5 in the United States Army (Tr. 4 ) . At that time, both had a
high school education
parties

moved

to

(Tr. 6) .

Hill

Air

After a year of marriage, the

Force

Base

where

the

Defendant

obtained employment as an instrument repair mechanic and earned
$8,000-9,000.00 per year

(Tr. 5 ) .

From 1968 through 1977 the

Defendant was continuously employed and was the primary income
producer

(Tr. 52-53).

Between 1968 and 1982, the date of the

parties1

separation, the Plaintiff worked part time for a total

of three years (Tr. 52). Plaintiff's Exhibit A, set forth below,
reflects the income of the parties during the time they lived
together and one year after their separation.
FAMILY INCOME
TOTAL
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

$10,840
11,411
13,324
14,797
15,968

HUSBAND

WIFE

$10,840
11,381
13,323
14,464
13,089

$ 30.36
$ 116
2,663

MEDICAL SCHOOL
1981
1982
1983

OTHER

11,248
26,990
35,579

216.00
•
64.00
189.00
185.00

4

In 1970, after leaving the Army, the Defendant decided to
attend college, and Plaintiff reluctantly agreed

(Tr.13).

At

that time, Defendant was working and receiving education benefits
from the G.I. Bill (Tr. 53). Defendant received those benefits
for his four years of college and the first year of medical
school at the University of Utah.

That income, together with the

monies Defendant was earning while working, supported his family
while he was in school and paid for his tuition and books (Tr.
34) . In addition, during this time, the parties purchased a home
and built an equity which was ultimately used to purchase a
second home
action.

(Tr. 57) , the residence involved in this divorce

He also saved money which was then used to support the

family during the last three years of medical school (Tr. 34).
At the conclusion of his undergraduate work, the Defendant
decided that he wanted to go to medical school.

He applied twice

and was finally accepted by the University of Utah in 1977 (Tr.
7).

The Plaintiff was adamantly opposed to his decision (Tr. 14,

31, 33) , and the Defendant testified that the marriage almost
broke up at that time (Tr. 14) .
During the marriage, Plaintiff did not work except in 1978,
1979 and 1980, when she was employed as a part-time waitress (Tr.
34 and 53) .

During that period, she thought she netted around

$200.00 per month.

She also thought those sums were used for
5

regular

living

expenses

(Tr.

35).

While

she

worked,

the

Defendant stayed home and watched the children (Tr, 30, 35).
In addition to Defendant's earnings and the benefits from
his G.I. Bill, he also received

$7,000.00 from his mother's

estate

family

which

went

to

general

expenses

(Tr.

53) .

Defendant took out three student loans, one of which was for
$20,000.00 (Tr. 54), and all of which he is now repaying and for
which the Plaintiff is not responsible (R. 215).
The Defendant graduated
secured

an

internship

from medical school in 1981 and

in Danville, Pennsylvania, through the

National Intern Matching Program (Tr. 7) .

The parties moved to

Pennsylvania and rented their Utah home (Tr. 52) .

The Plaintiff

objected to the move at the outset (Tr. 16, 55). She ultimately
did go; however, after six months she returned to Salt Lake in
March

of

1982

and,

separated (Tr. 18) .

since that

time, the parties have been

Her reasons for leaving were that she did

not like the area, was uncomfortable in that setting and missed
her

family,

affected

the

friends

and job

Defendant's

(Tr. 17) .

work

and

Her

internship

dissatisfaction
and

placed

an

extreme amount of additional pressure on him (Tr. 17) .
After the Plaintiff left, the Defendant secured a residency
as an emergency medical room physician in Pennsylvania which was
to be completed in 1986 (Tr. 8).

Upon Plaintiff's return to

Utah, she secured a job with Mountain Fuel Supply, where she
6

worked full time until just prior to trial. At trial, she stated
she had just voluntarily gone to three-quarter time so she could
spend more time with her children and get an education (Tr. 48,
59).

Mountain Fuel will pay all costs of her education and allow

her to continue working (Tr. 48).
(Tr. 42).

She nets $846.00 per month

At trial her monthly expenses were $2,056.00 (Ex. F,

Tr. 43, 58), which included a $309.00 per month mortgage payment
on the Utah home (Tr. 26). No definite amounts were presented by
her as to any additional expenses (Tr. 2 6).
At the time of trial, Defendant was employed under a twoyear contract with Cannonsberg General in Pennsylvania (Tr. 3) .
One year was left under that contract (Tr. 100), and no evidence
was presented as to what he intended to do when the contract
expired.

At trial he testified he intended to complete his

residency in 1986 and was not yet Board Certified (Tr. 8). Under
his employment contract in effect at the time of trial, he earned
$100,000.00

per

year,

or

$8,333.00

per

month,

and

netted

$7,100.00 per month after deducting certain expenses such as
malpractice insurance, but before deducting taxes (Tr. 9-11 and
66).

He put one-half of his gross earnings in a tax account (Tr.

102), had no tax deductions or shelters

(Tr. 103), and had

nothing left in the tax account after April 15 of each year (Tr.
102).

He is paying back his student loans (Ex. 3), and had

expenses, including the $1,100.00 temporary support payment, of
7

$4,337.00

(Ex.

3).

His net monthly salary after taxes was

$4,022.00 (Tr. 102).

He had no outside employment (Tr. 100).

The oldest child of the parties lived with him from October, 1983
until July, 1984 (Tr. 49-50) .

That child then went back with

Defendant one day after trial to live with him (8/29/85, Tr. 4).
In

August,

1984,

Plaintiff

requested

$1,650.00

per

month

temporary support (R. 74), and the court granted her $1,100.00
per month (R. 87) which the Defendant paid up through trial (Tr.
107).
Ruling of the Trial Court
After each side gave their closing arguments, the trial
court ruled as follows:
1.

It granted Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce (R. 213).

2.

It awarded Plaintiff the custody of the parties1 three

children, subject to Defendant's reasonable visitation rights (R.
213).
3.

It ordered Defendant to pay $300.00 per month per child

as child support ($900.00), subject to a $100.00 per month per
child abatement if any of the children came to live with him, and
further subject to that support continuing

until

each child

reached the age of 21, so long as they were full-time students
and not married (R. 213) .
4.

It gave Defendant tax exemptions for the two older

8

children and gave Plaintiff the exemption for the youngest (R.
213-214).
5.

It ordered Defendant to provide medical insurance on

the children and a life insurance policy on his life naming the
children as beneficiaries (R. 214) .
6.

It ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff $4 00.00 per month

alimony for five years with that award not to terminate should
she remarry within the first three years (R. 214).
7.

It gave Plaintiff the marital residence subject to a

lien in Defendant's favor payable when the youngest child reached
18 or 21 years of age if the child was a student living at home,
when the home was sold or when she cohabits with an adult male
not her spouse but not payable upon her remarriage (R. 214-215).
8.

It gave each party the personal property

in their

respective possessions (R. 215) •
9.
incurred

It ordered each party to pay the debts which they
after

separation

and

ordered

the

Defendant

to pay

approximately $20,000 in student loans (R. 215-216).
10.

It ordered the Defendant to pay his attorneys1 fees and

$2,500.00 to Plaintiff for her attorneys1

fees and costs (R.

216) .
The court made the following specific findings related to
the Defendant's medical education:
9. During the course of the marriage, the
parties lived together as husband and wife
9

for approximately 14 years, having separated
during March, 1982, and having lived separate
and apart since that time. (R. 2 05)
10. During the period 1977 through 1982,
the parties experienced a particularly
stressful period while Defendant was engaged
in medical school.
During that time
Defendant did not work, and the family
obligations were met by a series of student
loans, a bequest from the estate of
Defendant's mother and income earned by
Plaintiff during her employment. During the
14 years that the parties lived together,
Plaintiff assisted extensively in Defendant's
obtaining a college education, medical degree
and internship. In addition, Plaintiff made
substantial sacrifices in order to facilitate
the completion of Defendant's medical
schooling and internship. (R. 205-206)

21.
The court finds that alimony is
designed not only to meet the needs of
Plaintiff in this case, and is not solely
based upon her ability to support herself and
Defendant's ability to contribute to that
support, but also a means of repayment to
Plaintiff for her years spent caring for the
household, helping the husband in his
educational pursuits and support of the
family, and for her involvement through the
extensive educational process utilized to
obtain the medical training. (R. 208)

23.
The court further finds that the
medical degree and training are not
specifically a property right subject to
distribution by this court under the current
law of this state. Such degree and training
are applicable only to the determination of
alimony and child support.
The court has
considered the medical training and license
to practice only as it impacts income and
Defendant's
present ability
to pay
10

appropriate alimony and child support. Such
income will also be taken into account "in
future years as it raises in stability [sic]
the rate of child support." (T.T. Page 13 5,
Line 10) (R. 208)
Plaintiff's counsel prepared the Findings and Decree (R.
203, 212).
brief.)

(Copies have been included in the Addendum to this

She did not make a Motion for a New Trial or for an

order to amend the Findings and Decree.
Mrs. Martinez appealed the trial court's decision to this
Court.

Dr. Martinez did not cross-appeal.

Pursuant to Rule 4A

of the Rules of the Supreme Court, this Court transferred the
case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Appellant's Brief.

Mrs. Martinez filed her

Dr. Martinez filed his Respondent's Brief.

Mrs. Martinez did not file a Reply Brief.
In the original appeal, Mrs. Martinez raised the following
claims of error:
1.

The trial court erred in connection
with the way it dealt with Dr.
Martinez's professional degree.

2.

The trial court's award of alimony and
child support were unjustifiably low.

3.

The trial court should not have awarded
Dr. Martinez any of the dependency
exemptions.

4.

The trial court should have awarded Mrs.
Martinez more attorneys' fees than it
did.

Dr. Martinez responded and argued:

11

1.

The trial court acted within its broad
discretion in fashioning a remedy which
was fair to both parties.

2.

The trial court did not err in the
manner it dealt with Dr. Martinez's
medical education in that a medical
degree is not "property11 under Utah
statutes; that Mrs. Martinez failed to
present adequate evidence to support a
finding that a medical degree was a
marital asset; and that the trial court
properly dealt with compensating Mrs.
Martinez for any of her alleged
sacrifices in its award of child
support, alimony and property and debt
distribution.

3.

The trial court's award of alimony and
child support was fair and reasonable
based upon the facts of the case.

4.

The trial court's allocation of income
tax dependency exemptions was fair and
statutorily permissible.

5.

The trial court did not err in its award
of attorneys' fees.

Oral argument was presented to Judges Davidson, Billings
and Jackson of the Utah Court of Appeals and on April, 19, 1988,
that Court in a 2-1 decision (Judge Jackson dissenting) issued
its opinion, concluding that Judge Page had erred in the way he
dealt with Dr. Martinez's medical education, in his awards of
alimony

and

dependency

child

support,

exemption.

and

in

his

allocation

A copy of that opinion

of

the

(Martinez v.

Martinez , 754 P.2d 69 [Utah App. 1988]) has been included in the
Addendum to this brief.
that

opinion

had

either

At no time prior to the
party
12

raised,

argued

issuance of
or urged the

creation of the doctrine of equitable restitution, a concept
evidently

formulated

by

the

majority

in

its

deliberations

pertaining to the medical degree issue.
Dr. Martinez timely filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
with this Court, claiming error by the Court of Appeals in its
creation of the doctrine of equitable restitution; its unilateral
increase of Dr. Martinez's alimony obligation from $400.00 per
month to $750.00 per month, and child support obligation from
$900.00 per month to $1,800.00 per month; and its decision to
automatically award dependency exemptions to Mrs. Martinez, the
custodial parent.
On September 7, 1988, this Court granted Dr. Martinez's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari as to the equitable restitution
issue, but not as to the support and dependency exemption issues.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The Utah Court of Appeals erred in its creation of the
doctrine of equitable restitution to deal with the Defendant's
medical degree.
Under Utah law, as set out in the Petersen, Rayburn, and
Gardner

cases,

educational

a

medical

achievement

degree

or,

for

that

or job training obtained

matter,

any

by a party

during a marriage, is not "property" as that term is used in
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) .
13

If the education or

training so obtained enhances or increases earning potential,
that is to be considered by the trial court in awarding support.
Contrary to this position, an award of equitable restitution
is,

for

all

practical

purposes,

the

same

as

treating

a

professional degree as a marital asset subject to division upon
divorce.
the

Court

This is especially true in the Martinez case because
of

Appeals

begins

by

awarding

Mrs. Martinez

an

increased amount of permanent alimony based upon Dr. Martinez's
increased earning capacity.

It then also awarded her an amount

of equitable restitution, a remedy expressly distinguished from
traditional alimony or other spousal support and based on the
increased

earning

capacity of a spouse as a result of that

spouse's professional degree.
As a result, the Martinez decision is in conflict with
previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and of this Court on
an important question of state law.
departure

from

this

law

and

a

Plaintiff

in the court below.

It represents a drastic

theory

never

raised

by the

Its opinion related

to the

doctrine of equitable restitution should be vacated.
POINT II
The

trial

court

in

this

case

properly

exercised

its

discretion in fashioning a remedy which considered the individual
facts of the case, including the Defendant's education.

An

integral part of that remedy was an award of alimony to the
14

Plaintiff which was intended to assist her in connection with her
ongoing monthly financial needs and to reimburse her for the
effort and monies she claimed she had expended during the period
the Defendant was securing his education.
assistance she provided

In recognizing the

(R. 205-206), the trial court ordered

certain things not normally done in divorce actions to compensate
Mrs. Martinez and make certain that she was adequately provided
for.
Under the circumstances of this case, the remedy fashioned
by the trial court was fair and equitable.

It was not arbitrary

or capricious and, consequently, should be upheld.
Court

of Appeals panel accepted

Instead, the

some portions of the trial

judge's decision, rejected others and created a new remedy never
argued, urged, or even mentioned by Mrs. Martinez.

What the

Court of Appeals failed to recognize was that each aspect of the
trial judge's ruling was interrelated with the other aspects in
order to arrive at an overall fair and just decision to both
parties.
The action on the part of the Court of Appeals to change
portions of the trial judge's decisions on a "piecemeal" basis
improperly infringes and inhibits the trial court from fashioning
an overall remedy which considers all the facts and is fair to
both parties.

15

POINT I
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CREATION OF THE DOCTRINE
RESTITUTION.

ERRED IN ITS
OF EQUITABLE

Mrs. Martinez argued to the Court of Appeals that the trial
court erred in not including the Respondent's medical education
as

a

part

of

the marital

estate

for

purposes

of property

distribution, a position that has been accepted by only a small
minority of the state courts which have addressed this issue.
She

claimed

that

the

parties

made

an

investment

in

"human

capital" and that she was entitled to a return on her investment
in Dr. Martinez's medical degree.
Two judges on the Court of Appeals agreed with that concept
and concluded that not only should Mrs. Martinez's five-year
award of $400.00 per month alimony be automatically increased to
$750.00 per month permanent alimony, but that she should also
receive some sort of quasi alimony/property award to compensate
her for her alleged sacrifices and loss of income expectancy.

In

order to provide that additional award, the panel created a new
and unheard of concept and called it "equitable restitution."

In

so doing, the Court of Appeals erred.
Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah C.A. 1988), (a copy
of which is included in the Addendum to this brief) created a new
remedy called "equitable restitution."

Under Martinez, an award

of this type is now to be considered in divorce cases where one
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spouse has obtained a professional degree during the marriage,
and the divorce occurs as that spouse begins his/her new career
and is on the threshold of increased earning capacity.

The

Court expressly distinguished this new remedy from all other
forms
11 f

of

spousal

maintenance

[equitable restitution]1

sharing

of

the

expectations."

reward

or

support

and

stated

that

is nothing more than an equitable

of both

Id. at 78.

parties' common

efforts and

An award of equitable restitution

evidently will not terminate upon remarriage and may be payable
in a lump sum or periodically over time.
The practical and realistic effect of this decision is in
conflict of previous rulings by other panels of the Court of
Appeals and the dictum of the Utah Supreme Court.
fundamental

issue to be decided

The basic and

in this case is whether an

advanced degree is marital property subject to consideration and
division by a trial court in divorce actions.
The present
advanced

law

educational

in the State
degrees

is

of Utah with respect to

that

such

degrees

are

not

property interests or marital assets subject to division upon
divorce.

This issue was first considered by the Utah Court of

Appeals in Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987).
(A copy of this case has been included in the Addendum to this
brief.)

In Petersen, the parties had been married for 20 years,

during which time Dr. Petersen earned his medical degree.
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While

he was in school, he earned approximately $1,000.00 per year and
Mrs. Petersen worked full time for one year and part time for the
remaining three years.

The couple also received

additional

monies from Mrs. Petersen's parents.
In addition to a more traditional award of property and
maintenance, the trial court awarded Mrs. Petersen a $12 0,000.00
cash settlement, characterizing this award as a property award
with respect to the medical degree.
Appeals

was

squarely

faced

with

On appeal, the Court of

the

issue

of

whether

Dr.

Petersen's medical degree was a property interest subject to
division as a marital asset.

In concluding that it was not, the

Court began by noting that "the majority of jurisdictions that
have considered the issue have held that advanced degrees or
professional licenses are not property."
omitted).
the

Id. at 239 (citations

Thereafter, the Court proceeded to analyze and compare

characteristics

and

attributes

of

a recognized

property

interest such as a retirement plan with the characteristics of
an educational degree.

The Court stated:

Property can be bought, sold, and devised.
Bona fide degrees cannot be bought; they are
earned.
They cannot be sold; they are
personal to the named recipient.
Upon the
death of the named recipient, the certificate
commemorating award of the degree might be
passed along and treasured as a family
heirloom, but the recipient may not, on the
strength of that degree, practice law or
medicine.
In this case, the court awarded
the parties' home to Mrs. Petersen. But it
might have awarded the home to Dr. Petersen

or it might have ordered the home sold and
the net proceeds divided. The Court had no
such alternatives with the medical degree
precisely because the degree is not property.
Id. at 240.

From this analysis as well as from an analysis of

the cases from other jurisdictions, the court concluded that an
"advanced degree is or confers an intangible right which, because
of its character, cannot properly be characterized as property
subject to division between the spouses."

Id. at 241.

One of the cases analyzed and relied upon by the Petersen
court in reaching this conclusion is a leading case in the area
of professional degrees:
(Colo. 1978).

In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P. 2d 75

In this case, the Supreme Court of Colorado

affirmed a decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals, Graham v.
Graham, 555 P.2d 527 (Colo. App. 1976), which held that an M.B.A.
degree was not marital property subject to division by the court.
In Graham, the husband acquired a Bachelor of Science degree in
engineering and physics and an M.B.A. during a six-year marriage.
The wife

had

contributed

worked

full

time

throughout

the marriage and

70% of the total income which was then used for

family living expenses and for the husband's educational expenses
during the marriage.

The husband had worked only part-time.

In

addition, the wife had done most of the housework and had cooked
most of the meals.

In the divorce action, the trial court found

the husband's education to be a marital asset and, based on the
husband's

expected

future

earnings, valued
19

the

education at

$82,836.00 and awarded the wife a $33,134.00 cash settlement.
appeal, the trial court's decision was reversed.

On

The Colorado

Supreme Court analyzed CRS Section 14-10-113(2) which requires
the court to consider all relevant factors in making a division
of marital property and concluded that the husband's education
was not marital property within the meaning of that statute.

In

so holding, the court concluded:
An educational degree, such as an MBA, is
simply not encompassed even by the broad
views of the concept of "property." It does
not have an exchange value or any objective
transferrable value on an open market. It is
personal to the holder.
It terminates on
death of the holder and is not inheritable.
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is
an accumulative product of many years of
previous education, combined with diligence
and hard work. It may not be acquired by the
mere expenditure of money. It is simply an
intellectual achievement that may potentially
assist in the future acquisition of property.
In our view, it has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that terms.
Id. at 77.
Both of these cases present a well-reasoned and solid basis
for concluding that an educational degree is not a property
interest and is not a marital asset subject to division between
the parties to a divorce action.

It does not follow from that

position, however, that the non-student spouse is left without a
remedy.

Instead, many of the jurisdictions that conclude that a

degree is not property provide for an adequate remedy through an
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increased award of spousal support and maintenance.

The law in

these jurisdictions provides that the amount of this award falls
within

the

sound

discretion

of

the

trial

court

after

consideration of all the relevant factors in each case.

Among

these are the fact that one spouse has obtained an advanced
degree during the course of the marriage, the extent to which the
non-student
sacrifice

spouse

of

that

worked

to

spouse's

support

the

family,

own educational

and

and

the

professional

advancement.
This is the position taken by the Utah and Colorado courts.
In Petersen, supra, Judge Orme stated that
traditional

alimony

analysis

ff

[i]n this state,

is the appropriate and adequate

method for making adjustments between the parties in cases of
this type." Id. at 242.

While in a footnote to this quotation

the Court expressed concern over the situation where the parties
are divorced just as the student spouse is graduating and on the
threshold

of

increased

earning

capacity,

it

reaffirmed

its

position that an award of maintenance is the proper remedy and
stated:
In another kind of recurring case, typified
by fGraham v. Graham] , 574 P. 2d 75 (Utah
1978) where divorce occurs shortly after the
degree is obtained, traditional alimony
analysis would often work hardship, because,
while both spouses have modest incomes at the
time of divorce, the one is on the threshold
of a significant increase in earnings.
Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so the
other could attain a degree is precluded from
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enjoying the anticipated dividends the degree
will ordinarily provide. Nonetheless, such a
spouse is typically not remote in time from
his or her previous education and is
otherwise better able to adjust and to
acquire comparable skills, given the
opportunity and the funding. In such cases,
alimony analysis must become more creative to
achieve
fairness, and an award
of
"rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony,
not terminable upon remarriage, may be
appropriate.
Id. at 242, f. 4.
This

approach

to

adequately

compensating

a

non-student

spouse through an award of spousal maintenance was reaffirmed by
the Utah Court of Appeals in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P. 2d 238
(Utah

App.

1987)

where

Judge

Orme,

again

writing

for

the

unanimous panel stated:
Recently this Court held that an advanced
degree or professional license is not
marital property subject to division upon
divorce. However, an advanced degree often
accompanies a disparity in earning potential
that is appropriately considered as a factor
in alimony analysis. We reaffirm our holding
in Petersen and analyze the instant appeal
under the same analysis employed in that
case.
Id. at 240.
Following Petersen and Rayburn, the questions of valuation
of a medical degree for property distribution purposes and the
adequate compensation of a non-student spouse through a support
award were presented to this Court in Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076 (Utah App. 1988).

(A copy has been included in the
22

Addendum to this brief,)

The case was decided without having to

answer the question of whether a degree is a marital asset, but
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, discussed the great
number of problems associated with attempting to place a value on
educational achievements and referred at length to the reasons
relied on by the Colorado Court in Graham for concluding that
educational achievements are not property.

He stated:

We agree that an educational or professional
degree is difficult to value and that such
valuation does not easily fit the common
understanding of the character of property.
Id. at 1081.
The court went on to conclude that the proper remedy for Mrs.
Gardner was to award her an adequate alimony award.
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Grahamf supra, the Colorado
Supreme Court concluded that, while a non-student spouse is not
entitled to treat the degree as a marital asset, that spouse's
contribution to that degree is to be considered by the trial
court in determining the proper award of support and maintenance:
A spouse who provides financial support while
the other spouse acquires an education is not
without a remedy.
Where there is marital
property to be divided, such contribution to
the education of the other spouse may be
taken into consideration by the court. Here,
we again note that no marital property has
accumulated by the parties.
Further, if
maintenance
is sought and need
is
demonstrated, the trial court may make an
award based on all relevant factors.
Certainly, among the relevant factors to be
considered is the contribution of the spouse
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seeking maintenance to the education of the
other spouse from whom the maintenance is
sought.
Id. at 78 (Citations and statutes omitted.)
The

Graham

decision

was

recently

reconsidered

and

reaffirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of
Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1987).

(A copy of this case has been

included in the Addendum to this brief.)

In Olar, the husband

had been a full-time student throughout the parties1

12-year

marriage, with the exception of one year where he had worked
full time.

Mrs. Olar worked full time for the entire marriage,

with the exception of a nine-week maternity leave.

Mr. Olar's

education was financed by veteran's benefits, tuition waivers,
student

loans, fellowships, graduate

inheritance from his father.

student stipends and an

The only marital assets acquired by

the parties were two motor vehicles, furniture and miscellaneous
personal property, a mobile home and a savings account.
time

of

the

dissertation
committee

to

divorce, Mr.
and

had

obtain

only
his

Olar
to

had

present

doctoral

completed

his

this work

degree

in

At the
doctoral

before his

physiology

and

biophysics.
At trial, Mrs. Olar did not ask for a property distribution
of Mr. Olar's degree, but did request an award of support.

To

qualify for such an award in Colorado, a spouse must establish
the requirements of CRS Section 14-10-114 (1) (a) and (b) .
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These

sections provide that a court may award maintenance only if it
finds that a spouse lacks sufficient property to provide for his
"reasonable needs" and
"appropriate employment."

is unable to support himself through
After analyzing the facts in the Olar

case, the trial court denied Mrs. Olar's request for maintenance
after finding she did not meet these threshold requirements.
initial

appeal

On

to the Colorado Court of Appeals, the trial

court's decision was affirmed.

(See, In re Marriage of Olar, 84

C.A. 0329 [Colo. App., Oct. 17, 1985, unpub.].)
Thereafter, the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to
reconsider its decision in Graham v. Graham because the Court was
concerned

about

the

"harsh

and

often

unfair

outcome

in a

dissolution proceeding where one spouse has postponed his or her
own career and educational goals to support and contribute to the
career and educational goals of the other spouse."

747 P.2d at

678.
After reviewing the issue, the Court found that "the value
of an educational degree is too dependent upon the attributes and
future choices of its possessor to be fairly valued."
680.

Id. at

Therefore, it reaffirmed its holding in Graham that "an

educational degree is not marital property."

Id.

The court went

on, however, to state that the contribution of one spouse to the
education of the other is a relevant factor to be considered in
determining an award of maintenance:
25

In Graham we stated, a spouse who provides
financial support while the other spouse
acquires an education is not without a
remedy.
Here, it is the adequacy of the
remedy with which we are concerned.
The
contribution of one spouse to the education
of the other spouse may be taken into
consideration when marital property is
divided.
This remedy is effective only if
sufficient marital property has been
accumulated by the parties during their
marriage.
In Graham, and the case at bar,
the parties were divorced shortly after the
husband acquired his degree. The situation
in which the dissolution of marriage occurs
before the benefits of the advanced degree
can be realized, and where no material
property is accumulated, requires us to look
to another remedy for the inequity that
results for the working spouse.
Another
option mentioned in Graham was an award of
maintenance based on all relevant factors
including the contribution of one spouse to
the other spouse.
Id. at 680.

The court then remanded the case for an award of

maintenance on the basis that the threshold of reasonable need
under the Colorado statute is more than the minimum amount needed
to sustain life.

In interpreting the second statutory requisite

of "appropriate employment" of the non-student spouse, the court
held that such employment must be suited to the individual and
reflect that person's expectations and intentions as expressed
during the marriage.

Thus, Olar, supra, gives the Colorado trial

courts broad discretion in fashioning an adequate remedy for a
non-student spouse who has supported his/her partner in obtaining
an educational degree.

This approach is consistent with the

well-founded doctrine in Utah that a trial court is afforded a
26

wide latitude of discretion in fashioning a fair, equitable and
comprehensive remedy in divorce actions.
Burnham, 716 P.2d 781 (Utah

See, e.g., Burnham v.

1986); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d

1072, 1074 (Utah 1985); Argvle v. Argvle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah
1984); Higlev v. Higlev, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983); Doritv v.
Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982); and English v. English, 565
P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977).
A very complete, informative and thorough analysis of the
issue now before this Court is also found in the case of Archer
v. Archer, 493 A. 2d 1074 (Md. 1985).
similar to the facts of this case.

The facts of Archer are

At the time of the parties1

marriage, the husband had completed one year of medical school.
The wife had

completed two years of undergraduate work but

discontinued her education in order to work full-time.
four years of marriage, two children were born.

After

The husband

completed three years of medical school, received his medical
degree and license and completed a two-year residency.

The U.S.

Navy paid his tuition and gave him a monthly stipend during
school.

He

worked

summers

while

in

medical

school.

In

construing a statute related to dividing marital property, (a
statute very

similar

to the Utah statute) , the trial court

concluded that the medical degree was not marital property under
the act and denied the wife's claim for a monetary award.
trial court's decision was affirmed.
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The

The Archer decision first analyzes the logic of Graham,
supra, and gives an informative general summary of how other
courts have dealt with this difficult issue.
. . . of the twenty-four jurisdictions which
have considered the matter, courts in all but
two jurisdictions have uniformly held that a
professional degree or license is not marital
property subject to equitable division.
Virtually all of these courts, consistent
with the rationale advanced by the Colorado
Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Graham,
supra, have held that an advanced degree or
professional license lacks the traditional
attributes of "property,fl being neither
transferrable, assignable, devisable, nor
subject to conveyance, sale, pledge or
inheritance.
Some courts, by way of an
additional reason for concluding that a
degree/license is not marital property, have
held that such items are too speculative to
value. Other courts have said that efforts
to characterize spousal contributions as an
investment or commercial enterprise deserving
of recompense demean the concept of marriage.
Still other courts have found that the future
earning capacity of a degree or licenseholding
spouse is personal, a mere
expectancy and a post-marital effort — not
divisible as "marital property."
And some
other courts, in declining to find that a
graduate degree or professional license is
marital property, express the view that such
items are best considered when awarding
alimony.
Id. at

1077-78.

(Footnotes omitted.)

In holding that the

medical degree or license was not marital property within the
meaning of the Maryland Act, the Archer court concluded:
. . . While, as earlier indicated, we have
in some contexts construed the term
"property" in a broad sense, there is nothing
in the Maryland Act to suggest that the
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General Assembly intended that a medical
degree or license, earned during marriage,
would constitute "marital property" subject
to equitable distribution upon divorce by a
monetary award.
We therefore hold, in
accordance with the majority view, that a
professional degree or license does not
possess any of the basic characteristics or
property within the ambit of marital property
under Section 8-201(3) of the Act.
While
pension rights, as in Peering, constitute a
current asset which the individual has a
contractual right to receive, such rights are
plainly distinguishable
from a mere
expectancy of future enhanced income
resulting from a professional degree.
The
latter is but an intellectual attainment; it
is not a present property interest. It is
personal to the holder; it cannot be sold,
transferred, pledged or inherited.
It does
not have an assignable value nor does it
represent a guarantee of receipt of a set
monetary amount in the future, such as
pension benefits.
Quite simply, a
degree/license does not have an exchange
value on an open market. In re Marriage of
Graham, supra, 574 P. 2d at 77. At best, it
represents a potential for increase in a
person's earning capacity made possible by
the degree and license in combination with
innumerable other factors and conditions too
uncertain and speculative to constitute
"marital property" within the contemplation
of the legislature.
See also, Aufmuth v.
Aufmuth, 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 152 Ca.Rptr. 668
(1979), overruled on other grounds. In re
marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal.3d 808, 166
Ca.Rptr. 853, 614 P.2d 285 (1980); In re
Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill.App.3d 234,
83 111.Dec. 425, 470 N.Ed.2d 551 (1984);
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527
(1982).
Moreover, as Dewitt v. Dewitt. 98
Wis.2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980), makes
clear, income earned after the marriage is
dissolved as a result of the degree/license
would in no event constitute "marital
property" within the definition of that term
in Section 8-201(e), since it would not have
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in Section 8-201(e), since it would not have
been acquired during the marriage.
Id. at 1079-80.
The Archer court then concluded, as did the Graham and Olar
courts,

supra,

and

Judge

Page

in

this

case,

contributions of the supporting spouse could be

that

the

considered in

connection with her request for alimony.
Contrary to this position, the Utah Court of Appeals in
Martinez reversed the trial court and created the doctrine of
equitable restitution.

In distinguishing equitable restitution

from traditional maintenance and support, Judge Davidson stated:
[W]e hold that plaintiff is entitled to an
award of 'equitable restitution1 in addition
to traditional alimony.
We use the term
equitable restitution to describe the award
in order to establish a clear distinction
between it and traditional alimony or any
other form of spousal maintenance or support.
The function of equitable restitution is to
enable a spouse to share the newly obtained
earning capacity of a former spouse who has
achieved
that capacity through
the
significant effort and sacrifices of the
requesting spouse which were detrimental to
that spouse's development.
It is nothing
more than an adequate sharing of the rewards
of both parties 1
common efforts and
expectations.
Martinez, 754 P.2d at 78.

(Emphasis in original.)

While earlier in its opinion the Martinez court purported to
follow the law as outlined in Petersen and Rayburn, the practical
effect of equitable restitution is to create a property interest
in a spouse's newly obtained earning capacity as a result of an
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advanced educational degree.
law.

This result is contrary to Utah

The attempt of the Martinez court to create a property

interest in increased earning capacity runs afoul of the same
problems inherent in the creation of a property interest in an
advanced degree.

First, the valuation and division of this

interest will be as difficult and speculative as the valuation
and division of a degree as a property interest.

Second, just

like an advanced degree, increased earning capacity cannot be
bought, sold or devised.
value

is subject to the attributes, perseverance

choices of its owner.
with

It is personal to its holder and its

equitable

Judge Jackson

restitution

summarized

in his well-reasoned

and career

the problems
dissent and

stated:
By creating a divisible interest in Dr.
Martinez's enhanced earning capacity, this
court has awarded a non-terminable property
interest in a medical degree which goes
beyond the compensation approved in Petersen.
The majority has not limited its award to
Mrs. Martinez's contributions toward her
husband's medical education costs; it has
taken the further step of providing financial
recompense for lost expectations.
I would
reject any compensation formula based on
future earning capacity.
The factors and
variables involved in the valuation of an
enhanced earning capacity are as speculative
as those involved in an attempt to value an
advanced degree; such speculation can only
lead to inequity.
Provision for Mrs. Martinez's needs is best
dealt with through a generous but fair
distribution of property and award of
alimony, not through the creation of a
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distinctly new form of cleverly disguised
marital property for which there is no
precedent.
Id. at 82.

(Footnotes omitted.)

The Utah Supreme Court has also recently addressed the issue
of a party's future earning capacity being included in a property
distribution in Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985).

In

that case, the wife challenged a property distribution, claiming
that she was entitled to a share of the present value of her
husband's earning capacity or additional property in compensation
for the award of Defendant's consulting business to him.

This

Court rejected that approach and concluded that the trial court's
award of alimony was based upon the earning capacity of the
husband

and that

distribution.
The

it need not be considered

Id. at 567.

impropriety

restitution

in the property

of

creating

the

in addition to provision

doctrine

of

for spousal

equitable
support is

further emphasized by the factors outlined by the Martinez court
to be used by a trial court in determining an award of equitable
restitution.

The court stated:

Factors to be analyzed in determining an
award of equitable distribution include, but
are not limited to:
(1) the length of the
marriage; (2) the financial contributions and
personal development sacrifices made by the
requesting spouse; (3) the duration of these
contributions and sacrifices during marriage;
(4) the resulting disparity in earning
capacity between the requesting spouse and
the spouse benefitted thereby; and (5) the

amount of property accumulated during the
marriage. An award of equitable restitution
will not terminate upon plaintiff's
remarriage, and may be payable in lump sum or
periodically over time depending on the
circumstances of each case.
Id. at 78-79.

(Footnotes omitted.)

A careful review of these factors shows that they are either
already used by trial courts in determining alimony awards or
they are factors that trial courts should be given discretion to
consider in determining an overall family maintenance award.

As

a result, not only can the criteria listed above be dealt with
through the proper award of support, by their nature they are
better considered in a support determination.
That

a

spouse

can

be adequately

compensated

support award is especially true in this case.

through a

Judge Jackson

recognized the inequity of the equitable restitution award under
the specific facts of this case.

He pointed out that Mrs.

Martinez did not provide the financial capital that enabled Mr.
Martinez to attend school and obtain his degree and that there
was

no

evidence

education.

that

she

had

deferred

her

own

career

or

In addition, although the majority created equitable

restitution for those situations where the spouse was on the
threshold of increased earning capacity, Judge Jackson pointed
out that Dr. Martinez was already earning $100,000.00 per year
and the parties had accumulated real and personal property from
which an adequate compensatory award could have been made.
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To

the factual reasons for his dissent, Judge Jackson added several
others:
On the facts presented in this case, there
are additional reasons why I believe the
majority's disposition of this appeal is
misguided; (1) equity can be achieved under
current alimony and property distribution
statutes and case law; (2) an award of
equitable restitution coupled with the
majority's generous alimony and child
support awards is double-dipping; and (3) an
award of equitable restitution, in effect,
treats the professional education as
"property" subject to division upon
dissolution of a marriage.
Id. at 80-81.

Judge Jackson's approach to the property division

and support awards in this case and his reasons therefor are
consistent with Utah law that advanced educational degrees are
not marital assets subject to the division in a divorce action.
Instead, non-student supporting spouses should be compensated
through a fair award of spousal support or maintenance, which
award be based on the individual facts of each case.
The

real

question

before

this

Court

is not whether a

medical degree is marital property, but whether the acquisition
of skills and knowledge during a marriage, which in turn enhance
the

earning

property.

capability
An

of

affirmative

one

of

the

parties,

answer

to

this

is

question

marital
would

necessarily have a devastating practical effect on Utah domestic
relations cases.

If the Martinez position is adopted, then its

application cannot be limited only to professional degrees.
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It

must,

likewise, play

associate

to masters degrees, bachelors degrees,

degrees, technical

qualifications

and

even

a high

school diploma, if they were acquired either wholly or partially
during the course of the marriage.

It could also then be argued

that a degree from one institution, such as Harvard, is more
valuable

than

a

degree

from

another,

such

as

Utah

State.

Likewise, the concept would have to apply not only to educational
achievements but also to on-the-job training at a lower salary in
anticipation of a higher paying position at a later date with a
company.
Such an approach will necessarily "open Pandora's box" in
divorce actions.

It would require that expert testimony be

presented in every divorce action if either party acquired any
education or job training during the marriage.

Not only would

such testimony be highly speculative, but it would necessarily
complicate even the simplest divorce actions.

These are but just

a few of the reasons why the vast majority of states have refused
to adopt the concept that a degree is marital property.
The better approach is to do just what the trial court did
in the present case:

consider the Defendant's education in

relation to the support award.

The trial court did not err in

concluding that the Defendant's medical degree was not an asset
to be considered in a property distribution.
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On the other hand, it was error for the Court of Appeals
panel to create the doctrine of equitable restitution•

Not only

does the Court of Appeals create a property interest which is
contrary to Utah law, but such an award

is inequitable and

unnecessary in light of the ability of a trial court to award
support based on all the relevant factors of a case.

That

portion of the Court of Appeals opinion should be vacated.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS A FAIR AND
REASONABLE METHOD TO COMPENSATE THE PLAINTIFF
FOR ANY EFFORT EXPENDED BY HER WHILE THE
DEFENDANT WAS ATTENDING SCHOOL AND IT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.
The

trial

court

in

this

case

properly

exercised

its

discretion in fashioning a remedy which considered the individual
facts of the case.

An integral part of that remedy was an award

of alimony to the Plaintiff which was intended to assist her in
connection

with

her

ongoing

monthly

financial

needs

and to

reimburse her for the effort and monies she claimed she had
expended

during

education.

the

period

the

Defendant

was

securing

his

In recognizing the assistance she provided (R. 205-

2 06) , the trial court ordered certain things not normally done in
divorce actions.
First, it awarded Plaintiff $400.00 per month alimony for a
period of five years, with that award not to terminate on her
remarriage if the same occurred within the first three years.
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The Court of Appeals, without additional hearing, sua sponte
increased that award to $750.00 per month and made it permanent.
Second, while giving the husband a non-interest bearing line
in the marital residence, it made the same payable upon the sale
of the home, the wife's cohabitation, when the youngest child
reached 18 or 21 years if still a student living at home, but
not upon her remarriage.
Third, it awarded child support until each child reached the
age of 18, or 21 years if the child was a full-time student and
not married, when no evidence was presented to justify an award
of child support past the age of 18.
Fourth, it abated the husband's child support obligation by
only $100.00 per month per child when the children were with the
husband —

even if that were on a full-time basis.

Fifth, it required the husband to pay all transportation
costs related to visitation.
Sixth, it required the husband to pay all of the student
loans incurred in connection with securing his education.
Seventh, it gave the husband no credit for his inheritance
from his mother which was received during the marriage.
Each of the seven items set forth above are actions not
normally taken by a trial court in a divorce cases, and represent
a conscientious effort by the trial court to fashion a remedy
which would be fair to both parties, considering the fact that
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the Defendant was the primary provider during the marriage (Tr.
53) , while the Plaintiff worked part time for three years and
contributed no more than $200.00 per month to living expenses
(Mrs. Martinez's

Brief, Court

of Appeals, p.

5 ) ; that the

Defendant's education was paid for by his G. I. Bill benefits and
his inheritance (Tr. 53); that while working and going to school,
he was also able to acquire a substantial equity in a home (Tr.
57) , furniture and furnishings; that the Plaintiff could secure
her own education at no cost to her through her employment (T.r
48); that the parties had been separated for three years prior to
trial and that the Plaintiff had been receiving
support

from

the

Defendant

during

that

substantial

period;

that

the

Defendant had completed his internship and a portion of his
residency without any assistance, encouragement or companionship
from his wife (Tr. 14, 57); and that Plaintiff's employer would
pay the costs of her education if she chose to go to school (Tr.
48) .
Under the circumstances of this case, the remedy fashioned
by the trial court was fair and equitable.

It was not arbitrary

or capricious and, consequently, should be upheld.

As this Court

stated in Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 190 (1967):
It would lead to intolerable instability of
judgments if this court should assume the
prerogative and accept the responsibility of
merely second guessing a trial judge who has
done a conscientious job of attempting to
make just and equitable allocation of the
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property and income of the parties in regard
to alimony and support monies as the trial
judge appears to have done here. It is due
to this fact, taking into consideration the
nature of the trial judge's authority and
duty, and his advantaged position, that in
such matters he is allowed a comparatively
wide latitude of discretion which will not be
disturbed in the absence of clear abuse . • .
Id. at 151.
In Martinez, the

Court

of Appeals panel

accepted

portions of the trial judge's decision, rejected

some

others and

created a new remedy never argued, urged, or even mentioned by
Mrs. Martinez.

What the Court of Appeals failed to recognize

was that each aspect of the trial judge's ruling was interrelated
with the other aspects in order to arrive at an overall fair and
just decision to both parties.
Rather

than

analyzing

the

parties'

entire

financial

situation and balancing all of the equities, as did the trial
court, the Court of Appeals changed on a piecemeal basis certain
portions of the trial court's decisions. Use of this approach is
entirely incorrect inasmuch as in this case, as in most divorce
cases, the support, property, and debt awards are necessarily
interrelated.

To readjust those awards as the Court of Appeals

did also then requires a readjustment of other awards made by the
trial court.

That is to say, if the support awards were changed

by the Court of Appeals, then in order to continue to be fair,
the debt distribution may have to be reallocated.
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If the debt

distribution

is reallocated, then the benefit

of having the

dependency exemptions may have to be reconsidered and so on, ad
infinitum.
appellate

To sanction this approach in connection with an
court's

review

necessarily

goes

against

the well-

established principle that appellate courts should not attempt
to "second guess11 a trial court's support and property awards
(Bader, supra).

In this case, the Court of Appeals' decision

related to equitable restitution vis-a-vis the manner it dealt
with the support awards does just that, and it is unfair.

The

reasoning of the trial court related to how Mrs. Martinez should
be compensated for any effort expended by her while Defendant was
attending school is well-documented in the very specific findings
(see pages 9, 10 and 11, infra), and Judge Page's decision should
be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Under Utah law, a medical degree or, for that matter, any
educational achievement or job training, obtained by a party
during a marriage is not "property" as that term is used in
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953).

Instead, if the education

or training so obtained enhances or increases earning potential,
that may be considered by the trial court in awarding support.
The

trial

court

in

this

case

acted

consistently

with this

approach, which mirrors the decisions of all but a very few
states.

The trial court properly and correctly fashioned an
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equitable

and

adequate

remedy

for

Mrs. Martinez

under

the

specific facts of this case which reimburses her for any efforts
she expended in connection with the Defendant's education.
On the other hand, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Martinez v. Martinez, supra, is contrary to these principles and
contrary to Utah law, as set out in the Petersen, Rayburn and
Gardner cases.

An award of equitable restitution, as created by

the Court of Appeals is, for all practical purposes, the same as
treating a professional degree as a marital asset subject to
division upon divorce.

The determination of such an award is

subject to the same difficulties, speculation and inequities as
an award of an interest in a degree as marital property.

The

impropriety of such a remedy is especially evident under the
facts of the Martinez case because the court began by awarding
Mrs. Martinez an increased amount of permanent alimony based upon
Dr. Martinez's increased earning capacity.
her

an

amount

of

equitable

It then also awarded

restitution, a remedy

expressly

distinguished from traditional alimony or other spousal support
and based on the increased earning capacity of a spouse as a
result of that spouse's professional degree.
As a result, the Martinez decision is in conflict with
previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and of this Court on
an important question of state law.
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It represents a drastic

departure from this law and is a theory never raised by the
Plaintiff in the court below.

Simply and succinctly put, the

Martinez decision is wrong.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred and that portion of
its opinion which deals with the creation and application of the
doctrine

of

equitable

restitution

should

be

vacated.

The

decision of the trial court related to support, property and debt
distribution should be affirmed.

The Defendant/Petitioner should

be awarded his costs related to the proceedings he has been
required to file in this Court and to correct the error of the
Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *j2j<^

day of December, 1988.

DART, ADAMSQN & KASTING

By
^ N T M. KAST
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/PETITIONER were duly hand
delivered, addressed to:
Neil B. Crist, Esq.
Nelda Bishop, Esq.
HANSEN & CRIST
110 West Center
Bountiful, Utah 84010
DATED this *2j day of December, 1988
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KAREN C. MARTINEZ,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
JESS M. MARTINEZ,

Civil No. 34354
Defendant.
The above matter came on for trial on Friday, the 31st day
of May,

1985, the

presiding.

Honorable

Rodney

Plaintiff appeared

S.

Page, District

Judge

in person and represented by

counsel of record, Neil B. Crist, Esq.

Defendant appeared in

person and represented by counsel of record, Paul H. Liapis, Esq.
The court heard testimony of each of the parties, and of two
expert

witnesses

in

support

of

Plaintiff's

Defendant's Counterclaim for Divorce.

Complaint

and

Defendant's objections to

the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were heard before the
Court on Thursday, the 29th day August, 1985, again before the
Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge.
Defendant

appeared

through

counsel

Both Plaintiff and

for that hearing.

On

the

basis of that testimony, and the record before the court, the
court being duly advised in the premises now makes and enters the
following:

&
V*
*V
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FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Davis County, State of Utah,

and was such for a period in excess of three months prior to the
filing of the Complaint in this matter.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband having been

married

in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah on June 22,

1968.
3.

The following three children have been born as issue of

the marriage, and none other are expected:

4.

BRENT P. MARTINEZ

(d.o.b. October 1, 19 70)

RYAN S. MARTINEZ

(d.o.b. August 31, 1971)

HEATHER MARTINEZ

(d.o.b. May 29, 1975)

During

the

course

of

the

marriage

Defendant

treated

Plaintiff cruelly causing her great mental suffering and distress
by consorting with an adult female other than Plaintiff.
5.

The parties acquired

certain

real property

during

the

marriage, which real property is located at 745 West 2125 South,
Woods Cross, Utah 84087 and is otherwise described as:
All of Lot 221, Sorrento Estates
#2, Davis County, Utah.
.6.
certain

Subdivision

During the course of the marriage the parties
personal

property,

which

personal

property

acquired
has

been

allocated on an equitable basis prior to the hearing hereon; the
court finds such division to be equal.
7.
certain

During the course of the marriage
debts

and

obligations.

Those

the parties

debts

and

acquired

obligations

should be allocated as follows:
A.

Plaintiff should be awarded the following debts and

obligations; all incurred after the separation of the parties:
(1)

First Interstate VISA, approximately $706.73;

(2)

ZCMI, apprixmately $537.00;

(3)

Granite Furniture, approximately $96.00;

(4)

Levitz Furniture, approximately

(5)

1

$250.00

J.C. Penney s, approximately $214.00;

2

(6)

Mt.

America

Credit

Union,

approximately

$376.00; and
(7)

Her

attor- ley's

fees

(excluding

award

from

Defendant), of approximately $6,000.
B.

The Defendant should be awarded the following debts

and obligations:
(1)

National Direct Student Loan,

approximately

$10,000;
(2)

Utah

Higher

Education

Assistance

Authority

Loan, approximately $5,739.04;
(3)

Health Profession Student Loan, approximately

$3,230;
(4)

Geisinger Credit Union

after

separation

of

(his moving

parties),

expenses

approximately

$1,800;
(5)

AVCO Financial Service, approximately $1,200,

(incurred after separation of parties);
(6)

North Central Bank (incurred after separation

of parties), approximately $900;
(7)

MASTERCARD

(incurred

after

separation

of

parties), approximately $800.00; and
(8)
8.

During

His attorney's fees of approximately $2,500.

the course of the marriage, the parties

together as husband and wife for approximately

lived

14 years, having

separated during March, 1982, and having lived separate and apart
since that time.
9.
the

During the marriage, the parties jointly participated in

attainment

of

a

Bachelor's

Degree

by

Defendant.

While

achieving this degree, Defendant worked and supplied the majority
of the

income

to the

family, while

Plaintiff

attended

to

the

child care and care of the home.
10.
experienced

During

the

period

1977

through

1982,

the

parties

a particularly stressful period while Defendant was

engaged in medical school.

During that time Defendant did

not

work, and the family obligations were met by a series of student
loans, a bequest from the estate of Defendant's mother and income
3
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earned by Plaintiff during her employment.

During the 14 years

that the parties lived together, Plaintiff assisted extensively
in Defendant's obtaining a college education, medical degree and
internship.
in order

In addition, Plaintiff made substantial sacrifices

to

facilitate

the

completion

of Defendant's

medical

schooling and internship.
11.

The parties

are both

fit and

proper

parents

awarded the care, custody and control of the parties

1

to be

three minor

children, but it is in the best interest of those children that
custody be awarded to Plaintiff.
12.

Defendant's gross

income

is $100,000 per year

as a

result of his contract with Canonsburg Diversified Services, Inc.
dba Canonsburg General Hospital, Canonsburg, Pennsylvania 15317.
Defendant's annual expenses associated with that employment are
approximately

$7,000, leaving

a gross

income

before

taxes

of

approximately $93,000 per year or $7,750 per month.
13.

Plaintiff is presently employed with a gross income of

approximately $1,033 per month, and expects a 25% reduction in
that salary during the next few months as a result of a voluntary
transfer to a less stressful position within the company.
14.

On

the

basis

of

Plaintiff's

historical

monthly

expenditures of approximately $2,050 per month, she is in need of
financial assistance from Defendant by way of child support and
should be awarded child support in the sum of $30 0 per month per
child.

To

living more

assist

the children

comparable

in maintaining

to that enjoyed

a

by their

standard

of

father, such

child support should be ordered to continue through age 21 if the
children are full-time students and not married.
15.
accident

Defendant has available through his employment health,
and dental

parties' children.
all

medical

insurance which

be carried

on the

Defendant should further be responsible for

expenses

insurance, other

should

than

over
the

and

above

deductible

that
amounts

covered

by

associated

the
with

routine office calls and prescriptions.
16.

Defendant presently has insurance on his life in the

amount of $110,000, that being Policy No. 130566 with National
4
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Public Service for $10,000 and a group policy with the American
Medical

Association

maintained

with

However,

additional

children may

$100,000, which

the parties' children

their minority.
father

for

be equally

from

a

included

should

as beneficiaries

in the event

children

insurance

during

that Defendant

subsequent

should

marriage,

as beneficiaries

be

those

under

such

policy,
17.

In light of the distance between Plaintiff's residence

and Defendant's residence, Defendant should be awarded reasonable
visitation

with

the

children,

to

include

up

to

eight

weeks

visitation during the summer months, and during the children's
Christmas vacation from December 26 until the day prior to the
commencement of school activities at the close of that vacation
period.

The children should spend Christmas Eve and Christmas

Day with their mother each year.

Defendant should be awarded

other visitation as is feasible on 24-hour notice to Plaintiff.
18.

As

a

result

of

the

distance

between

the

parties

residences, there will be a substantial cost of transportation to
facilitate Defendant's visitation.

As

a result, during the

extended summer visitation, or during periods that a child or
children live with Defendant, the child support provided herein
should be reduced by the sum of $100 per month per child for the
actual time the children are living with Defendant.
further
incurred

finds that there are on-going
by

Plaintiff

even

during

The Court

expenses which will be

periods

of

time

that

the

use

and

children are physically with Defendant.
19.

Plaintiff

should

be

awarded

the

exclusive

occupancy of the parties' residence subject to a lien in favor of
Defendant for the sum of $17,528.00, payable upon the youngest
child reaching the age of 18 years or the age of 21 years if she
is still a student and living at home after attaining the age of
18 years, or upon the sale of the home, whichever occurs first.
The lien in favor of Defendant is specifically ordered not to be
payable on the remarriage of Plaintiff but shall be payable in
the event that Plaintiff cohabitates with an adult male without
the benefit of marriage.
A-%

20.
parties

There presently exists a large disparity between the

1

present and potential incomes,

21.

The court finds that alimony is designed not only to

meet the needs of Plaintiff in this case, and is not solely based
upon her ability to support herself and Defendant's ability to
contribute to that support, but also a means of repayment to
Plaintiff for her years spent caring for the household, helping
the

husband

in

his

educational

pursuits

and

support

of

the

family, and for her involvement through the extensive educational
process utilized to obtain the medical training.
22.

Plaintiff's income and resources being inadequate to

meet her needs for support and maintenance, she should be awarded
the sum of $400 per month for a period of five years as and for
alimony.

Such alimony should not terminate in the event that she

remarries within three years of the Decree of Divorce becoming
final,

but

should

terminate

under

the

normal

condition

of

remarriage if such takes place more than three years after the
Decree herein becomes final.

Cohabitation with an adult male

shall terminate alimony, as provided by law at any time during
the five year period.
23.

The court further finds that the medical degree and

training

are

not

specifically

a

property

right

subject

to

distribution by this court under the current lav/ of this state.
Such degree and training are applicable only to the determination
of

alimony

medical

and

child

training

and

support.
license

The
to

court

practice

has

considered

only

as

it

the

impacts

income and Defendant's present ability to pay appropriate alimony
and child support.

Such income will also be taken into account

"in future years as it raises in stability

(sic) the rate of

child support". (T.T. Page 135, Line 10)
24.
Defendant

As

a

to

the

result

of

support

the
and

substantial
maintenance

contribution
of

the

by

parties1

children, it is fair and equitable that Defendant be awarded the
two

oldest

children

for

tax

deduction

purposes,

and

that

Plaintiff be directed to file the necessary documents in order to
allow Defendant to claim them as deductions during each December
6

starting 1985.

Plaintiff should be awarded the deductions for

the youngest child.
25.

Plaintiff's resources are inadequate to allow her to

pay her attorney's fees incurred herein, a sum of $7,800 plus the
cost of the trial.

As a result, Plaintiff should be awarded a

judgment against Defendant
$2,500.

for attorney's

fees in the

sum of

However, Defendant has paid that sum prior to the execu-

tion of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce; therefore, no award of attorney's fees or costs should
be made in the Decree.
26.

The parties having

been

separated

for

a period

of

approximately three years, the Decree of Divorce herein should
become final upon entry.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

Plaintiff should be awarded

a Decree of Divorce from

Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, v/ith such Decree to
become final upon entry.
B.

The care, custody

and control of the parties' minor

children should be awarded to Plaintiff, subject to reasonable
visitation as set forth in the Findings above.
C.

In order to make the distribution of that property which

qualifies for distribution by this court as equal as possible,
Plaintiff

should

be

awarded

the

real

property

set

forth

in

Paragraph 5 of the Findings above subject to a lien in favor of
Defendant for one-half of the present equity therein, that being
for the sum of $17,678.

Such lien should be payable upon the

youngest

child

reaching

the

age

youngest

child

reaching

the

age

unmarried and a full-time

of
of

18
21

years, or
years

if

upon

she

student after the age of

that

remains

18 years.

Such lien should further be payable upon the sale of the home, or
upon

Plaintiff's

remarriage, but

cohabitation
should

with

specifically

Plaintiff's remarriage.
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an

adult

not be made

male

without

payable

upon

D. The personal property of the marriage has been divided
equally between the parties, and such award should be confirmed
by this court.
E.

The medical degree and training acquired by Defendant

during the marriage is not a property asset properly allocable
and distributable by this court.
equally

allocated

the

As a result, the court has

remaining

consideration of this item.

property

assets

without

The court has considered the medical

training and license to practice only as it impacts income and
Defendant's present ability to pay appropriate alimony and child
support.

Such income will also be taken into account "in future

years as it raises in stability (sic) the rate of child support".
(T.T. Page 135, Line 10)
F.

The debts and obligations

of the marriage

should

be

allocated as set forth in Paragraph 7 of the Findings above, such
allocation being fair and equitable.
G.

Plaintiff should be awarded the sum of $300 per month

per child as and for support of the minor children, with such
support to be continued until age 21 if each child is a full-time
student and not married after attaining the age of 18 years.
H.
and

Defendant should be ordered to provide health, accident

dental

insurance

for

the

benefit

of

the

parties1

minor

children, and to be responsible for any deductible expenses not
covered

by

that

insurance, with

the

exception

of

deductibles

associated with routine office calls and prescriptions.
I.

Defendant should be ordered to maintain in full force

and effect the policies of life insurance presently existing upon
his life, payable to the benefit of the parties1 minor children.
However, any subsequent children fathered by Defendant should be
included on an equal basis under that policy.
J.

As a result of the substantial cost of transportation

incurred by Defendant, in the on-going expenses attributable to
Plaintiff

during

the

children's

absences,

the

child

support

provided herein should be abated by the sum of $100 per month per
child

for

actual

time

that

the

Defendant.
8

children

are

living

with

K.

Plaintiff should be awarded the sum of $400 per month as

and for alimony for a period of five years.

Such alimony should

not terminate in the event that she remarries within three years
of the Decree of Divorce herein becoming final but should terminate under the normal condition of remarriage if that remarriage
takes place more than three years after the Decree becomes final.
Such alimony should terminate by law in the event that there is
cohabitation during the alimony period.
L.

No further award of attorney's fees should be made as a

result of this action.
DATED this

Q A fl

7*ft*» day of Stepfeeirlicr, 19 85.
BY THE COURT:

RODNEY S J PAGE
District Judge

*

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
this third amended proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law to Paul H. Liapis, Attorney for Defendant, via first class
mail, postage prepaid on this rS-Q d a Y of September, 1985.

y^<^^

NEIL B. CRIST
Attorney for Plaintiff
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NEIL B. CRIST #0759
Attorney for Plaintiff
110 West Center Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 295-2391
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KAREN C. MARTINEZ,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.
JESS M. MARTINEZ,
Civil No. 34354
Defendant.
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The above matter came on for trial on Friday, the 31st day
of

May,

1985, the

presiding.

Honorable

Plaintiff

Rodney

appeared

in

S.

Page, District

person

and

Judge

represented

counsel of record, Neil B. Crist, Esq. Defendant

by

appeared

in

person and represented by counsel of record, Paul H. Liapis, Esq.
The court heard testimony of each of the parties, and of two
expert

witnesses

in

support

Defendant's Counterclaim

of

Plaintiff's

for Divorce.

Complaint

and

In addition, the Court

heard Defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Thursday, the ?9th day of August, 1985, with
the

Honorable

Rodney

S.

Page,

District

Judge

presiding.

Plaintiff and Defendant appeared through counsel at that hearing.
On the basis of the testimony, and the record before the court,
the court having previously

entered

its Findings

of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following:

FILMED
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DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

DIVORCE

GRANTED:

Plaintiff

is

awarded

a Decree

of

Divorce from Defendant, thereby severing the bonds of matrimony
previously existing between the parties.

Such Decree will be

final upon entry in the records of the court without the need for
further action on the part of the parties.
2.

CUSTODY;

Plaintiff is awarded

the care, custody and

control of the following children born as issue of this marriage,
subject to reasonable visitation retained by Defendant as set
forth herein:

3.

BRENT P. MARTINEZ

(d.o.b. October 1, 1970)

RYAN S. MARTINEZ

(d.o.b. August 31, 1971)

HEATHER MARTINEZ

(d.o.b. May 29, 1975)

VISITATION;

Defendant is awarded reasonable visitation

with the children, to include up to eight weeks visitation during
the summer months, and during the children's Christmas vacation
from December

26 until the day prior

to the

school activities at the close of that vacation.

commencement

of

In carrying out

this visitation, the court orders that children spend Christmas
Eve and Christmas Day with their mother each year.

Defendant

should be awarded other reasonable rights of visitation as is
feasible so long as he provides not less than 24 hours advance
notice to Plaintiff of his intention to exercise that visitation.
4.

CHILD

SUPPORT;

Plaintiff

is

awarded

from

Defendant

child support in the amount of $300 per month per child.

Such

child support is specifically ordered to continue past the age of
18 years until each child reaches the age of 21 years so long as
the child is a full-time student and not married.
5.

CHILD SUPPORT ABATEMENT;

During periods that the child-

ren live with Defendant for extended periods, the child support
provided herein is ordered to be reduced by the sum of $100 per
month per child for the actual time that the children are in the
primary care of Defendant.
6.

TAX DEDUCTIONS;

Defendant is awarded the parties' two

oldest children as and for state and federal income tax deduction
2

purposes, and Plaintiff is awarded the parties1 youngest child
for such tax deduction purposes.

Plaintiff is further ordered to

file any necessary documents in order to allow Defendant to claim
the two oldest children for each commencing 1985.
7.

MEDICAL

INSURANCE:

Defendant

is

ordered

to

provide

health, accident, medical and/or dental insurance on the parties1
children

and

covered

by

to be responsible
that

insurance,

for

all medical

other

than

expenses

deductible

not

amounts

associated with routine office calls and prescriptions.
8.
full

LIFE INSURANCE:

force

amount

and

of

Defendant is ordered

effect the policies

$110,000

payable

to

insuring
the

to maintain

his

parties

1

life

in

in

the

children

as

beneficiaries during their minority.

In the event that Defendant

fathers

subsequent marriage, those

additional

children

in any

children may equally share as beneficiaries under such policies.
9.

ALIMONY:

Plaintiff is awarded

alimony

in the sum of

$400 per month for a period of five years after the Decree of
Divorce herein is made final.
terminate

Such alimony is ordered not to

in the event that she remarries with an adult male

within three years of the Decree of Divorce becoming final, but
such alimony is ordered to terminate under the normal conditions
of remarriage if such takes place more than three years after the
Decree

herein

becomes

final.

Cohabitation

shall

terminate

alimony as per the statute at any time.
10.

REAL PROPERTY;

Plaintiff is awarded the exclusive use

and occupancy of the real property acquired during the marriage,
which property is located at 745 West 2125 South, Woods Cross,
ULtah 84087, and is otherwise more specifically described as:
All of Lot 221, Sorrento Estates Subdivision
#2, Davis County, Utah.
Such award is made subject to a lien in favor of Defendant for
the sum of $17,528, payable upon the occurence of the first of
the following conditions to take place.
A.

The youngest child reaching the age of 18 years or

the age of 21 years if he or she is still a student and living at
home after attaining the age of 18 years;
3

B.

Upon the sale of the home; and

C.

Upon Plaintiff's

cohabitation

with

an

adult

male

which is not issue of the parties.
Defendant's

lien

is

specifically

not

payable

in

the

event

of

Plaintiff's remarriage.
11.

PERSONAL

PROPERTY;

The

personal

property

during the marriage is awarded to that person having

acquired
possession

of the property as of the date of the hearing hereon.
12,

DEBTS:

The debts and obligations of the marriage

are

allocated as follows:
A.

Plaintiff

is

av/arded

the

following

debts

and

obligations; all incurred after the separation of the parties:
(1)

First Interstate VISA, approximately $706.73;

(2)

ZCMI, apprixmately $537.00;

(3)

Granite Furniture, approximately $96.00;

(4)

Levitz Furniture, approximately $250.00

(5)

J.C. Penney 1 s, approximately $214.00;

(6)

Mt.

America

Credit

Union,

approximately

$376.00; and
(7)

Her

attorney's

fees

(excluding

award

from

Defendant), of approximately $6,000.
B,

The Defendant

is awarded

the

following

debts

and

obligations:
(1)

National

Direct

Student

Loan,

approximately

$10,000;
(2)

Utah

Higher

Education

Assistance

Authority

Loan, approximately $5,739.04;
(3)

Health Profession Student Loan, approximately

$3,230;
(4)

Geisinger Credit Union

after

separation

of

(his moving

parties),

expenses

approximately

$1,800;
(5)

AVCO Financial Service, approximately $1,200,

(incurred after separation of parties);
(6)

North Central Bank

(incurred after separation

of parties), approximately $900;
A-^4

(7)

MASTERCARD

(incurred

after

separation

of

parties), approximately $800,00; and
(8)

13.

His attorney's fees of approximately $2,500.
f

ATTORNEY S FEES:

No

costs

or

attorney's

fees

are

awarded beyond those previously paid by Defendant.
DATED this

rn

day of September, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

District
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
this third amended proposed Decree of Divorce to Paul H. Liapis,
Attorney for Defendant.via first class mail, postage prepaid on
this rSO d a Y of Septofefrer7, 1985. If no objection is received
prior to September 14, 1985, I request that the same be signed
and entered.

^

^

>

<

^

^

NEIL B. CRJST
Attorney for Plaintiff

9-/7-XS

MARTINEZ v, MARTINEZ

Utah

69

Cite•• 754 ?2d 69 (UuhApp. 1988)

have federal income tax deductions for the
two children, court could not award tax
exemptions for the children to the father
while awarding custody to the mother in
1986 divorce decree where mother's amended complaint in 1985 had put the distribution of tax exemptions at issue. 26 U.S.C.
A. § 152(eX4XB). .

Karen C. MARTINEZ, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
r.
Jess M. MARTINEZ, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 860159-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 19, 1988.

Wife appealed from order of the Second District Court, Rodney S. Page, J.,
which divorced parties, awarded custody,
awarded child support and alimony, and
divided property. The Court of Appeals,
Davidson, J., held that: (1) federal income
tax exemptions could not be awarded to
husband where custody was awarded to
wife; (2) awards of child support and alimony were inadequate; (3) husband's medical
degree was not subject to valuation distribution; but (4) wife was entitled to equitable distribution to recognize her contributions and sacrifices while husband obtained medical degree.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part,
and remanded.

3. Divorce <3=*227(2)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding wife only $2,500 in attorney
fees, even though she had asked for over
$7,800, where extensive fees were generated by interest and preparation of expert
testimony offered to support valuation of
husband's medical degree which was rejected by the lower court.
4. Divorce <s=»308
Award of child support in the amount
of $300 per child was inadequate to the
extent that it was less than $600 per month
per child in view of father's annual income
of $100,000.

5. Divorce «=>312.6(9)
Although trial court's findings of fact
did not fully address child support factors,
that was not reversible error where the
totality of the factual evidence in the
record made the need for child support
clear.

Jackson, J., dissented and filed an opinion.

1. Husband and Wife «=>279<1)
Prior to entry of divorce decree, father
was entitled to exemptions for two children
as stipulated by the parties in separation
agreement in
1983.
26
U.S.C.A.
§ 152{eX4XB).
2. Divorce <*=»297
Although parties had stipulated in separation agreement in 1983 that father could

6. Divorce <3=3247
Award of alimony in the amount of
$400 per month for a period of five years
was inadequate to the extent that it was
less than $750 per month and to the extent
that it was not continuing, in view of husband's income of $100,000 per year.
7. Divorce <3=>252.3(1)
Medical degree is not subject to valuation and distribution in a divorce.

A-16

70

Utah

754 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

8. Divorce <s=»252.3(l)
Where wife had provided some income
and had provided care of children while
husband obtained medical degree, wife was
entitled to an award of "equitable restitution/' in addition to traditional alimony, to
allow her to share the newly obtained earning capacity of her husband, who had
achieved that capacity through the significant efforts and sacrifices which the wife
had made and which were detrimental to
the wife's development
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

9. Divorce <3=>252.3(1)
Equitable restitution to spouse for sacrifices made while then spouse obtains education which leads to greatly increased income is not to be awarded in case where
marriage has lasted for many years after
the professional degree has been attained
as, in such a case, sufficient assets will
have been accumulated and appropriate distribution to the requesting spouse will enable that spouse to share in the economic
benefits earned as a result of the professional degree.
10. Divorce <3=>252.3(1)
Factors to be analyzed in determining
an award of equitable restitution to spouse
who has made significant efforts and sacrifices to enable other spouse to obtain professional degree are the length of the marriage, the financial contributions and personal development sacrifices made by the
requesting spouse, the duration of those
contributions and sacrifices during the
marriage, resulting disparity in earning capacity between the requesting spouse and
the spouse benefited thereby, and the
amount of property accumulated during
the marriage.
11. Divorce e=»252.3(l)
Award of equitable restitution to one
spouse to recognize contributions and sacrifices made to enable the other spouse to
obtain a professional degree will not terminate upon the requesting spouse's remarriage and may be payable in lump sum or
periodically over time, depending on the
circumstances of each case.

Neil C. Crist (argued), for Hansen, Crist
& Spratley, Bountiful, for plaintiff and appellant
Yasemin M. Salahor, Paul H. Liapis,
Kent M. Kasting (argued), Salt Lake City,
for defendant and respondent
Before JACKSON, BILLINGS and
DAVIDSON, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals from a decree of divorce
entered by the Second District Court We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
The parties were married on June 22,
1968; subsequently, three children were
born. At the time of marriage, both plaintiff and defendant were high school graduates and defendant was serving as an enlisted man in the U.S. Army. After defendant's discharge from the service, he accepted employment at Hill Air Force Base,
Utah where he worked as an instrument
repair mechanic with an annual gross salary of approximately $10,000.00. Defendant
began his higher education in 1970. Defendant testified the parties discussed his
pursuit of a degree and that plaintiff
thought it was a "good idea" but that she
"wasn't terribly in favor of it" because it
would be time consuming. Plaintiff testified she was in favor of the decision because the family would "have a better future." Defendant completed his undergraduate program five and one-half years
later. During this phase of his education,
defendant supported the family on his
wages and G.L BUI benefits. Plaintiff
gave birth to children in 1970, 1971, and
1975.
While an undergraduate, defendant de
cided to apply to medical school. The par6
ties agree that defendant's application to
medical school threatened their marriage!
Plaintiff was concerned that defendant's
lack of employment during four years
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would be financially detrimental to the appropriate adjustments" in the support
family and that medical school would se- agreement in the event of future changes
verely limit defendant's ability to "spend in financial circumstances.
much time" with the children and plaintiff.
After plaintiff hired new counsel, she
Seeing that defendant was adamant, plainfiled a verified amended complaint in Notiff agreed to "stick by him" during the vember 1983, in which the distribution of
next four years believing that, as a result the tax exemptions remained the same. On
of their mutual sacrifices, the family would May 9, 1985, however, plaintiff filed a moeventually enjoy a higher standard of liv- tion for leave to amend the complaint
ing.
which was subsequently granted. This
Defendant entered medical school in 1977 amendment listed defendant's salary as
and graduated in 1981. Family support $100,000.00 per annum and requested that
was derived from student loans, savings, the child support and alimony awards rethe remainder of defendant's G.I. Bill en- flect the significant increase in defendant's
titlement, $7,000.00 from defendant's moth- income. Plaintiff requested attorney fees
er's estate, and income from plaintiffs and costs which would reflect the current
part-time employment.
state of the litigation as opposed to that
Upon completion of medical school, de- anticipated in 1983. Plaintiff also requestfendant accepted an internship in Pennsyl- ed the trial court to strike the previously
vania. Plaintiff reluctantly left Utah. The proposed distribution of federal tax exempfamily's first residence in Pennsylvania tions for the children.
was in an isolated location with no teleTrial to the court was held on May 31,
phone and no playmates for the children.
1985.
The decree of divorce awarded cusThe family then rented a home in a larger
tody
of
the children to plaintiff subject to
town and plaintiff sought employment to
reasonable
visitation. Plaintiff received
supplement defendant's salary as an intern.
$300.00
per
month
per child in child support
Plaintiff testified that she found a position
subject
to
an
abatement
of $100.00 per
at a fast food restaurant but defendant did
month
per
child
in
the
event
that a child
not want her to work there because it
should
live
with
defendant
for
an extended
would be embarrassing. Because of the
friction between the parties and defend- period. The distribution of tax exemptions
ant's admitted relationship with another was as initially agreed in the stipulation
woman, plaintiff requested they seek mari- and separation settlement Alimony was
tal counseling but defendant refused. Be- awarded in the amount of $400.00 per
cause of plaintiffs lack of prospects for month for a period of five years being
suitable employment in Pennsylvania and nonterminable for a period of three years
the marital discord, plaintiff and the chil- even if plaintiff remarried. Plaintiff was
dren returned to the family home in Utah awarded attorney fees in the amount of
to wait for defendant to finish his medical $2,500.00. Plaintiff was also awarded the
training. Although plaintiff understood home subject to a mortgage and an eqdefendant intended to practice medicine in uitable lien in favor of defendant for the
Utah, defendant completed his training and sum of $17,528.00 payable upon the occurrence of enumerated, future contingencies.
accepted employment in Pennsylvania.
The award of the home to plaintiff necessiPlaintiff filed a verified complaint for
tated that she continue to make monthly
divorce on February 15,1983. In a stipulamortgage payments of $309.00.
tion and separation agreement, signed by
the parties and filed with the court on July
Plaintiff presents the following issues
29, 1983, plaintiff agreed defendant could for review: (1) did the award to defendant
claim federal tax exemptions for two of the of the two tax exemptions violate federal
children while she retained the exemption law; (2) were the awards of attorney fees,
for the third child. The settlement agree- child support, and alimony so inadequate as
ment also recognized the need to "make to constitute an abuse of discretion; and (3)
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is defendant's medical degree marital property subject to division?
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME TAX
EXEMPTIONS
Plaintiff contends the distribution of
state and federal income tax exemptions
for two of the children to defendant violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution in light of the 1984 Tax Reform Act and its effect on 26 U.S.C.
§ 152(e) (1988).1
Subsection 152(eXl) describes the normal
situation where a custodial parent claims
the tax exemption for a child. An exception is provided in subsection 152(eX4XA).
The noncustodial parent may claim the exemption when there is a qualified pre-1985
instrument between the parents which
states that the noncustodial parent shall be
entitled to the exemption for the child and
that parent provides at least $600.00 yearly
for the child's support The definition of a
qualified pre-1985 instrument is stated in
subsection 152(eX4XB) as:
For purposes of this paragraph, the term
"qualified pre-1985 instrument" means
any decree of divorce or separate maintenance or written agreement—
(i) which is executed before January 1,
1985,
(ii) which on such date contains the provision described in subparagraph (AXO,
and
(iii) which is not modified on or after
such date in a modification which expressly provides that this paragraph
shall not apply to such decree or agreement
[1] The parties stipulated to the distribution of-the tax exemptions for the children in a separation agreement filed with
the court in 1983. The distribution was
incorporated in the verified amended complaint also filed that year. Subparagraphs
(i) and (ii) of subsection 152(eX4XB) are
satisfied by the 1983 filings. There was no
written modification prior to January 1,
1985, which expressly revoked the distribu1. The decree of divorce utilizes the term "deduction" and the United States Code utilizes "exemption" when referring to the individual al-

tion of tax exemptions during the perkx
the stipulation and separation agreemen
was in effect Therefore, defendant wai
entitled to the two exemptions as stipulate*
prior to the entry of the decree of divorce
[2] However, plaintiffs amended com
plaint in 1985 put the distribution of ta:
exemptions at issue in the divorce proceed
ing. The provisions of the separatioi
agreement were no longer effective. Plain
tiff requested the tax exemptions formal
three children but the trial court's order dk
not honor that request This result is con
trary to the general provisions of section
152(e). Any argument that the stipulatioi
and separation agreement qualifies a s ^
pre-1985 instrument, where plaintiff w&J
ingly relinquishes her right to the exemp
tions under federal law, neglects plaintifft
rejection of its terms in the post-divorct
period. By amending her complaint, plain
tiff modified and affirmatively rejected tK
pre-divorce distribution. Plaintiff is eriti
tied to the tax exemptions for all of th<
children in view of the award of custody tx
her and the failure of defendant to estab
lish any exception to the general rule stat
ed above.
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
[3] Plaintiff argues the trial couri
abused its discretion in awarding attorney
fees of only $2,500.00 when she asked foi
$7,871.00. Plaintiff clearly demonstrated I
need for assistance. The court recognizee
that need by making the award- However,
the court considered a written statement oi
attorney fees as a basis for the award
Extensive fees were generated by interest
and preparation of the expert testimony
offered to support the valuation of the
medical degree. That argument waa-rej
jected by the lower court We find nc
abuse of discretion in the award
Because defendant did not cross appea
on this issue, we do not consider whetha
there was sufficient evidence presented tt
the trial court to justify any award of atto?
lowance subtracted from income when comput
ing tax owed.
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ney fees. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987).

economic reality, the children who reside
with their mother will not enjoy a standard
of living remotely comparable to that of
AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT
their father.
[4] Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3,-4
The award established by the trial court
(1987) establish the obligation of both parcannot
be justified when applying the
ents to support their children and "[a]
factors
listed in Utah Code Ann.
child's right to that support is paramount"
§
7&-45-7(2)
(1987).3 We find plaintiff and
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394
(Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court con- her children are left in a precariously baltinued "The trial court may fashion such ancedfinancialexistence while defendant is
equitable orders in relation to the children relatively affluent Plaintiff and the chiland their support as is reasonable and nec- dren are in great need of assistance. The
essary, considering not only the needs of defendant has no responsibility for the supthe children, but also the ability of the port of anyone other than plaintiff, the
parent to pay." Id. Plaintiff contends the children, and himself.
award of $300.00 per month per chfld was
At the present time the courts of this
so inordinately low that it constituted an state do not have uniform guidelines to
abuse of discretion by the trial court We employ in determining an award of child
agree.
support4 Many other jurisdictions, howThe trial court found defendant's gross ever, have established child support guideincome was $100,000.00 per annum or lines or schedules, based upon current eco$8,333.00 per month, at the time of the nomic data as to the cost of rearing childivorce, while it determined plaintiffs dren, to be used by trial courts. Although
gross income was $1,033.00 per month.2 we do not use the numbers or approaches
The court found that plaintiff had monthly in fashioning the award in this case, a
expenditures of $2,050.00 and was in need general comparison illustrates the inadeof financial assistance from defendant to quacy of the award. Because these formuassist the children "in maintaining a stan- las are based upon adjusted incomes, we
dard of living more comparable to that cannot directly compare the numbers.
enjoyed by their father."
Nevertheless, it is clear that under each,
Assuming the three children spend the the support would be much higher. For
majority of the year with plaintiff, her example, in Colorado, an income shares
gross monthly income, including awarded guideline state, the award would be approxchild support and alimony, is $2,333.00. imately $1,535.00. Under Wisconsin's
After taxes have been deducted from the Child Support Guidelines, which were reportions of income subject to taxation, cently adopted by our neighboring states of
plaintiffs net monthly income approxi- Idaho and Nevada, where only the noncusmates her meager monthly expenses leav- todial parent's income is considered and
ing no leeway for emergencies, presently where 29% of gross income is the presumpnecessary replacement expenditures, or tive award, the child support for the three
any amenities of life. Under such grim children would be $2,320.00.
2. The lower court also found that plaintiff expected a 25% reduction in her salary because of
a voluntary transfer to a less stressful position
within her employment
3. Section 78-45-7(2) lists the following factors
to be considered in awarding prospective support:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;

(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the
support of others.
4. This Court notes, however, that a Task Force
established by the Judicial Council is presently
investigating the propriety of adopting Uniform
Child Support Guidelines for Utah based upon
current economic data.

74

Utah

754 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

[5] Under the economic circumstances
of this case, the award of child support is
inequitable and must be modified. The dissent argues the case must be remanded to
determine the children's need and the ability of each party to pay child support We
note the findings of fact do not fully address the child support factors. However,
we believe this not to be reversible error
because the totality of the factual evidence
in the record is "clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of the judgment" of the need for
child support. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996, 999 (Utah 1987); Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 202 (Utah App.1987).
The record is also replete with the financial
needs of the children and the relative abilities of plaintiff and defendant to meet
those needs. Nothing could be gained by a
remand for this purpose except a delay of
the increased award. Basal upon the
above reasoning, we award the sum of
$€00M per month per child, support to
continue to age 21 if the child is a full time
student and not married.5 On remand, the
trial court shall enter its order for child
support in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5.1 (1987).
AWARD OF ALIMONY
[61 The standard of review relating to
alimony requires that we not disturb the
trial court's award unless "such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion." English v. English,
565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). The Utah
Supreme Court in that often quoted case
states that "the most important function of
alimony is to provide support for the wife
as nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during marriage, and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public
charge/' J(L at 411, The Court continued
that a trial court should consider "the financial conditions and needs of the wife,
the ability of the wife to produce a suffi5. The award to age 21 was made by the trial
court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1
(1986).
6. A review of plaintiffs expenses shows them to
be extremely low and based upon what she

cient income for herself; and the ability <rf
the husband to provide support" Id at
411-12.
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah
1985), the Court conducted an extensive
analysis of these three factors. Although
the trial judge carefully considered the
factors outlined in Jones, because plaintiff
and the children were living in an artificially depressed standard of living, the award
of only $400.00 per month of terminable
alimony is inadequate. We refuse to penalize plaintiff for trying to live within her
means and failing to show higher necesh
sary expenses.*
An application of one of the English
standards could justify the award made In
this case. Plaintiff endured a poor standard of living during the marriage. She
had little money to spend then so she
should have little now. That result will
preserve "the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage." But such a result
is unfair. A divorce court is a court of
equity. It is not equitable to preserve the
status of limited income for one party and
affluence for the other when the one sacrificed to help the other achieve such affluence. When the totality of the English
standards are applied the award is clearly
inadequate.
The court below also abused its discretion in limiting the award of alimony to a
period of five years; being nonterminable
by reason of remarriage for three years.
In Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah
1985), the Utah Supreme Court analyzed a
similar fact situation wherein the plaintiff
wife was a high school graduate and had
spent the majority of the marriage bearing
and rearing the parties' six children. Defendant husband was a well paid consultant who provided his services to governmental agencies on a contract basis. While
affirming the award of alimony in the
amount of $1,600.00 per month, the Court
modified the award by striking its two-year
actually spent rather than estimates of what she
needed to sustain herself and her children at a
reasonable standard of living based upon the
total family income.
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limitation and making the alimony perma- from the increased earning capacity affordnent subject to future changed circum- ed by the medical degree and the numerous
stances. In support of its modification, the years the Gardners enjoyed the standard of
Court pointed to the wife's limited edu- living afforded by the medical degree.
cation, her lack of work experience, and That is not the case here. The Court notthat she had "no reasonable expectation of ed, "The cases which have refused to hold
obtaining employment two years hence that that professional degrees and practice conwill enable her to support herself at a stitute marital property subject to valuastandard of living even approaching that tion and distribution have nonetheless aswhich she had during the marriage." Id. sessed and divided the value of the degree
at 567. See also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d or practice on the basis of other legal and
96, 103 (Utah 1986).
equitable remedies." Id. at 1080-81. The
For the reasons stated previously and Court described the common fact pattern
based upon the facts in the record, we hold applicable to this acknowledgment of the
that plaintiff is entitled to an award of degree's equitable worth as a situation
alimony on a continuing basis and we where "the husband is supported throughaward permanent alimony in the sum of out a long graduate or professional pro$750.00 per month subject to the provisions gram by the working wife, and the couple
of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987).
is divorced soon after graduation. In such
cases, there are few marital assets to disTHE MEDICAL DEGREE AND
tribute, and the courts have considered othAWARD OF EQUITABLE
er ways of compensating the spouse." Id.
RESTITUTION
at 1081. This is essentially the situation
[7] We next must determine whether presented here. While this marriage has
defendant's medical degree is marital prop- continued for many years the only assets
erty subject to division. In the recent case are the home and the enhanced earning
of Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 capacity of defendant The earning capaci(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court dis- ty must be recognized in fashioning those
cussed this problem and noted that there is "legal and equitable remedies" necessary
authority from other jurisdictions on both to assist plaintiff to readjust her life. The
sides of the issue. However, this Court, in valuation and distribution of the medical
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 239-42 degree in this case is not a viable alterna(Utah App.1987) and Ray burn v. Ray burn,
tive. Valuation would be speculative in the
738 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah App.1987), anaextreme, and distribution ignores the fact
lyzed the issue and held that a medical
7
degree is not marital property subject to that the degree is personal to defendant
division in a divorce decree. We agree We prefer to follow the majority rule, upwith the Utah Supreme Court "that an held in Petersen and Rayburn, that a medieducational or professional degree is diffi- cal degree is not subject to valuation and
cult to value and that such a valuation does distribution in a divorce. However, this
not easily fit the common understanding of case is a striking example of a highly paid
the character of property." Gardner, 748 professional disposing of his wife with a
P.2d at 1081. The Court in Gardner was minimum amount of support just as that
not required to address the issue because professional is reaching a level of income
there was significant other property accu- for which both the professional and his
mulated during the marriage resulting wife have striven. This prevents the wife
7. It is argued that estimating the value of a
medical degree is no more speculative than
measuring damages in a wrongful death case.
However, in wrongful death, the measurement
begins at death and is subject to no future
variables introduced by the decedent. Here, we
must guess at the future course of defendant's
career. Will he continue to practice in the same

specialty in the same locale? A future decision
or happenstance could totally change or even
terminate the value of the medical degree. Can
defendant then return to court to change the
valuation and distribution based upon the more
certain circumstances? Could plaintiff prevent
defendant from making decisions which could
impact the value of the degree?
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from enjoying the benefit of her labor and
tions and sacrifices of the one spouse in
sacrifice in support of her husband's goals.
enabling the other to attain a degree
See generally L. Weitzman, The Divorce
have been compensated by many years
Revolution, ch. 5, 124-35 (1985).
of the comfortable lifestyle which the
degree permitted. Traditional alimony
From the time of the marriage in 1968
analysis works nicely to assure equity in
until their separation in 1982, the parties
such cases.
enjoyed few of the material pleasures of
life. The court found that 'During the 14
In another kind of recurring case, typiyears that the parties lived together, plainfied by Graham [In re Marriage ofGra
tiff assisted extensively in Defendant's obham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978JV
taining a college education, medical degree
where divorce occurs shortly after the.
and internship. In addition, plaintiff made
degree is obtained, traditional alimony
substantial sacrifices in order to facilitate
analysis would often work hardship bethe completion of Defendant's medical
cause, while both spouses have modest
schooling and internship."8 Plaintiff acincomes at the time of divorce, the one is
cepted the sacrifices necessary to support
on the [threshold] of a significant indefendant's aspirations in anticipation of
crease in earnings. Moreover, the
future benefits. The trial record shows the
spouse who sacrificed so the other could
following exchange:
attain a degree is precluded from enjoy*
Q. Okay. Was there any discussion of
ing the anticipated dividends the degree
future benefits that would be obtained
will ordinarily provide
In such
through this?
cases, alimony analysis must become
A. Yes. He [defendant] told me that if
more creative to achieve fairness, and an
I would sacrifice, and if I would see it
award of "rehabilitative" or "reimburse-'
through, that someday he would make it
ment" alimony, not terminable upon reup to me and we would have material
marriage, may be appropriate. See, e.g^
items that we had gone without. And
Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343
his hours would be flexible and he would
N.W.2d 796 (1984); Mahoney v. Mahohave more time to spend with himself
ney, 91 N J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
and the children. If we would just be Id at n. 4. This is the situation where our
patient.
analysis "must become more creative to
Defendant offered no rebuttal to the ex- achieve fairness." Id. Equity demands a
change.
recognition of the sacrifices and contribuThis Court in Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242, tions made by plaintiff in support of deforesaw the situation now at issue. Writ- fendant's medical education. The defending for the Court, Judge Orme recognized ant has been enriched by plaintiffs efforts
that an occasion might arise whereby one and, therefore, plaintiff has earned an
spouse was reaching a high level of income award of some permanent financial benefit,
just at the time of divorce rather than the in her own right, that will allow her to
more frequent situation in which the par- share in the economic benefits achieved
ties had enjoyed the benefits of the hus- through their joint efforts. The modified
band's medical education for a number of award of traditional alimony merely mainyears. Judge Orme wrote:
tains plaintiff on a plane modestly above
In cases like the instant one, life pat- that experienced by the parties during the
terns have largely been set, the earning marriage. Even this modest award may be
potential of both parties can be predicted lost through the happening of some future
with some reliability, and the contribu- circumstance.* The dissent would restrict
8. We must wonder whether defendant could
have or would have entered and completed
medical school had plaintiff obtained a divorce
earlier. Defendant likely would have been obligated to pay alimony mod child support. He
would probably not have had the benefit of the

family home and surely would not have had the
benefit of plaintiffs part-time work.
: \
9. Traditional alimony forces the recipient,to
make future choices with the understanding
that such choices may result in the loss of all-,
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plaintiff to an award of traditional alimony
based upon defendant's newly acquired level of income. Because there has been little
property accumulated and because the income was acquired after separation, plaintiff is entitled to a more permanent remedy.
This issue has engendered much case
law. Many courts have held that a professional degree is not marital property subject to distribution but nevertheless believe
some remedy must be created for the
spouse who supported the attainment of
that degree. A threshold factor is the
meaning of "support" when the term is
applied to the efforts of the non-professional spouse. Must "support" equate to direct
financial assistance provided through full
time employment while the student spouse
devotes his or her full time efforts to
course work? Is "support" rendered by a
spouse whose full time activities are devoted to providing a home environment for the
student spouse and family? Here, plaintiff
bore the children, was the principal in providing child care and maintaining the domestic setting, and was also employed parttime for several years whUe defendant attended medical school. To hold that plaintiffs only value is the income she generates ignores the value of her contributions
in every other aspect of family life. The
logical conclusion is that motherhood and
nurturing of children is valueless; that preserving and maintaining a home is worthless; that the functions of mother, homemaker, and helpmate contribute nothing of
value to a family. We refuse to so limit
our definition of support Certainly, our
Supreme Court in analyzing traditional
property distributions has never limited a
wife to recovering only what she monetarily contributed to the marriage. Huck v.
Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986). We hold
in accordance with the court's finding that

plaintiff contributed to and supported defendant's educational achievements.
The case law remedies in this situation
establish a spectrum, from those narrowly
focusing on financial support provided to
the professional spouse, while he or she
was a student, to those which consider the
totality of the non-professional spouse's efforts in the family venture to obtain economic stability through education. For example, in Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 747, the
wife was allowed to recover from her physician husband contributions to his direct
support, school and professional training
expenses, plus reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation.
A case recognizing more than strict financial contributions is Saint-Pierre v.
Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.1984),
in which the Supreme Court of South Dakota held, "in a proper case," the trial court
should consider "all relevant factors" in
awarding "reimbursement or rehabilitative
alimony." These included "the amount of
the supporting spouse's contributions, his
or her foregone opportunities to enhance or
improve professional or vocational skills,
and the duration of the marriage following
completion of the nonsupporting spouse's
professional education." Id. at 262.
In Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash.2d
168, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (Wash.1984), the
Supreme Court of Washington listed and
analyzed several factors the trial court
must consider "in determining the proper
amount of compensation for the supporting
spouse." These include the supporting
spouse's contributions for direct educational costs, no more than one-half what the
couple would have earned had "the efforts
of the student spouse not been directed
towards his or her studies," "[a]ny educational or career opportunities which the
supporting spouse gave up in order to ob-

mony. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-5(5) and
(6) (1987). No one should be forced into making such choices, particularly when the other
party, who enjoys his position through the joint
efforts of both parties, is under no similar refrictions on behavior. We note what the Oklahoma Supreme Court wrote in Hubbard v. Hub
°*rd, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979). when responding to the argument that the wife's recovery

from her physician husband, whom she helped
through medical school, be limited to alimony
for support and maintenance. The per curiam
decision reasoned T o do so would force her to
forego remarriage and perhaps even be celibate
for many years simply to realize a return on her
investments and sacrifices of the past twelve
years." Id at 752 (footnote omitted).
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tain sufficiently lucrative employment, or
to move to the city where the student
spouse wished to attend school[,]" and
"[t]he future earning prospects of each
spouse, including the earning potential of
the student spouse with the professional
degree."
Wisconsin statutes allow a trial court to
grant an order requiring maintenance pay.
ments to either party after considering several factors. Among these are:
(4) The educational level of each party at
the time of marriage and at the time
the action is commenced.
(5) The earning capacity of the party
seeking maintenance, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of
absence from the job market, custodial
responsibilities for children and the
time and expense necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employment
(6) The feasibility that the party seeking
maintenance can become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably
comparable to that enjoyed during th$
marriage, and, if so, the length of tim$
necessary to achieve this goal.
(8) Any mutual agreement made by th$
parties before or during the marriage,
according to the terms of which on$
party has made financial or service
contributions to the other with the expectation of reciprocation or other com^
pensation in the future, where such
repayment has not been made, or any
mutual agreement made by the parties
before or during the marriage concerns
ing any arrangement for the financial
support of the parties.
10. We emphasize the specific nature of the fact$
presented in this case and stress that equitable
restitution would not be awarded in the more;
frequent case where the marriage lasted for
many years after the professional degree had;
been granted. There; sufficient assets would
have been accumulated and an appropriate distribution to the requesting spouse would enable;

(9) The contribution by one party to the
education, training or increased earn*
ing power of the other.
Wis.Stat. § 767.26 (1982), See also Haugan
v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d
796, 800-01 n. 4 (Wis.1984).
[8,9] Clearly, some jurisdictions which
require courts to examine and value the
contributions to a marriage partner's development. This appears to be the fair and
equitable approach. Therefore, we hold
that plaintiff is entitled to an award of
"equitable restitution" in addition to traditional alimony. We use the term equitable
restitution to describe the award in order to
establish a clear distinction between it and
traditional alimony or any other form .of
spousal maintenance or support The function of equitable restitution is to enables
spouse to share the newly obtained earning capacity of a former spouse who has
achieved that capacity through the significant efforts and sacrifices of the requesting spouse which were detrimental to that
spouse's development It is nothing more
than an equitable sharing of the rewards of
both parties' common efforts and expectations.10
[10,11] Factors to be analyzed in determining an award of equitable restitution
include, but are not limited to: (1) the
length of the marriage; (2) the financial
contributions and personal development
sacrifices made by the requesting spouse;
(3) the duration of these contributions and
sacrifices during the marriage; (4) the resulting disparity in earning capacity between the requesting spouse and the
spouse benefited thereby, and (5) the
amount of property accumulated during
the marriage.11 An award of equitable restitution will not terminate upon plaintiffs
remarriage, and may be payable in lump
that spouse to share in the economic benefits
earned as a result of the degree.
11. Because this case establishes a new form of
spousal award, we hesitate to state that the
enumerated factors in determining equitable
restitution are all inclusive as of the writing of
this opinion. See Biswell v. Duncan, 742 ?J2d
80, 86 n. 5 (Utah App.1987).
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sum or periodically over time depending on
the circumstances of each case.12
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
case is remanded to the trial court for the
purpose of taking any further evidence
that may be necessary to determine the
amount of equitable restitution to be
awarded to plaintiff and its manner of payment and for entry of judgment pursuant
to this opinion. Costs against defendant
BILLINGS, J., concurs.
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully and loyally dissent.
Loyal to the majority, but not to their
opinion, I flag their decision as being at the
forefront of judicial activism. I regret that
I could not dissuade my colleagues from
breaking new ground with the invention of
"equitable restitution." The opinion manufactures a divorce remedy that is (1) outside our statutory scheme;l (2) without
precedent in the pronouncements of the
Utah Supreme Court; (3) not requested by
the appellant;2 (4) forced on the trial
courts for further development; (5) not
needed to do justice to the parties in this
case and may, in fact, work inequity.
EQUITABLE RESTITUTION
OR SUPPORT
In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237
(Utah App.1987), this court held that an
advanced degree is not marital property
12. For example, in following the Utah Supreme
Court's admonishment against unnecessarily tying a couple together after divorce as stated in
Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1079, defendant's lien on
the family home might be extinguished and the
amount credited against the overall award of
equitable restitution. We recognize that this
would probably be only a fraction of the total
amount of equitable restitution awarded.
!• The majority acknowledges the existence of
our divorce statutes in remanding the child support and alimony issues. The majority states:
(•) "On remand, the trial court shall enter its
order for child support in accordance with Utah
Code Aim. § 30-3-5.1 (1987)," i.c, raise the total
•mount of child support from $900 to $1,800
Per month; (b) *[W]e award permanent alimo-

subject to division upon divorce, even
where this achievement has been made possible through the assistance of the other
spouse. We have, nonetheless, acknowledged that there may be situations where
equity demands an extraordinary award of
nonterminable rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony in order to compensate a
spouse who "endure[s] substantial financial
sacrifices or defeifs] her own education to
help" the other spouse in obtaining an advanced degree. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738
P.2d 238, 241 (Utah App.1987). This might
occur where: (a) the parties mutually endeavor to increase one spouse's earning
capacity, but at the time of trial the spouse
who has benefitted from the parties' endeavors is merely on the threshold of a
substantial increase in earnings, Petersen,
737 P.2d at 242 n* 4; or (b) there is insufficient marital property from which to make
a compensatory award to the contributing
spouse. See Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988). In such
cases, the spouse who has made substantial
financial sacrifices and contributions to increase the earning capacity of the other
spouse is entitled to recompense for those
contributions that are beyond the duty of
support normally associated with marriage,
less any benefits received. See, e.g., Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis.2d 17, 318 N.W.2d
358 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ.
488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
Decisions from other jurisdictions involving compensation of the spouse who has
contributed to the attainment of an adny in the sum of $750 per month subject to the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987),"
Lc, increase alimony from the $400 awarded by
the trial court. However, no statute is cited as
the basis for equitable restitution. Our divorce
statutes and case law authorize only the distribution of property and an award of support for
the benefit of the spouse and children. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 30-3-1 to -10.6 (1987).
2. Mrs. Martinez argued both at trial and on
appeal that a professional degree is a property
interest subject to division upon divorce. Since
equitable restitution was not a part of Utah law
until this majority opinion was crafted, the trial
was not conducted and the evidence was not
presented under that theory.
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vanced degree have generally involved four
factors:
[F]irst, they share the loss of the husband's foregone earnings during the period of investment; second, the wife provides the financial capital to enable her
husband to forego those earnings; third,
she may forego opportunities to further
the development of her own earning capacity; fourth, and most significantly,
they both expect to gain a return on the
full costs of the investment through continuation of the marriage. Thus, the
working spouse predicates her sacrifice
of income and personal educational advancement on the expectation of future
returns to her from sharing in her husband's enhanced earning capacity.
Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing
Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for
the Marital Investor in Human Capital,
28 Kan.L.Rev. 379, 380 (1980).
The extraordinary award fashioned by
the majority in this case is inappropriate
for several reasons. First, Mrs. Martinez
did not provide the financial capital that
enabled her husband to attain his college
and advanced degree. Instead, Dr. Martinez provided the bulk of the family's financial support, in addition to paying for
his education. This is not the classic
"working spouse/student spouse" situation
necessitating an extraordinary award.
See, e.g., Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d
747 (Okla.1979); Haugan v. Haugan, 117
Wis.2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d 796, 799-800
(1984); Roberto, 318 N.W.2d 358.
Second, no evidence was presented that
Mrs. Martinez deferred her own career or
education in order to advance the education
of her husband. Both parties had only
high school educations at the time of marriage. Mrs. Martinez testified at trial that
she wanted to continue her own education
someday but had not yet begun doing so,
even though her employer would pay threefourths of her school costs and would allow
her to continue working.
While Mrs. Martinez raised the children
and performed the household responsibilities, Dr. Martinez provided the family's primary financial support in the form of his

inheritance monies, funds from student
loans (which the trial court required him to
repay), and proceeds from his G.I. Bill.
Mrs. Martinez worked part-time during
three of the seventeen years of their marriage. Her nominal total earnings of approximately $2,300 were applied to family
living expenses. During the marriage, the
family took modest vacations, purchased
two homes, furniture and furnishings, and
two automobiles. Equity simply does not
demand an extraordinary remedy in this
case because no extraordinary injustice is
present
Even if Mrs. Martinez had made substantial financial contributions or educational
sacrifices in order to further her husband's
education and career, there are other reasons why the creation of a new hybrid
award of equitable restitution is not warranted in this case. Unlike the hypothetical case contemplated by this court in Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n. 4, in which the
spouse with an advanced degree is only on
the threshold of reaping an enhanced income at the time of the parties' divorce, Dr.
Martinez was already earning a gross annual income of $100,000. He is not merely
at the threshold of significant earnings; he
is already standing in the parlor. In addition, the parties here accumulated real and
personal property from which a compensatory property award could be made: $34,561 equity in a home; three vehicles worth
$3,995; an IRA account valued at $2,000;
stocks of unknown value; and household
furnishings valued at $6,500. The presence
of both substantial earnings and accumulated property at the time of the divorce
provides an adequate basis for rendering
an extraordinary remedy, if Mrs. Martinez
is entitled to recompense.
On the facts presented in this case, there
are additional reasons why I believe the
majority's disposition of this appeal is misguided: (1) equity can be achieved under
current alimony and property distribution
statutes and case law; (2) an award of
equitable restitution coupled with the majority's generous alimony and child support
awards is double-dipping; and (3) an award
of equitable restitution, in effect, treats the

MARTINEZ v. MARTINEZ

Utah

81

Cite a* 754 PJ2d 69 (UUhApp. 1988)

professional education as "property" subject to division upon dissolution of a marriage.
First, in fashioning an award of alimony,
the trial court must consider the financial
condition and needs of the recipient
spouse,3 the ability of that spouse to be
self-supporting, and the ability of the other
spouse to pay. Paffel v. PaffeU 732 P.2d
96,100-01 (Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).
Dr. and Mrs. Martinez were married for
approximately seventeen years. The trial
court found that Dr. Martinez incurs expenses associated with his employment of
approximately $7,000 per year, leaving approximately $93,000 annually or $7,750 per
month. Mrs. Martinez earned approximately $1,033 per month and estimated
that she required $2,050 per month to meet
the expenses for herself and the three children. Under the temporary support order,
she had been receiving $1,100 per month in
child support. She sought additional monies to make up the difference between her
net earnings and expenses and to provide
her with the means to make major house
repairs. In the event that a professional
degree was not viewed as a marital asset,
she sought an alimony award not subject to
termination upon remarriage.
The trial court stated that it considered
the large disparity between the parties'
respective earning abilities and the fact
that the wife's resources were inadequate
to meet her needs. However, I agree with
Mrs. Martinez that the trial court failed to
apply these factors correctly in that the
award of $400 per month alimony, nonter3. In determining the "need" of the recipient
nonstudent spouse, the trial court is not limited
to considering only the low living expenses incurred during the time that the other spouse
studied to obtain an advanced degree. The
Utah Supreme Court recently stated in Gardner,
a case also involving an advanced degree, that
alimony should "equalize the parties' respective
standards of living and maintain them at a level
as close as possible to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage." Gardner, 748
P.2d at 1081; accord Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d
669, 671 (Utah App.1987); Petersen, 737 ?2d at
239; Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah
1985); Higley v. Higley, 676 PJZd 379, 381 (Utah
1983). Although Gardner involved a marriage

minable for three years and continuing for
a period of five years, is so low as to
constitute a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion. Mrs. Martinez earns $1,033
gross income per month. The alimony
awarded by the trial court, plus her net
monthly earnings of $846, provides her
with approximately $1,246 with which to
meet her monthly expenses, excluding
sums awarded for child support. In contrast, Dr. Martinez enjoys approximately
$7,750 gross monthly income. Considering
the disparate earning capacities, the trial
court's alimony award was insufficient and
inequitable in that it failed to provide the
parties with a comparable standard of living.
Second, based on Dr. Martinez's earnings
at the time of trial, the majority has increased total child support from $900 to
$1,800 and increased the duration and
amount of alimony to a permanent award
of $750 per month. An award of equitable
restitution on top of the already generous
awards of alimony and child support fashioned by the majority is duplicative and not
necessary to achieve equity.
Finally, an advanced degree is the memorialization of an individual's "attainment of
the skill, qualification and educational
background which is the prerequisite of the
enhanced earning capacity."
Wehrkamp
v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264, 266 (S.D.
1984); cf. Petersen, 737 P.2d at 240 (quoting In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo.
429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (en banc)). The
value of an advanced degree lies in the
potential for increased earnings made possible by the degree and by other factors
in which the parties enjoyed a high standard of
living for many years prior to the divorce, the
language of Gardner was clearly aimed at preventing the divorced spouse of a high income
earner from suffering a major decline in standard of living following a divorce. This language should not be construed as prohibiting a
trial court from making an award that raises the
recipient spouse's standard of living from what
it was during the marriage where, as here, the
student spouse experiences a major increase in
earnings just prior to the marriage's termination. In other words, the "need" of the recipient spouse in this situation is not necessarily
what he or she managed to live on during the
lean school years.
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and conditions of employment If the advanced degree itself does not fall within
the classification of marital "property" subject to distribution upon divorce, then neither should an individual's enhanced earning capacity. Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa.Super.Ct 151, 486 A.2d 951 (1984); Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d at 266; Stern v. Stern,
66 N J . 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
The majority declares that:
The function of equitable restitution is to
enable a spouse to share the newly obtained earning capacity of a former
spouse who has achieved that capacity
through the significant efforts and sacrifices of the requesting spouse which
were detrimental to that spouse's development. It is nothing more than an equitable sharing of the rewards of both
parties' common efforts and expectations.
By creating a divisible interest in Dr. Martinez's enhanced earning capacity, this
court has awarded a nonterminable property interest in a medical degree which goes
beyond the compensation approved in Petersen. The majority has not limited its
award to Mrs. Martinez's contributions toward her husband's medical education
costs; it has taken the further step of
providing financial recompense for lost expectations. I would reject any compensation formula based on future earning capacity. The factors and variables involved
in the valuation of an enhanced earning
capacity are as speculative as those involved in an attempt to value an advanced
degree; such speculation can only lead to
inequity.
Provision for Mrs. Martinez's needs is
best dealt with through a generous but fair
distribution of property and award of ali4. Unlike the majority's award of equitable restitution, an alimony award can be modified* in
appropriate circumstances, under the court's exercise of continuing jurisdiction- Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1987). This is particularly
important in the situation presented here, where
Dr. Martinez is working under a contract of
limited duration.
5. The majority opinion interchanges the terms
"adjusted gross income" and "gross income" in
comparing the amount of child support award-

mony,4 not through the creation of a distinctly new form of cleverly disguised marital property for which there is no precedent.
CHILD SUPPORT
Both husband and wife have a duty to
support their children. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-45-3, -4 (1987). "Child support
awards should approximate actual need,'
and, when possible, assure the children a
standard of living comparable to that which
they would have experienced if no divorce
had occurred." Peterson v. Peterson, 748
P.2d 593, 596 (Utah App.1988).
The trial court found that Dr. Martinez
earned approximately $7,750 gross income
per month. Dr. Martinez testified that his
earnings were established under a two-year1
employment contract, that he was in the
50% tax bracket, and that he had no tax
shelter. The trial court also found that
Mrs. Martinez earned approximately $1,033
gross income per month. Mrs. Martinez
testified to net monthly earnings of $846
plus nominal royalties from an oil well
She anticipated a reduction in her earnings
as a result of her voluntary cutback in
working hours. Mrs. Martinez calculated
monthly living expenses for herself and the
three children at $2,050. This was the only'
evidence of the dollar amount of the children's monthly need for support The majority has elected to disregard that evi
dence because they think the figure was
too low. Having rejected the only evidence
of the children's need, the majority makes
its own independent estimate.
Using their own estimate of need and the
parties' gross monthly incomes, the majority has awarded $600 per month per child
for a total of $1,800.5 Their action fails tc
ed by the trial court with an award calculated
under guidelines from Colorado and Wisconsin,
even though the terms have markedly different
meanings. Although the majority disclaims reliance on the child support guidelines from other jurisdictions, they do, in fact, rely upon the
potentially greater amounts available in otherjurisdictions in order to justify an award of $600
per month per child.
cJ
The problem with this analysis is that the
guidelines adopted by other jurisdictions arei
irrelevant for purposes of an award in UftahJ~
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account for the effects on each party of:
(1) tax rate changes under the 1986 Tax
Reform Act; 6 (2) their award of the tax
exemptions for all the children to Mrs. Martinez; (3) the disposition of the home mortgage debt as discussed below; (4) their
increase of alimony from $400 to $750 per
month; and (5) their equitable restitution
award in an amount to be determined by
the trial court.
I would remand this case on the child
support issue for the taking of further
evidence and a current determination of the
children's need and the ability of both parents to pay child support, to be considered
with the other appropriate adjustments in
the parties' incomes and liabilities.
HOME MORTGAGE
The parties stipulated at trial that their
jointly-acquired home had a current market
value of $63,000 and an equity of $34,561.
The stipulated figures reveal the existence
of a home mortgage obligation in the sum
of $28,439. However, neither the trial
court nor counsel identified this sizeable
debt in the distribution of debts and property. Nor do the trial court's written Findings of Fact specify who must assume the
$28,439 mortgage obligation and make the
payments. The record reveals that Mrs.
Martinez had been making a $309 monthly
mortgage payment and the court stated
that each party was to assume and dis-

charge those debts that they have been
paying.
Paragraph 19 of the written Findings of
Fact states that the "[p]laintiff [Mrs. Martbez] should be awarded the exclusive use
and occupancy of the parties' residence
subject to a lien in favor of Defendant for
the sum of $17,528.00 . . . " The Decree of
Divorce reiterates this language and
awards plaintiff "exclusive use and occupancy," subject to a lien in defendant's
favor. The court's oral ruling was: "[Qhe
Court will award to the the [sic] Plaintiff
the home of the parties, subject to a lien
for defendant's share of the equity in the
amount of one-half of the net equity."
The court's allocation of the parties' financial obligations includes no reference to
$28,439 of mortgage debt Mrs. Martinez
was required to pay specified debts and
obligations totalling $8,179.73. The $28,439 was not specified and does not appear
in the record. Dr. Martinez was required
to pay specified debts and obligations totalling $26,169.04. If Mrs. Martinez must assume and pay the house mortgage, her
post-divorce debt responsibility is $36,618.73, $10,449.69 more than his.
Conclusion of Law C provides that, "[fjn
order to make the distribution . . . [of marital property] as equal as possible, Plaintiff
should be awarded the real property . . .
subject to a lien in favor of Defendant for
one-half of the present equity therein, that
being for the sum of $17,678." Although

Child support guidelines utilize different ap- 6. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 will have a signifproaches to allocate economic responsibility for
icant impact on Dr. Martinez's disposable inchildren of divorced parents depending upon
come, assuming ongoing gross income in the
varying public policy. See generally Cassetty,
$100,000 range. He testified at trial that he had
"Emerging Issues in Child Support Policy and
to set aside one-half of his income to pay taxes.
Practice," in The Parental Child Support ObliFor 1988 and later tax years, there are two basic
gation: Research, Practice and Policy 3 (J. Castax rates for individuals, 15% and 28%. In
setty ed. 1983).
addition, the law effectively creates a third rate
As the majority opinion demonstrates, the recof 33% on income above certain levels. Thus,
ommended amount of child support under othportions of Dr. Martinez's income will be taxed
er jurisdictions' guidelines may radically differ
at 15%, 28%, and 33% rather than all at 50%.
because of differences in the underlying policy
Moreover, Utah income tax laws have changed
goals adopted by a given state. The guidelines
in the interim. Counsel in divorce actions
of some states, such as Wisconsin, do not adjust
would be well advised to provide the trial court
for the income of the custodial parent. This is
with complete information regarding the tax
obviously inconsistent with Utah's adoption of a
implications of the property distribution, alimopublic policy which holds both parents responny, child support and dependency exemption
sible for the support of their children. For
arrangements being proposed. The combined
these reasons, whether the support guidelines in
disposable income available to the severed famiother states would afford a higher level of suply can often be increased by prudent tax planport should not be a factor in making an equitable award in Utah.
ning during a divorce.
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the stated objective is equality of distribution, the requirement that Mrs. Martinez
assume and pay the mortgage would burden her by an additional $14,219.50 (V2 of
$28,439), despite the parties' widely disparate disposable income and the fact that
Mrs. Martinez must support herself and
the children on less than $2,200 per month.
Since the court failed to specifically identify the home mortgage, the court also
failed to include the amount of $28,439 in
the equity calculation. Thus Mrs. Martinez
became personally responsible to pay the
major debt of the parties.
The trial court's inclusion of the home
mortgage in Mrs. Martinez's debt burden
as part of the property and debt distribution is an abuse of discretion, even without
looking at the gross disparity of income.
The home mortgage matter alone justifies
a remand.
CONCLUSION
The majority has fixed the amount of
alimony and child support to be pakL This
action deprives the trial court, on remand,
of any flexibility to adjust the debts, property, alimony, and support awards and to
fashion an overall award package that harmonizes all the variables. The trial court's
discretion will be so restricted that an equitable outcome will be impossible. This
case should instead be remanded for retrial
on the alimony, child support and property
distribution issues.

David A. MAXWELL, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Angeline B. MAXWELL, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 860267-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 6, 1988.
Former wife began proceeding for alimony and property distribution of former

husband's military retirement. The Third
District Court, Tooele County, John A. Rokich, J., awarded former wife alimony and
divided former husband's military retirement fund and appeal was taken. The
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that (1)
former husband's special appearance in
proceeding was ineffective, and (2) failure
of trial court to make specific findings regarding agreement to waive alimony and in
support of distribution of military retirement benefits required remand.
Vacated and remanded.

1. Divorce e=202
Trial court had jurisdiction over wife's
claims for alimony and property distribution of former husband's military retirement notwithstanding former husband's
entry of special appearance attacking state
court's jurisdiction and claiming that Japanese divorce had settled all matters between parties; former husband's special
appearance was ineffective as when former
husband made special appearance he submitted relevant documents expressly by his
general appearance, he asked for affirmative relief, thus waving special appearance,
and trial court maintained continuing jurisdiction over former husband.
2. Husband and Wife <s=>281
Trial court may refuse to enforce property settlement agreement upon specific
finding as to why agreement should not be
followed.
3. Divorce «=>287
Failure of trial court to articulate specific reasons for disregarding former wife's
waiver of alimony or monetary claims
signed in Japan required remand.
4. Divorce <S=>287
Failure of trial court to make finding
as to actual number of years former husband served in military, a finding that was
necessary to determine amount of retirement that was subject to distribution, required remand.
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4. Divorce <S=>237
Gary V. PETERSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.

Traditional alimony analysis is appropriate and adequate method for making
adjustments between spouses, one of whom
has helped finance the other's advanced
education, where divorce does not take
place until several years after second
spouse has earned his/her degree.

Julie A. PETERSEN, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 860007-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

5. Divorce <&=»247

May 18, 1987.
Parties' marriage was dissolved by the
Second District Court, Weber County, Calvin Gould, J., and husband appealed from
court's division of marital property. The
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1)
medical degree that husband earned during
marriage while wife was principal wage
earner did not constitute "property" subject to division in connection with parties'
divorce, but (2) award of $1,000 per month
to wife, to compensate her for her "share"
in husband's advanced degree, could be
sustained Dy recharacterizing it as provision for additional alimony.
Affirmed
rections.

and

remanded

with

di-

1. Divorce <3=184(4)
Generally, trial court is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting financial
and property interests of parties to divorce
action, and its determinations are entitled
to presumption of validity.
2. Divorce <*=>252.3<1)
Medical degree that husband earned
while wife was principal wage earner was
not "property" subject to division in connection with parties' divorce.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Divorce <*=»252.3(1)
Advanced degree is or confers intangible right which cannot properly be characterized as "property," subject to division
between spouses in connection with their
divorce; declining to follow Daniels v.
Daniels, 20 Ohio Op.2d 458,185 N.E.2d 773.

"Rehabilitative" or "reimbursement"
alimony not terminable upon remarriage
may be appropriate, to compensate one
spouse for sacrifice of helping to finance
other spouse's advanced degree, where divorce takes place shortly after degree is
obtained, before first spouse has had
chance to enjoy comfortable life-style
which degree will permit.
6. Divorce <£=>240(2)
Award of $1,000 per month to doctor's
wife, to compensate wife for her "share" in
husband's medical degree, could be sustained bv recharacterizing 'nnt a? property
settlement but as provision for additional
alimony, to extent such additional alimony
was warranted under circumstances.
7. Divorce <^237
Criteria considered in determining reasonable award of support must include financial conditions and needs of spouse in
need of support, ability of that spouse to
produce sufficient income for his or her
own support, and ability of other spouse to
provide support.
8. Divorce «=»24<X2)
Alimony of $2,000 per month was not
unreasonable, where wife had substantially
financed husband's medical education, subsequently became accustomed to comfortable life style that medical degree made
possible, and enjoyed much different earning potential than that of husband, to
tfhom all of income-Droducing assets had
been awarded.

Paul M. Belnap, Strong & Hanni, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
Pete N. Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, Ogden,
for plaintiff and appellant
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Before ORME, JACKSON and
BENCH. JJ.
OPINION
ORME. Judge:
The appellant seeks a reversal or readjustment of the property division and alimony awarded to his former wife upon
their divorce. His challenge focuses on a
$120,000 property settlement given to his
ex-wife to reflect her interest in his medical
degree. We affirm the trial court's basic
disposition, but require amendment of the
decree insofar as the $120,000 award is
concerned.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married in September
1963 when they were both entering their
senior year of college. Both graduated
with Bachelor's degrees. Dr. Petersen continued his cJucatiun and obtained a Master's degree, while Mrs. Petersen worked
as an elementary school teacher to help
finance her husband's education. After receiving his Master's degree, Dr. Petersen
entered medical school. During medical
school, Dr. Petersen earned approximately
$1,000 per year in income. The couple also
took out a student loan and received some
money from Mrs. Petersen's parents.
While her husband was in medical school,
Mrs. Petersen worked one year on a full
time basis and three years part time.
When Dr. Petersen began his internship,
Mrs. Petersen stopped working to stay at
home with their child. During the next
fifteen years, Mrs. Petersen was not employed outside the home and her teaching
certification expired.
By the time of their divorce, the parties
had been married twenty years and had six
children under the age of 18. The decree
gave Mrs. Petersen custody of the six minor children, the family residence subject
to the first mortgage, most of the family
furniture, and two automobiles. She was
awarded $300 per month per child as child
support, $1,000 per month alimony, and the
cash property settlement of $120,000,
which Dr. Petersen was to pay in install-

ments of $1,000 per month without interest
Under the decree, Dr. Petersen received
his professional corporation, the total interest in his pension and profit sharing plan,
two condominiums, a boat, an undivided
one-seventh interest in a cabin near Bear
Lake, and other rental property. He also
was given the right to claim all six children
as dependents for income tax purposes.
The trial court explained the $120,000
cash settlement as follows:
The Court believes that this case is classic, in that defendant is entitled to a
property award reflecting an ownership
interest of the defendant in plaintiffs
medical degree. It is abundantly clear
that defendant helped plaintiff earn that
degree during their marriage, and that
plaintiffs ability to earn is based upon
that degree. Further, that folio win er the
earning of the degree and the entry into
the medical practice, by mutual agreement, defendant undertook the raising
and nurturing of the children as her responsibility to the marital partnership,
while plaintiff practiced medicine. It is
difficult to find in the evidence presented
any system for the measurement of the
value of the degree, and the Court must
therefore deal with the case mostly upon
an alimony basis. To deal with the case
fully upon an alimony basis is not fair to
the defendant, inasmuch as any effort to
restructure her life by seeking to better
her employment opportunities or to remarry will operate against her alimony
rights. Defendant is therefore awarded
$1,000 per month permanent alimony and
a lump sum property award in respect to
the medical degree in the amount of
$120,000, payable in installments of
$1,000 per month from the date of the
decree.
On appeal, Dr. Petersen argues that the
division of marital property was inequitable, particularly the $120,000 property
settlement given to his wife. Dr. Petersen
argues that it was error to characterize
"his" medical degree as marital property
and require him to cash out Mrs. PeterA _ ^ ^
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sen's interest therein over a 10-year period.

000 as a property award, payable in $1,000
monthly installments. Characterization of
these payments as a property award created the main issue for appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
[1] Generally, the trial court is permitDEGREES AS PROPERTY
ted considerable discretion in adjusting the
[2] The question of whether an adfinancial and property interests of the par- vanced degree is a property interest subies to a divorce action, and its determina- ject to division upon divorce is one of first
tions are entitled to a presumption of validi- impression at the appellate level in Utah.1
ty. E.g., Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d However, the majority of jurisdictions that
781, 782 (Utah 1986). And although appel- have considered the issue have held that
ate courts may weigh the evidence and advanced degrees or professional licenses
mbstitute their judgment for that of the *re* not property. Wisner v. Wisner, 129
rial court in divorce actions, as the Su- Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz.App.1981)
)reme Court stated in Turner v. Turner, (husband's medical license and board certif>49 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982), "this court will not icate are not property subject to division,
io so lightly and merely because its judg- but education is a factor to be considered in
nent may differ from that of the trial arriving at equitable property division,
udge. A trial court's apportionment of maintenance, and child support); In re
>roperty will not be disturbed unless it Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal.App.3d 446,
vorks such a manifest injustice or inequity 152 Cal.Rptr. m, 677 (1979) (legal eduis to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." cation not a property right); In re Mar•49 P.2d at 8.
riage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d
75,
77 (1978) (MBA degree not marital
In the present case, the trial court approproperty
subject to division): In re Marpriately attempted to equalize ihe parties'
riage
of
Hortsman,
263 N.W.2d 885, 891
respective standards of living. See Olson
(Iowa
1978)
(law
degree
is not a distributav. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985).
ble
asset
upon
divorce;
future earnings
Dr. Petersen was found capable of earning
$100,000 per year while Mrs. Petersen's are); Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich.App. 404, 354
ability to obtain recertification and secure a N.W.2d 359, 361 (Mich.App. 1984) (medical
teaching contract was found to be specula- degree not property or marital asset); Mative at best. Even if she succeeded, she honey i\ Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488, 453 A.2d
would earn only one-fourth to one-fifth of 527, 536 (1982) (courts may not make any
what Dr. Petersen would earn annually. permanent distribution of the value of proThe trial court spoke of the difficulty of fessional degrees and licenses, whether
measuring the value of Dr. Petersen's de- based on estimated worth or cost); Ruben
gree. The court chose to balance the ine- v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733, 735
qualities between the parties partly with (1983) (graduate degree acquired by one
the alimony award. However, the trial spouse during the marriage is not an asset
court did not want Mrs. Petersen to lose all subject to division upon divorce); Mucklerof her entitlement upon remarriage, so the oy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d
trial court provided for an additional $120,- 1357, 1358 (1972) (medical license is not
I. In Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982).
the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the valuation of a professional corporation. In Dogu, the
husband was awarded his professional corporation, and his wife was awarded property to
offset its value. 652 P.2d at 1309. Although the
proper characterization of a medical degree, as
in the present case, and the valuation of a professional medical corporation, as in Dogu, may
Involve related questions, the legal issues regarding the two are distinct.

In Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Ulah 483. 211
P.2d 452 (1949). the Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's property division and award of alimony to the wife, referring to the wife's working to help her husband through school; the
fact that, with the divorce, the wife was deprived of the benefits of his increased earnings;
and the discrepancy in their earning capacities.
Tremayne docs not address the issue of whether
an advanced degree or license is marital property*
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community property); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750-51 (Okl.1979)
(medical license not property but wife entitled to compensation for her investment).2
^hese cases and others are-consistent
with our understanding of what "property"
island what an - educational degree is.
Property can be bought, sold, and devised.
Bona fide degrees cannot be bought; they
are earned. They cannot be sold; they are
personal to the named recipient Upon the
death of the named recipient, the certificate
commemorating award of the degree might
be passed along and treasured as a family
heirloom, but the recipient may not, on the
strength of that degree, practice law or
medicine. In this case, the court awarded
the parties' home to Mrs. Peterson. But it
might have awarded the home to Dr. Petersen or it might have ordered the home sold
and the net proceeds divided. The court
had no such alternatives with the medical
degree, precisely because the degree is not
property. Consideration of some of the
cases cited above and others supports our
fundamental conclusion and demonstrates
the range of related problems.
In Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14,
498 P.2d 1357 (1972), it had been argued
that the husband's education was the product of the joint labor and industry of both
parties, so that after their marriage it was
community property. The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected this argument and
concluded:
A medical license is only a permit issued
by the controlling authority of the State,
authorizing the individual licensee to engage in the practice of medicine. The
medical license may be used and enjoyed
by the licensee as a means of earning a
livelihood, but it is not community property because it cannot be the subject of
joint ownership.
84 N.M. at 15, 498 P.2d at 1358.
The same issue arose as to an M.B.A.
degree earned by the husband in In re
2. The question of whether an advanced degree
or professional license is marital property subject to division upon divorce has attracted considerable attention from legal scholars. For
one of the better reasoned discussions, see Note.

Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574
P.2d 75 (1978). Again, the concept of an
advanced degree being property was rejected:
An educational degree, such as an
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even
by the broad views of the concept of
"property." It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market It is
personal to the holder. It terminates on
death of the holder and is not inheritable.
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many
years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may
not be acquired by the mere expenditure
of money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist
in the future acquisition of property. In
our view, it hoc none cf the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that term.
194 Colo, at 432, 574 P.2d at 77.
The wife in Graham had worked full
time throughout the couple's six-year marriage, and had contributed 70 percent of
the family income in addition to most of the
household work while her husband was acquiring his degree. The trial court found
that the degree was jointly owned property
and had determined that the future earning
value of the M.B.A. degree to Mr. Graham
was $82,836.00. Mrs. Graham was awarded $33,134.00 of that amount On appeal,
the state supreme court affirmed the reversal of the trial court by the court of appeals. 574 P.2d at 76. The fact that the
decision left Mrs. Graham with nothing to
show for her six years of labor prompted a
three judge dissent which strongly urged
that the husband's increased earning power
represented by the degree should be considered marital property, where there was
no accumulated property and the spouse
Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law:
A Proposal for Excluding Educational Degrees
and Professional Licenses from the Marital Estate, 11 Hofstra L.Rev. 1327 (1983).
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who subsidized the degree was ineligible
Plaintiff does not contend that his license
for maintenance.3 574 P.2d at 78-79.
is excluded from distribution because it
is separate property; rather, he claims
The equitable concerns addressed in the
that it is not property at all but repreGraham -dissent are reflected in the few
sents a personal attainment in acquiring
cases that have found an advanced degree
knowledge. He rests his argument on
or-professional license to be marital properdecisions in similar cases from other jurdisdictions and on his view that a license
in Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E.2d 773
does not satisfy common-law concepts of
(Ohio 1961), the court held that the right to
property. Neither contention is controlpractice medicine was in the nature of a
franchise and constituted property which
ling because decisions in other States
the trial court had a right to consider in
rely principally on their own statutes,
making an award of alimony. In Daniels,
and the legislative history underlying
the parties to the action were married while
them, and because the New York Legisstudents at a university. During the time
lature deliberately went beyond traditionof their marriage the wife received her
al property concepts when it formulated
degree in business administration and the
the Equitable Distribution Law.
husband received a degree in medicine one
66 N.Y.2d at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498
year later. Each contributed toward his or
her own maintenance and education, the N.Y.S.2d at 746. New York's highest court
balance in financial support for the family acknowledged in O'Brien that their statute
coming from the wife's father, who contrib- creates a new species of property previousuted sizable sums to the marriage. At the ly unknown at common law or under prior
time of their divorce, neither party had statutes. 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at
much in the way of tangible assets. The 719. 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Critical portions
court awarded $24,000 in lump sum alimo- of the New York Equitable Distribution
ny, but did not actually divide the value of Law provide that in making an equitable
the medical degree. 185 N.E.2d at 776. distribution of marital property, the court
shall consider the efforts one spouse made
Recently, in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 to the other spouse's career or career poN.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d tential and the difficulty of evaluating an
743 (1985), the New York Court of Appeals interest in a profession. 66 N.Y.2d at 584,
affirmed the trial court's holding that a 489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at
license to practice medicine acquired during 746-47. Thus, the analysis in O'Brien, althe marriage is marital property subject to though illustrative of the equitable condivision. In O'Brien, the wife was held
cerns for the working spouse who supports
entitled to a 40 percent interest in her
the other through an advanced degree, 66
husband's medical license. The wife had
N.Y.2d at 585-88, 489 N.E.2d at 716-18,
contributed approximately 76 percent of
498
N.Y.S.2d at 746-48, is limited in applithe couples' total income while the husband
cation
because of the pivotal role of the
obtained his license. The breakdown of the
unusual
and expansive distribution statute
marriage occurred shortly after the husenacted
in
New York.
band completed his schooling, and the only
tangible asset existing after their nine-year
marriage was the husband's medical license.
The New York court distinguished its
analysis in O'Brien from that of other jurisdictions which have found a license or
advanced degree not to be marital property. As the O'Brien court explained:

(3-5] We agree with the majority opinion in Graham that an advanced degree is
or confers an intangible right which, because of its character, cannot properly be
characterized as property subject to division between the spouses. No special statute, as in New York, permits us to treat
the degree as though it were property. On

3- In Graham, the wife did not request alimony
because a Colorado statute. Coio.Rev.Siat. § 1410-114 (1973). restricted the court's power to

award maintenance to cases where the spouse
seeking it was unable to support himself or
herself. 574 P.2d at 79.
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the other hand, criteria for an award of
support in Utah are not so rigid as in
Colorado, preventing the harsh result of
Graham. ^ t f t h f e ^ t e ; traditional alimony
^malysia is the appropriate and adequate
method for making adjustments between
the parties in cases of this type.4 *
AWARD IN THIS CASE
[6] As indicated, the trial court was in
error when it awarded Mrs. Petersen the
$120,000 cash settlement to reflect her
share of the value of her husband's medical
degree. Nonetheless, the court's basic disposition was fair and can be sustained if
the $1,000 monthly payments which Dr.
Petersen was to make in satisfaction of
that obligation are recharacterized as additional alimony, a result which is readily
supported by the trial court's findings.
In reviewing the court'c findings, *ve find
ample evidence to affirm the property division aside from the $120,000 cash settlement. As the Supreme Court stated in
Fletcher u. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah
1980), ,4[t]here is no fixed formula upon
which to determine a division of properties,
it is a prerogative of the court to make
whatever disposition of property as it
deems fair, equitable, and necessary for
the protection and welfare of the parties."
615 P.2d at 1222. Although Dr. Petersen
was awarded a smaller percentage of the
marital assets, he received all but one of
the income producing assets: his professional corporation, his pension and profit
sharing plan, two condominiums, and other
business interests. The parties were to
share evenly in a $10,000 investment corpo4. In cases like the instant one, life patterns have
largely been set. the earning potential of both
parties can be predicted with some reliability,
and the contributions and sacrifices of the one
spouse in enabling the other to attain a degree
have been compensated by many years of the
comfortable lifestyle which the degree permitted. Traditional alimony analysis works nicely
to assure equity in such cases.
In another kind of recurring case, typified by
Graham, where divorce occurs shortly after the
degree is obtained, traditional alimony analysis
would often work hardship because, while both
spouses have modest incomes at the time of
divorce, the one is on the threshhold of a significant increase in earnings. Moreover, the

ration. We find the basic property division
equitable.
[7] As for the cash settlement payable
in monthly installments of $1,000, it is
properly affirmed as alimony, making Mrs.
Petersen's entire alimony award $2,000 per
month. Criteria considered in determining
a reasonable award of support must include the financial conditions and needs of
the spouse in need of support, the ability of
that spouse to produce sufficient income
for his or her own support, and the ability
of the other spouse to provide support.
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985).
[8] In this case, then, the first factor to
be considered is the financial condition and
needs of Mrs. Petersen. For over ten
years, Mrs. Petersen and her family enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle. She
now must make mortgage payments on tne
home and pay for the ordinary expenses of
food, clothing and transportation. Other
than the one-half interest in the investment
corporation, Mrs. Petersen was awarded
none of the income-producing assets. She
has no outside income.
The second factor to be considered is
Mrs. Petersen's ability to produce a sufficient income for herself. Although Mrs.
Petersen is a college graduate with a Bachelor's degree and is trained as a school
teacher, she is not currently certified. She
would require additional training to become
certified and, even if certified, her ability to
produce income would be one-fourth to onefifth of what Dr. Petersen's income has
provided the family. The trial court found
spouse who sacrificed so the other could attain
a degree is precluded from enjoying the anticipated dividends the degree will ordinarily provide. Nonetheless, such a spouse is typically
not remote in time from his or her previous
education and is otherwise better able to adjust
and to acquire comparable skills, given the opportunity and the funding. In such cases, alimony analysis must become more creative to
achieve fairness, and an award of "rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony, not terminable upon remarriage, may be appropriate. Sec,
e.g.t Haugan v. Haugan. 117 Wis.2d 200. 343
N.W.2d 796 (1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney. 91
N J . 488. 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
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that the chance of her being able to secure
a teaching contract was "speculative."
During most of the marriage, Mrs. Petersen was not employed outside the home.
She stopped working, primarily at the urging of her husband, and devoted her time
to raising their six children. It is unreasonable to assume that she will be able
immediately to enter the job market and
support herself in the style in which she
had been living before the divorce. See
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985).
The final factor to be considered is the
ability of Dr. Petersen to provide support.
This is the proper realm in which to consider advanced degrees or professional licenses. An advanced degree is ordinarily an
indicator of potential future earnings. In
addition, the attainment of a degree by one
spouse often results in a disparity of income thct iz likely tc last for 2 great time,
particularly in cases like the present one.
Dr. Petersen has a history of earning more
than $100,000 a year and Mrs. Petersen has
not worked for the past fifteen. But it is
the discrepancy in their earning power
which is the basis for alimony, not the
discrepancy in their educations. There is
no logical reason, for example, for treating
differently a self-trained artist without formal education who earns and will earn
$100,000 a year and a doctor with a medical
degree who earns and will earn $100,000 a
year. Other things being equal, if such an
artist divorces his or her spouse, he or she
should pay alimony comparable to that paid
by such a doctor. Whether a spouse's abili3. It is clear the court viewed the payments to
Mrs. Petersen, both those it specifically called
alimony and the additional $1,000 monthly payments, as appropriate for her support. It utilized the "property" label in characterizing some
of the monthly total as a means to preclude
termination of the payments to Mrs. Petersen
upon her remarriage. Although the court provided that the $1,000 per month payments not
called alimony would terminate in ten years,
nothing in the court's findings establishes any
particular significance to that point in time.
We accordingly see no basis, now that the entire
' monthly payment is properly characterized as
alimony, to require that half of the $2,000
monthly total automatically and arbitrarily terminate at the end of ten years. Cf. Olson v.
OUon, 704 P.2d 564. 567 (Utah 1985) (court

ty to provide support is the result of an
advanced degree or professional license is
irrelevant to the analysis. The key is the
spouse's ability.
In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah
1983), the Supreme Court explained:
Where a marriage is of long duration and
the earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds that of the other, as here, it is
appropriate to order alimony and child
support at a level which will insure that
the supported spouse and children may
maintain a standard of living not unduly
disproportionate to that which they
would have enjoyed had the marriage
continued.
658 P.2d at 1205. See Jeppson v. Jeppson,
684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984).
In Savage, the parties had enjoyed a high
standard of living during the marriage and
the court upheld an award of $2,000 per
month alimony and child support ot $500
per month per child. 658 P.2d at 1205. In
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406
(Utah 1983), the Supreme Court upheld an
alimony award of $2,500 per month as not
excessive. 669 P.2d at 409. We agree that
$2,000 per month alimony to Mrs. Petersen
is sufficient to help her maintain a standard of living not unduly disproportionate
to that which she would have enjoyed if the
marriage had continued.4
Accordingly, this case is remanded to
District Court to amend the decree to provide that Mrs. Petersen receive $2,000 per
month alimony and, correspondingly, to delete the $120,000 cash award. The decree
modified divorce decree to delete provision that
alimony would terminate after two years where
monthly amount was reasonable but two-year
limit was not). Of course, it would be proper
for the district court to readjust the amount of
alimony award*:J to Mrs, Petersen if at any
point in time there develops a material change
of circumstances, such as Mrs. Petersen securing gainful employment or if Dr. Petersen's salary drops dramatically through no fault of his
own. See, eg., Naylor v. Naylor. 700 P.2d 707,
710 (Utah 1985); Haslam v. Haslam. 657 P.2d
757, 758 (Utah 1982). The district court retains
continuing jurisdiction in divorce actions to
amend alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-5
(1986). In addition, the alimony awarded to
Mrs. Petersen automatically terminates under
certain circumstances. Id.
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is otherwise affirmed. Each party shall
bear his or her own costs of appeal.
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ„ concur.

Dawn W. HORNE, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
W. Reid HORNE, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 86006O-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 18, 1987.

The 3rd District Court, Salt Lake
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered nunc
pro tunc order distributing property incident to previously granted divorce. Exhusband appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that: (1) statute committing broad discretion to trial courts in
granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic
relations matters was not limited in scope
to cases involving marital status of the
parties; (2) statute eliminated the commonlaw requirement of previously made final
order, and (3) good cause did not exist for
entry of the order nunc pro tunc.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Courts «=114
The court has the power to act nunc
pro tunc—to do act upon one date and
make it effective as of prior date; the
common-law power of nunc pro tunc allows
the court to correct errors or supply omissions to permit the record to accurately
reflect that which in fact took place. U.C.
A.1953, 3(Ma-l.
2. Statutes <*=>189
In construing legislative enactments,
the reviewing court assumes that each

term in the statute was used advisedly, and
thus, interprets and applies the statute according to its literal wording unless it is
unreasonably confused or inoperable.
3. Divorce «=»254(1)
Statute committing broad discretion to
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations was not limited
in scope to cases involving marital status of
the parties, but could also apply to property division problems; by its wording, the
statute applies to any and all matters relating to divorce proceedings. U.C.A.1953,
30-4a-l.
4. Statutes «=»222, 239
Statutes are not to be construed as
effecting any change in the common law
beyond that which is clearly indicated;
however, where statute is in derogation of
the common law, and is also remedial in
nature, the remedial application should be
construed so as to give effect to its purpose.
5. Divorce «=»162
Statute committing broad discretion to
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations matters eliminated the common-law nunc pro tunc requirement of previously made final order; literal
reading of statute indicated legislative intent to change standard for entry of nunc
pro tunc orders in domestic proceedings
from requiring previously made final order
as delineated by common law to requiring
finding of "good cause," and legislative
history indicated that statute was remedial
in nature; Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298
(Utah), superseded by statute. U.C.A.1953,
3(Ma-l.
6. Divorce <s=*254(l)
"Good cause" did not exist to enter
nunc pro tunc order distributing property
incident to previously granted divorce;
agreement between parties expressly stated that property was to be transferred to
equalize the marital assets in order to insure that the transfer of property would
not be taxable event, and in entering order
prior to effective date of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984 and without the essential and
A-39
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ry intent is clearly revealed in the words he
wrote. Since every required statutory element was expressed in his handwriting, no
sound purpose or policy was served by
invalidating Fitzgerald's holographic will.
See Estate of Black, 30 Cal.3d 880, 889, 641
P.2d 754, 759, 181 Cal.Rptr. 222, 227 (1982).
The will with two dates is facially ambiguous about whether it was executed before
or on the same date as the single-dated
will. However, the terms of the twice-dated will do not conflict with the other will's
terms. These consistent provisions must
be considered valid. Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-2-503 (1978).
The holographic wills should have been
admitted to probate. The order of the trial
court appointing Kenneth Fitzgerald as the
personal representative of decedent is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision. No
costs are awarded.
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur.

Catherine RAYBURN, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
Robert L. RAYBURN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 860022-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

rary alimony, and (2) award to wife of
one-half interest in husband's retirement
fund was not abuse of discretion.
Affirmed as modified.
1. Divorce <s=»237. 252.3(1)
Advanced degree or professional license is not marital property subject to
division upon divorce, but an advanced degree often accompanies disparity in earning
potential that is appropriately considered
as factor in alimony analysis.
2. Divorce <s=*247, 252.3(1)
Cash settlement of $45,000, payable in
monthly installments of $750, could not be
sustained as property settlement, in that
value represented compensation for husband's professional degree, but payments
could be properly affirmed as temporary
alimony, given wife's needs and husband's
ability to provide support.
3. Divorce <3^247
Award to wife of one-half interpst in
present value of husband's retirement
fund, payable over five years with interest,
was not abuse of discretion, in that fund
was asset accumulated during marriage,
and especially where court permitted payments to be treated as "alimony" for tax
purposes.

Gaylen S. Young, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
B.L. Dart, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and respondent.
Before ORME, BENCH and
JACKSON, JJ.

May 29, 1987.
OPINION
Action was brought for divorce. The
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered divorce decree, and husband appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1)
installment payments to account for husband's medical degree could not be sustained as property settlement, but payments could be properly affirmed as tempo-

ORME, Judge:
In this divorce action, defendant Robert
L. Rayburn appeals the valuation and distribution of a retirement plan and an award
of a $45,000 property settlement to offset
his medical degree. We affirm the trial
court's basic disposition, but require
amendment of the decree insofar as the
$45,000 award is concerr.ee.

RAYBURN v. RAYBURN
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Catherine Rayburn and Dr.
Rayburn were married in Florida on June
50, 1972. Earlier that same day, Dr. Ray)um had obtained his medical degree from
he University of Florida. At the time,
£rs. Rayburn had a masters degree in
ifiplogy and was employed as a research
associate at the University of Florida. The
auple moved to Houston, Texas where Dr.
laybum completed a one year internship
it Baylor University. Dr. Rayburn earned
18,000 to $9,000 during the internship,
irs. Rayburn also worked during that
'ear. earning approximately $7,200. The
ouple returned to Florida where Dr. Ray>urn completed a three-year residency,
arning approximately 511,000 to $13,500
er year. Mrs. Rayburn worked for a
hort time in Florida, but upon the birth of
heir first child, she stopped working fullline and worked only occasionally, and on
part-time basis, throughout the rest of
he marriage.
After the residency, the family moved to
an Antonio, where Dr. Rayburn completed
wo years of military service. During the
ive-year period of the internship, the resiency, and his military service. Dr. Rayurn acted as the primary financial providr for the family. Mrs. Rayburn stayed at
ome, for the most part, to raise their
rentual three children.
'After military service, the family moved
>vSalt Lake City where Dr. Rayburn joined
*e staff of the Primary Children's Medical
enter as a pediatric-anesthesiologist. In
October 1982, Mrs. Rayburn filed for a
ivorce.
$Vial was held on July 18 and 19, 1983.
X the time of trial, Dr. Rayburn was earnig approximately $125,000 a year. After
ie two day trial, the court issued a memol&dum decision. In the decision, the court
Btermined to award custody of the three
ahor children, ages 9, 5, and 2, to Mrs.
*yburn and to order Dr. Rayburn to pay
ifld support in the amount of $400 per
}fld per month. Apparently overlooking
fef exact sequence of events on the Rayttrns' wedding day, the court found the
Hsband's medical deirree to h«» :i marifnl

asset and ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay Mrs.
Rayburn $45,000, payable at $750 a month,
as her share of the asset and to "maintain
her lifestyle for a period of adjustment."
The decision would have awarded Dr. Rayburn all of his retirement fund.
About two weeks later, the court issued
a supplemental decision in which the court
altered its earlier decision on the retirement plan. The court, "in order to make a
more equitable division of property," ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay one-half the net
present value of the retirement plan, $56,850, to Mrs. Rayburn in five annual installments of $11,370 plus interest. The court
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and a decree on September 15, 1983.
The decree expressly awarded no alimony
and set December 15, 1983. as the effective
date of the divorce.
Dr. Rayburn promptly filed a motion for
relief from judgment or for a new trial.
Dr. Rayburn claimed the trial court failed
to consider the drastic tax consequences of
placing a present value on the retirement
plan and awarding half of that to his wife.
The court took Dr. Rayburn's motion under
advisement. On December 9, 1983, the
court issued another memorandum decision. This decision provided for amendment of the decree in such terms as would
permit the five retirement plan payments
to be treated as alimony for tax purposes.
The court entered a second set of findings,
conclusions, and decree on February 28,
1984. The second decree again awarded no
alimony as such, made the embellishment
for tax purposes, and set February 28 as
the effective date of the divorce. Dr. Rayburn retained new counsel, who filed a
motion for relief from the new judgment or
a new trial. The court denied the motion
and Dr. Rayburn appealed.
On appeal, Dr. Rayburn claims the court
erroneously placed a high value on the
retirement plan without considering the tax
consequences. Dr. Rayburn also claims
the court erred in finding the medical degree to be a marital asset and placing a
value on it without any supporting evi-
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RECORD ON APPEAL
divorce. Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d
Dr. Raybum ordered a transcript on ap- 237 (Utah App.1987). ^However, an adpeal of only 30 pages, representing a tiny vanced degree often accompanies a disparifraction of the testimony offered at trial. ty in earning potential that is appropriately
Under Rule ll(eX2) of the Rules of the considered as a factor in alimony analysis.
Utah Court of Appeals and the predecessor See id, 243. ^e.reaffirni our holdingJn
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "If the {Petersen* and ^analyze<-th^fistant^appeal
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a *Smd£rthe same anal^is'employed in that
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or case.
is contrary to the evidence, the appellant
shall include in the record a transcript of
[2] The cash settlement of $45,000 payall evidence relevant to such finding or able in monthly installments of $750 cannot
conclusion." Since the transcript provided
be sustained under Petersen as a property
by the appellant is insufficient to allow a
settlement, but payments of $750 per
review of the evidence to determine the
period are properly
propriety of the findings, this court accepts month for a five-year
4
l
affirmed as alimony. Criteria considered
the trial court's Findings of Fact as true
and only evaluates the legal correctness of in determining a reasonable award of supthe two disputed dispositions.2 As indi- port must include the financial conditions
cated, the disputes concern the $45,000 and needs of the spouse in need of support,
property settlement reflecting Mrs. Kay- the ability of thai spvuae tu produce suffibum's "share" of her husband's medical cient income for his or her own support,
degree and the payments for Mrs. Ray- and the ability of the other spouse to proburn's one-half interest in the present val- vide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
ue of the doctor's retirement plan.3
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). See Paffei v. Pa//el, 732 P.2d 96, 100-101 (Utah 1986) (failTHE MEDICAL DEGREE
ure to consider these three factors consti[I] Recently this court held that an ad- tutes an abuse of discretion). Although
vanced degree or professional license is not characterizing the monthly payments as a
marital property subject to division upon property settlement, the trial court exclusions, and decree clearly supercedes the first
1. See Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607. 608
(Utah 1976) ("Appellate review of factual matters can be meaningful, orderly, and intelligent
only in juxtaposition to a record by which lower
courts' ruling and decisions on disputes can be
measured."). In Sawyers, the Supreme Court
presumed the findings of the trial court to have
been supported by admissible, competent, substantial evidence. Id. See Mitchell v. Mitchell,
527 P.2d 1359. 1360-61 (Utah 1974).
2. At oral argument. Dr. Rayburn advised he did
not really intend to question the findings in
view of the evidence, only the propriety of the
disposition in view of the findings.
3. On appeal. Dr. Rayburn also argues that the
trial court erred in filing two separate Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and two separate decrees with different effective dates. In
this regard he relies heavily on the failure of the
second batch of documents to employ the term
"amended," contending confusion will result
about which decree controls. The second set of
findings, conclusions, and decree was oi course
prompted by Dr. Rayburn's motion for relief
from judgment. Although not expressly labeled
as "amended." the second set of finHim»< mn.

set and arc the direct subject of this appeal.
4. The trial court quite clearly viewed those payments as necessary for support but utilized the
properly settlement label as a means to preclude
their termination should Mrs. Rayburn remarry. While il is true that with alimony the receiving spouse may lose some of his or her
award through certain changed circumstances,
like remarriage. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(1986), it is noted that with installments on a
property award, the receiving spouse might lose
some of the award if the paying spouse obtained
a discharge in bankruptcy. By contrast, an alimony obligation would survive bankruptcy. H
U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West Supp.1987). Characterization of required future payments as in
satisfaction of a marital property disposition,
rather than as alimony, is not always in the best
interest of the receiving spouse. Cf. Beckmann
v. Beckmann, 685 P.2d 1045. 1050 (Utah 1984)
(The fact that an instrument is labeled "property
settlement agreement" docs not necessarily determine whether debt is dischargeable. Court
will look at underlying nature of the debt, including whether spouse would be inadequately
ci.r»~»^t-^
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pressly found factors that readily meet the
criteria listed in Jones.
As for Mrs. Rayburn's need for support
gnd her ability to produce sufficient income, the trial court found that Mrs. Rayburn was presently unemployed, but that
she had been employed and was well-educated, having acquired bachelor's and master's degrees. However, with minor children residing at home and not yet in school,
Mrs. Rayburn was reluctant to return immediately to the full-time workforce. In
addition, the court accepted Mrs. Rayburn's
testimony that in order to bring her employment skills to a satisfactory level, she
needed to return to school and obtain further education "to complement her current
education."5 As for Dr. Rayburn's ability
to provide support, the trial court found
that Dr. Rayburn was well-educated, having obtained an M.D degree, and that he
had a successful practice as a pediatnc-anesthesiologist, earning a projected $125,000
for 1983.

his medical degree before the parties were
married. Although Mrs. Rayburn worked
periodically during the marriage, she did
ffot endure substantial financial sacrifices'
or defer her own education to help him
obtain the degree. In addition, Mrs. Rayburn shared the financial rewards permitted-by her husband's advanced degree for
several years. Those rewards also resulted
in the accumulation of considerable real
and personal property during their marriage, which was equitably divided upon
their divorce. The award of temporary alimony, at $750 per month for a maximum of
five years, 7 adequately meets Mrs. Rayburn's support needs and is readily sustainable under the criteria outlined in Jones.

THE RETIREMENT PLAN
[31 Dr Rayburn's retirement fund was
one of the valuable assets accumulated
during the marriage and was of course
subject to equitable division upon divorce
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P 2d 431, 433
tutah 1982; Stv Enyitrl v Enyltrl, 576
In its first memorandum decision, the P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978) We accept
trial court characterized the monthly pay- the trial court's finding that the retirement
ments for Mrs. Rayburn as necessary "to fund's present value was SI 13,700 In its
maintain her life style for a period of ad- second memorandum decision, the trial
justment" The 5-year period correspond- court explained that it had considered seved to the amount of time it would take for eral ways to distribute the life's share of
Mrs. Raybuni to complete her additional the retirement fund and found fixing a sum
education on a part-time basis and until the equal to one-half of the present value and
parties' youngest child was in school all
distributing that to Mrs Ravburn as a cash
day/
award to be the most equitable By requirWe acknowledge that there will be situa- ing Mrs. Rayburn's share in the retirement
boos where an award of non-terminable fund to be cashed out following divorce,
rdobflitative or reimbursement alimony the court avoided leaving the parties in a
*J0aW be appropriate. See Petersen v. Pet- "financial entanglement that would contin*T9*n, 737 P.2d at 242 n. 4. However, this ue for approximately twenty or thirty
» W)t such a case. Dr. Rayburn acquired years and would probably result in further
**^Jhi$ additional education was apparently in
w ^ field of computer science No doubt com£ puicnzation has mushroomed in importance in
« ^ j ^ ' ** m n c a f l y c v c r Y a r c a °f scientific
^ • ^ v o r , during the decade Mrs. Rayburn was
^ e m p l o y e d Computer literacy would greatl>
^*™ace Mrs. Rayburn's ability to obtain suit**** employment.
I'Taii rational basis for limiting the payments
Anve~year period of adjustment distinguishes
from Petersen, where we declined to
it a ten-year cap on alimony otherwise
where there was no articulated basis for
ucally diminishing the award upon the

elapse of ten years See Petersen v Petersen,
737 P 2d at 243 n. 5. See also Olson v. Olson.
704 P.2d 564. 567 (Utah 1985)
7. The alimony obligation could terminate earlier under certain circumstances
Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5 (1986) In addition, the district
court has "continuing jurisdiction' to change
the alimony award "as is reasonable and necessary," id. (3). provided there develops a substantial change in the parties' circumstances See.
eg. Naylor v. Navlor. 700 P 2d 707. 710 (Utah
1985)
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court hearings and cause future animosity
between the parties."
However, the court went on to explain
that "to require the defendant to pay the
full sum at one time would have been an
extra burden." By allowing Dr. Rayburn
to make five annual payments, the court
left him the option of paying his obligation
out of current income or on some other
basis, rather than having to liquidate the
fund or sell other assets. The court additionally softened the impact by ultimately
allowing the payments to be characterized
in such terms as would permit them to be
treated as "alimony" for tax purposes.8
There is admittedly some potential for
confusion because of the measures taken
by the trial court to massage the tax treatment of the payments to Mrs. Rayburn.
However, these measures were the trial
court's response to Dr. Raybum's very
own argument that the payments worked a
financial hardship on him. The trial court
allowed the payments to be considered "alimony" for tax purposes in order to give Dr.
Rayburn the tax break of the alimony deduction while at the same time permitting
Mrs. Rayburn to be cashed out within a
few years. On appellate review, the trial
court's apportionment of property will not
be disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a
clear abuse of discretion. E.g., Turner v.
Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). We
find no abuse of discretion in the court's
awarding Mrs. Rayburn a one-half interest
in the retirement fund, payable over five
years with interest On the contrary, and
especially with the refinements which were
made to address Dr. Raybum's concerns
about taxes, the trial court's approach was
clearly fair and equitable.
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the
district court to amend the decree to provide that Mrs. Rayburn receive $750 per
month alimony for five years and, corre8. The trial court did not stop here in tailoring
the provision to make it as painless to Dr. Rayburn as possible under the circumstances. The
court stated in its Conclusions of Law: "In the
event that the payments under this paragraph
do not qualify as 'alimony' for tax purposes, this
would constitute a change of circumstances cn-

spondingly, to delete the $45,000 cash
award. The decree is otherwise affirmed.
Each party shall bear his or her own costs
of appeal.
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

o
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SCIENTIFIC ACADEMY OF HAIR DESIGN, INC., a Utah corporation, dba
Mediterranean Hair Academy, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.

Robert 0. BOWEN, in his official capacity as director of the Division of Registration within the Department of Business Regulation, a Department of the
Government of the State of Utah, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 860035-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 8, 1987.
Administrative suspension of license to
operate a cosmetology/barbering school
was affirmed by order of the District
Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County, James S. Sawaya, J., and school
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings.
J., held that: (1) the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but (2) the
findings in support of the suspension were
not contrary to a clear preponderance of
the evidence, even assuming such standard
rather than the "arbitrary and capricious'
standard was applicable.
Affirmed.
titling the defendant to come back before th<:
Court and obtain a modification reducing this
payment to the extent of the income tax which
he is required to pay because of an inability to
take a deduction of these payments as 'alimony'."
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a somewhat similar instruction was harmless error. Furthermore, the property stolen was not fungible property which defendant might have legitimately possessed.
Rather, the checks were identified as property belonging to others were shown to
have been forged and would not legitimately have been in his possession under any
circumstances.

Betty M. GARDNER, Plaintif
and Appellant,
V.

William James GARDNER, Defends*,
and Respondent
No. 19246.

Affirmed.

Supreme Court of Utah.

HALL, CJ. f concurs.

Jan. 4, 1988.

DURHAM, Justice (concurring
separately):
I concur in the majority opinion, but
write separately to emphasize the obligation of defense counsel to notify judges
who have ruled on pretrial suppression issues that defendants' objections to challenged evidence are ic»erved and not withdrawn, thus alerting those judges to the
possibility that trial evidence may affect
the validity of earlier rulings. I agree that
in this case there was an extensive hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress, and it is
quite clear from the record that defense
counsel did not intend to waive any related
evidentiary objections at trial. In fact, several ambiguous references during trial to a
"prior motion" may have referred to defendant's pretrial motion to suppress. It is
important, however, that trial judges be
given the opportunity to review pretrial
suppression rulings when and if there is
any likelihood that they were erroneous.
When the pretrial judge is also the trial
judge, unlike the circumstance in State v.
Lesley, G72 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), this is
easily accomplished by indicating on the
record, either at the end of the pretrial
hearing or at the trial outside the presence
of the jury, that there is a continuing objection to the evidence challenged in the motion to suppress.
HOWE, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur in the concurring opinion of
DURHAM, J.

Divorce decree was entered by the Second District Court, Weber County, Ronald
0. Hyde, J., and wife appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate C.J., held
that: (1) trial court was required to value
husbands tetii errant account; (2) wi'? wac
entitled to findings ir. support of denial of
her request for portion of husband's medical assets; (3) regardless of whether evaluation and distribution of a professional degree or professional practice is ever appropriate, it was inappropriate in the present
case where marriage was of long duration
and present earnings and business assets
provided a more accurate measure of the
true worth of wife's investment in husband's degree; and (4) alimony award was
insufficient and inequitable.
Reversed and remanded.
Howe, J., filed opinion concurring and
dissenting.

1. Divorce e=>286<5)
Though the Supreme Court may modify decisions of trial court, trial court's apportionment of marital property will not be
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a
clear abuse of discretion.
2. Divorce €=252.3(4)
Marital property includes pension fund
or insurance, but dividing retirement or
pension funds is not necessarily consistent
u,ifK

"»-i'n/Mnl»*«5 of euuitable distribution in

GARDNER v. GARDNER
Q | « M 7 4 S PJUI 107* (Utah |*M)
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payout begins should be employed only in
rare instances.

would qualify for social security payments
only as an "ex-wife married over 20 years."

3. Divorce «=»252.3(4)

9. Divorce «=>225

Trial court, in apportioning marital
property upon divorce, was required to at
least consider the value of the husband's
retirement account, and alternatives available for taking that value into account
would include requiring husband to pay
half of net present value to wife in annual
installments, or reapportioning property
distribution to offset that value.

There was no error in divorce case in
failing to award attorney fees to wife,
where portion of property award was for
purpose of assisting wife to pay attorney
and no showing was made in trial as to the
nature and amount of fees.

4. Divorce «=»253(4)

Wife was entitled to finding in support
of denial of her request for a portion of the
assets of husband's medical assets, and it
was error to refuse to place present value
thereon on the ground that the assets were
"futuristic."
5. Divorce <s=252.3(l)
Goodwill is properly subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.
6. Divorce <S=>252.3<1)
Regardless of whether professional degree and professional practice may in appropriate cases constitute marital property
subject to evaluation and distribution upon
divorce, wife's request for property interest in husband's medical degree was inappropriate where the marriage was of long
duration and present earnings and business
assets provided a more accurate measure
of the true worth of the wife's investment
in her husband's degree.
7. Divorce <s=>237

Alimony award should, after marriage
of long duration and to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective standards
of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage.
8. Divorce C=»240<2)
Alimony award of $1,200 per month
until husband's retirement and $600 per
month thereafter was an abuse of discretion where husband was a physician with
earnings of $6,000 per month, wife had not
been employed for 30 years, husband had
substantial retirement assets, and wife

Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and
appellant
C. Gerald Parker, Ogden, for defendant
and respondent
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Betty Gardner appeals from a
decree awarding alimony and attorney fees
in a divorce action she brought against her
former husband, William Gardner. We reverse and remand for further consideration.
Mr. and Mrs. Gardner were married at
Steels Tavern, Virginia, on April 17, 1950.
No children were born to them, but the
couple adopted two children who are now
both adults. Early in the marriage, Mrs.
Gardner worked full-time as a secretary
while Mr. Gardner completed his medical
training. Mr. Gardner also worked various
jobs, and his parents provided support in
the form of medical school tuition. Mrs.
Gardner has not worked since 1958, when
Mr. Gardner completed his medical training. Mr. Gardner is now employed as a
general surgeon, earning $6,000 per month.
While married, Mr. and Mrs. Gardner
acquired substantial real and personal
property. Their major asset was a farm,
including a home and equipment located
near Eden, Utah, worth between $246,000
and $280,000. Other assets included Mr.
Gardner's medical assets and retirement
funds with an uncertain valuation of between $73,000 and $177,000; a contract for
the sale of stock in the Ogden Clinic Investment Company; a certificate of deposit;
household furniture, furnishings and fixtures; boats and automobiles; sporting
equipment; and two horses and associated
equipment. At the time of divorce, the
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couple's only outstanding debts were a
first mortgage on the family home and a
loan for the purchase of one automobile.
The trial court ordered that the farm,
home, and equipment be sold and the proceeds be divided equally. Until the farm
was sold, Mrs. Gardner was en tided to its
use, although she had to pay the mortgage,
taxes, and insurance. The court also ordered that the motor vehicles and boats be
sold and the proceeds divided equally, with
the exception of one personal automobile
for each party. The household furnishings
and other items of personal property were
divided roughly equally, according to personal need. Mr. Gardner was awarded his
medical and business assets, including retirement funds, except Mrs. Gardner was
awarded one-third of the proceeds from the
sale of the Old Ogden Clinic building to pay
her attorney fees. They were to share
equally a money market certificate. The
w>urt granted Mrs. Gardner $1,200 pt;r
month alimony, to be reduced to $600 per
month following Mr. Gardner's retirement.
Mrs. Gardner was also to have a claim for
$50,000 against Mr. Gardner's estate in the
event that he predeceased her.
Mrs. Gardner asks this Court to reverse
the judgment of the lower court. She cites
Woodward r. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431
(Utah 1982), for the proposition that she
has a spousal right to an equitable distribution of Mr. Gardner's retirement funds.
She also asserts a property interest in his
medical degree and business and claims
that the alimony award was insufficient.
Finally, she asks this Court for an award of
attorney fec<>.
| I | In a divorce proceeding, the trial
court should make a distribution o( property and income so that the parties may
readjust their lives to their new circumstances as well as possible. Turnrr r.
Turner. 619 l\2d 6 (Utah 11*82): MacDonald r. MacDonatd. 120 Utah 573. 236
P.2d 1066 (1951). Although this Court may
modify decisions of the trial court, its apportionment of marital property will not be
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust ur a
clear abuse of discretion. Turner. 649
P.2d at K.

The trial court awarded Mr, GattfSnTTff
retirement account and medical^^^S
without placing a present value O n ^ p S
those assets. The trial court' cEffisrawg
those types of assets Mfuturistk" WroStt
cated that their value would be'utiQ&KM
retirement The court did not attemB^k
resolve the differing valuations of'fh#$to
sets and provided little explanation fbr?{&
award to Mr. Gardner.
' $Mu#(i
Recently, in Acton v. Deliran, 737* Kjjf
x
996, 999 (Utah 1987), we noted:
<*<*
Failure of the trial court to make fin<£
ings on all material issues is reversible
error unless the facts in the record are
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable pf
supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment" Kinkella v. Baugh, 660
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). . . . The findings of fact must show that the court's
judgment or decree "follows logically
from, and is supported by, the evidence."
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah
1986). The findings "should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached." Rucker [v.
Dal ton). 598 P.2d [1336] at 1338 [Utah
1979]. See also Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Public Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981).
The trial court's statement in its findings
that the retirement account and Mr. Gardner's medical assets are "futuristic" was
apparently intended to mean that they
could not be given a present value or
should not for other reasons be taken into,
account. That, however, does not follow
from the evidence presented at trial, nor is
it supported by our cases. Regardless of
how remote the full value of an asset is, it
still has present value. The testimony adduced at trial devoted to differing valuations by the parlies merited more precise
findings.
(2| In Woodward r. Woodward. 656
P.2d at 432, we recognized that retirement
benefits, whether vested or not. are a form
of deferred cnni|*?n:»ation which a court
should at least consider when dividing marital assets. A right to deferred compensa-
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tion acquired during marriage, or that portion of one's right to deferred compensation acquired during marriage, should not
be entirely ignored in dividing assets, irrespective of when the vested funds are payable Thus, marital property "encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived; and
this includes any such pension fund or insurance " Englert i\ Englert, 576 P 2d
1274 (UUih 1978)
However, an award of a part of a
spouse's retirement funds may create significant problems. In some instances, marital assets are sparse, income is low, and an
award of an equitable share of retirement
assets might work a substantial hardship
Courts have, however, awarded the value
of the assets on a periodic payment plan
%
and, in some instances, have provided for
payments when payout begins This alter
native should be employed only in rare
instances In Woodward, the Court stated
Long term <uiu ueferreu snaring o\ financial interests are obviously too susceptible to continued strife and hostility, cir
cumstances which our courts traditional
ly strive to avoid to the greatest extent
possible
[WJhere other assets for equitable
distribution are inadequate or lacking altogether, or where no present value can
be established and the parties are unable
to reach agreement, resort must be had
to a form of deferred distribution based
upon fixed percentages
656 P2d at 433 (quoting Kxkkert v KikkerU 177 N J Super 471, 478, 427 A 2d 76,
79-80 (1981)).
Obviously, dividing retirement or pension
funds is not necessarily consistent with
principles of equitable distribution in all
cases. The purpose of divorce is to end
marriage and allow the parties to make as
much of a clean break from each other as
ia reasonably possible An award of deferred compensation which ties a couple
,together long after divorce can frustrate
that objective.
13J Nevertheless, the division of retirement funds between two persons can be

accomplished when necessary For example, in Raybum v Raybum, 738 P.2d 238
(Utah App 1987). a physician was required
to pay one-half the net present value of his
retirement plan, $.^6,850. to his former wife
in five annual installments
The court
awarded present value of the share to be
paid within five years to avoid "leaving the
parties in a 'financial entanglement that
would continue for approximately twenty
or thirty years and would probably result
in further court hearings and cause future
animosity between the parties ' " Id. at
241-42 Raybum provides a possible alternative for dealing with the value of the
retirement account in this case Because
of the sizeable assets m this case, another
alternative would be reapportionment of
the property distribution to offset the value
of the retirement account
In any event, it *ill be necessary on
remand to determine the \alue of the re
tirement account
The account has a
present value of between $73 0W> and
$177,000, and the Court should at least
consider the value of the account in making
the property distribution
Another alternative for the apportion
ment of property lies in the trial court's
discretion to award the entire value of a
solely owned professional corporation to
the husband Dogu v Dogu% 6.72 P 2d 1308
(Utah 1982) In Dogu, the earning power
of the corporation resulted entirely from
Dr Dogu's continuing ability to work;
however, there were questions as to his
ability to do so The trial court awarded
the wife savings certificates, bank accounts, and stock to offset the present liquid assets of the corporation (accounts receivable and bank accounts) The trial
court did not attempt to value the future
earnings potential of the corporation, pre
sumably because of questions regarding
the ability of Dr Dogu to continue to gen
erate income for the corporation
14,5] The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr
Gardner is a member, is a well-entrenched
institution, whose twenty-three members
have banded together in a business organization It is not likely to be highly sus
ceptible to earnings interruptions because
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of the ill health of one of its members.i.
The Ogden Clinic is not entirely valueless.i.
Mr. Gardner's share, using his own figures,;.
is worth at least $3,826 (partnership $3,726,>,
corporation $100). Mrs. Gardner's accountants value the business much higher. Nei-ither gave consideration to the good willII
inherent in the professional clinic.1 Mrs.
Gardner was entitled to findings in support
of the denial of her request for a portion of
those assets. Instead, the trial court disposed of the medical assets in the same
sentence in which it disposed of the retirement account.
The medical assets at issue here were not
included in the retirement account, but the
trial court seems to have assumed that
they were one and the same. In any event,
no findings of fact were made as to the
value of the medical assets. The award to
,
Mr. Gardner of his retirement funds and
medical assets may be proper and equitable. However, we cannot adequately
review the trial court's determinations on
the basis of the sparse findings before us.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a
valuation of the medical assets and retirement accounts and reconsideration of the
distribution of the marital property on the
basis of those findings.
In addition, Mrs. Gardner assets an equitable and legal property interest in the
medical degree of her former spouse.
Whether professional degrees and professional practice constitute marital property
subject to valuation and distribution upon
the dissolution of a marriage has been the
subject of much debate in recent years,
especially in the wake of decisions where
such a valuation has been made. See, <*.(/..
Inman v. In man, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky.
1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N..I. 488.
1.

A m a r r i a g e mav In* analogized to a partnership. Upon dissolution <»t the marital 'p.wtner
ship." an equitable distribution should IK- based
on c o n s i d e r a t i o n of all assets, not just those- th.«t
s u r \ i v e the trip to the lx>ttom ol the balance
sheet. W h e r e appropriate, value may be given
to that " s o m e t h i n g in business which gives rea
sonable expectancy <>( preference in the race of
competition," c o m m o n l y known as good will.
Jackson v. Caldwell. 18 Utah 2d HI. 85. 415 l\2d
6<S7. 670 (1966).
The ability of a business to generate income
from its c o n t i n u e d patronage is c o m m o n l y re

453 A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'BrieM
66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N j £
2d 712 (1985). It has similarly been tfa
subject of discussion in our Court of Apt
peals. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 PjJd
238 (Utah App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen;
737 P.2d 237 (Utah App.1987).
^
One authority has argued that educational achievements are susceptible to valuation,2 but there is judicial authority for the
proposition that the value of an education
does not fall within the common understanding of the concept of property:
An educational degree, such as an
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even
by the broad views of the concept of
"property." It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is
personal to the holder. It terminates on
death of tbn hol<W and is nor inheritable.
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many
years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may
not be acquired by the mere expenditure
of money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist
in the future acquisition of property. In
our view, it has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that term.
/// re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429,
432, 574 P.2d 7f>, 77 (1978). See also Mahoney, 91 N J . 488 at 496, 453 A.2d 527 at
531.
The cases which have refused to hold
that professional degrees-and practice constitute marital property subject to valuation and distribution have nonetheless assessed and divided the value of the degree
terred lo as ^«MK1 uill. (MMKJ will is proper I v
subjei t to equitable distribution upon J i x o u e .
See. e.K.. IhtKan i. Dufian. 92 N.J. 423. 4S7 A.2d
! ( 1981); Matter <>f Marriage of /7.vee. 91 W.ish
2d 324. SH8 J* 2d l P h (1979)
Hut see Hie
J reai/nenf of (,'<**/ Will in Divorce l*riKeedtne,s.
18 F a i n . 1 . 0 . 213 (1984)
2.

See F i t / p a t n e k & Doueettc. Can (he i.cotujrmc
Value of an l.Jucatmn Really He Measured?, 7 1
J.Fain.I.. SI (1983)
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or practice on the basis of other legal and
equitable remedies. These cases follow a
common fact pattern. Typically, the husband is supported throughout a long graduate or professional program by the working
wife, and the couple is divorced soon after
graduation. In such cases, there are few
marital assets to distribute, and the courts
have considered other ways of compensating the spouse, in a limited number of
cases, the courts focus on the educational
degree or professional practice. See generally In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Mahoney, 91 N.J.
488, 453 A.2d 527; Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847;
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743,
489 N.E.2d 712; and Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979), for various theories of valuation.
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1983).

In

/0J;

we enumerated thre, factors important in
fixing an ahmony award: (1) the financial
cond.fons and needs „f t h e wife; (2) the
ab.lity of the wife to p r o d u c e s u f f i c j e n t
»"«»"« for herself; and (3) the ability of
the husband to provide support. Jones.
r r l
English.

/ ' 1 0 ? 5 - * » al*0 **9li*
ft
565 P.2d 409. 412 (Utah 1977).

Mrs Gardner has not been gainfully employed s.nce 1958. Though testimony indicated that she was skilled as an executive
secretary, it will be difficult for her to
rega.n these skills and become reemployed
after a thirty-year absence. Mr. Gardner
by contrast, retains his career as a phvsi'
cian with earnings of $6,000 per month.
The trial court awarded Mrs C , r d - e r
$1,200 per month as alimony, to be reduced
to $600 per month following Mr. Gardner's
retirement. The court provided no explanation of the basis for t h e ^retirement
award and stated that the reduction in ahmony following Mr. Gardner's retirement
reflected a drop in h,s e a r n i n g p o t e n t i a l
Mrs. Gardners eligibility for social security and the fact that the house would be
sold providing Mrs. Gardner with liquid
assets. We think that this award was an
abuse of discretion.

(6) We agree that an educational or
professional degree is difficult to value and
that such a valuation does not easily fit the
common understanding of the character of
property. However, at least in the present
instance, we need not reach the question of
whether such s valuation may ever take
place. Sufficient assets distinguish this
case from others in which equity and fairness required another solution. Where, as
here, the marriage is of long duration,
present earnings and business assets provide a more accurate measure of the true
worth of the wife's investment in her husband's degree. The home, farm, automoMrs Gardner executed an affidavit prior
biles, and other assets of approximately
$500,000 allow for a divisible award be- £ Z
' , S t , n * J e r ™ « * l y expenses at
tween the Gardners. In a sense, Mrs. $1,700 per month. The trial court apparGardner has realized benefits from the ently rehed on testimony at the hearing
medical degree in the form of a greater and on a prior affidavit which set her
property settlement and higher alimony. monthly needs at $1,200. Mrs. Gardner is
We find Mrs. Gardner's request for a prop- not employed and has | i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f
erty interest in Mr. Gardner's medical de- be.ng reemployed. Viewing her future
gree inappropriate under these facts and earning potential and current monthly exaffirm the findings of the trial court in this pens*,, however arrived at. against that of
Mr. Gardners, we think it is dear that the
regard.
award ,s insufficient to ^ u a ) i 2 e t h e
[7, 8) Mrs. Gardner also claims the trial ties standards of living.
rourt's award of alimony was insufficient
Similarly, the trial court'., award of $600
md inequitable. We agree. An alimony
monthly alimony following M r . Gardner's
iward should, after a marriage such as this retirement « also unreasonably low. Mr
md to the extent possible, equalize the
parties' respective standards of living and ^ T M U V U b S U n t , a l r * t i r e ™ ' " assets.'
bhould Mr. Gardner
v-mruner rpark
reach retirement are
naintain them at a level as close as possithese assets will have incre^H . n h o L *
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tially. Mrs. Gardner, however, has no pension and will qualify for social security
payments only as an "ex-wife married over
20 years." She will not qualify for regular
social security benefits until she has
worked another thirty-nine quarters. Because the likelihood of her providing for
her own retirement is small, we find that
the trial court's award is insufficient to
equalize the parties' standards of living
following Mr. Gardner's retirement
We reverse and remand for further proceedings in light of the above and in light
of the factors enumerated in Jones, 700
P.2d at 1075. On remand, the trial court
must evaluate the wife's ability to support
herself based on findings and conclusions
under the standards stated in Acton v.
Dcliran, 737 P.2d 996. It is not clear from
the record before us that Mrs. Gardner will
be able to meet her monthly needs either
before or after Mr. Gardner's retirement,
and this is the focus of our concern. Our
review of the record therefore indicates
that the alimony award may have to be
increased.
However, explicit findings
based on the factors in Jones are needed to
support that conclusion.
191 Finally, Mrs. Gardner asks this
Court to make an award of attorney fees.
The trial court made no specific award of
attorney fees. However, in its findings of
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court
made clear that an award of a one-third
interest in the Old Ogden Clinic building
account and the division of the money market certificate was for the purpose of assisting the wife to pay her attorney. Mr.
Gardner correctly notes that a request for
attorney fees must be accompanied by evidence at trial as to the nature and amount
of such fees. See Warren v. Warren, 655
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982). No such showing was made at trial, and the findings do
not support Mrs. Gardner's request. Insofar as we have approved the property settlement of the lower court, the award of
attorney fees made part of that settlement
is affirmed.
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
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HOWE, Justice (concurring and
dissenting).
I concur in the majority opinion except
that part dealing with alimony. As tcthiti
part, I dissent for the following reason^
First, in reversing and remanding forU
valuation of the medical and retiremeS
assets and a redistribution of marital projh
erty on the basis of those findings, Mrs.
Gardner's financial position will undoubtedly improve and her income increase. This
increase will have a direct bearing on the
amount of alimony which she should be
awarded. It is premature for us to now
hold that the $1,200 per month or the $600
per month awarded by the trial court is
inadequate. It may well be that after the
redistribution of property is made, the
amounts awarded will be entirely fair and
could even be excessive. This is esj>ecially
true as to $600 alimony after Mr. Gardner's
retirement Any amount of his retirement
awarded to her on remand decreases her
need for alimony and his ability to pay i t
Tiie U ial judge recognised Una reality when
he wrote in his memorandum decision:
Upon his retirement, the alimony shall
reduce to $600 per month. The reasons
for this reduction are: by the time of
retirement, the home should be sold and
the plaintiff should have liquid assets;
defendant's income will materially decrease; plaintiff will also receive some
social security benefits. It is my intent
in awarding to the defendant his medical
assets and retirement assets that alimony shall be paid therefrom and that the
plaintiff shall have a claim thereon as
against the defendant's estate if he
should predecease her. This claim shall
be in the amount of $50,000.
Second, the $l,700-per-month alimony requested by Mrs. Gardner was based on her
affidavit which listed her monthly needs at
that amount, but based on her assumption
that the court would allow her to continue
to live on the twenty-one-acre country estate of the parties on which is a six-bedroom home with garages for four cars, a
barn, and other outbuildings. Consequently, in arriving at her $l,700-per-month r e
quest, she included the monthly mortgage
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payment, the property taxes, insurance pre- position of the parties after their divorce.
miums on that property, monthly utilities Again, this concept is contrary to the three
on that proj>erty, and amounts for the care factors to be considered which we enumerof the farm animals and for farm, garden, ated in Jones v. Jones, supra: (1) the finanand house maintenance and repairs. How- cial condition and needs of the wife, (2) the
ever, the trial court did not award her the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient
country estate or allow her to i>ermanently income for herself, and (3) the ability of the
stay there, but ordered that the parties sell husband to provide supj>ort. We have said
the property as soon as possible. The ma- that the wife is entitled to enjoy as near as
jority opinion does not assail this determi- possible the same standard of living she
nation. The sale of the property ordered enjoyed during the marriage and she
by the court necessarily eliminated many of should be prevented from becoming a pubthe monthly expenses which formed a basis lic charge. English v. English, 565 P.2d
for the $1,700 alimony request The trial 409. 411 (Utah 1977). But this is not the
court, therefore, acted properly in exclud- same as "equalizing" their incomes. The
ing those items of expense in determining a instant case is a good example. Mr. Gardreasonable amount of monthly alimony and ner is a highly skilled surgeon earning
presumably included instead the cost of $6,000 per month. Mrs. Gardner was not
Mrs. Gardner's living in smaller and less employed at the time of the divorce. She
expensive quarters. On cross-examination. thought she could maintain the standard of
Mrs. Gardner admitted that her cost of living to which she had become accustomed
living would be less if she did not live on if she received $1,700 per month alimony.
the estate. Thus, the $1,200 awarded by If their financial positions after divorce are
the trial court was clearly within the range to be equal, she presumably should have
of the evidence before the court The ma- $3,000 ptrr month aiimony. 1 do not think
jority *!%*:> «»ui claim mat $1,200 was the majority intends that result.
"clearly erroneous" as rule 52, Utah Rules
The object of divorce is to set the parties
of Civil Procedure, requires us to conclude
before we may upset findings of fact by free of each other after an equitabie division of property is made and, if needed, an
the trial court.
award of alimony is made which will enable
We have always accorded trial courts
both parties to maintain as near as possible
considerable latitude in fixing alimony.
the standard of living they enjoyed during
Yet here, the majority sweeps aside the
the marriage. The parties then go their
trial court's judgment because is only oneseparate ways and attempt to rebuild their
fifth of Mr. Gardner's monthly income and
lives. But because of the disparity in their
is insufficient to "equalize the parties' stanearning ability, the wife here, who has
dard of living." Insofar as this writer
knows, reasonable and fair alimony has training as a secretary but has not been
never been expressed as a percentage of employed for thirty-three years, will never
the husband's monthly income. This is a earn as much as her husband-surgeon.
.new concept, completely foreign to the test Our cases do not suggest that the divorce
frecognized in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 decree should attempt to cure this disparity
(Utah 1985), for determining an alimony by "equalizing" their future incomes.
•award. Since the monthly income of divorced husbands is not all the same, the
Snonthly needs and financial conditions of
[divorced wives vary widely, and debts and
Either factors have to be considered, perybentages should not be employed or relied
P" Finally, I strongly dissent from the reated references in the majority opinion
at alimony is to "equalize" the financial
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded.

In re the MARRIAGE OF Sally K.
OLAR, Petitioner,
and
Terry T. Olar, Respondent
No. 85SC487.
Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
Dec. 21, 1987.
Wife brought dissolution of marriage
action. The trial court failed to award wife
maintenance. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Vollack, J., held that (1)
educational degree did not constitute marital property subject to division upon dissolution, and (2) in determining maintenance,
trial court should have considered any unfairness which resulted when wife sacrificed her own educational goals to support
her spouse through school
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part with directions.
1. Divorce «=>252.3(1)
An educational degree is not "marital
property" subject to division upon dissolution of marriage.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Divorce «=»252.3<1)
Contribution of one spouse to education of other spouse may be taken into
consideration when marital property is divided upon dissolution of marriage.
3. Divorce *=»237
Maintenance is available only if property is insufficient to provide for financial
needs of spouse. CR.S. 14-10-114.
4. Divorce «=»237
Determination of what constitutes "appropriate employment," for purposes of

statute requiring that spouse seeking maintenance be unable to support himself
through appropriate employment, requires
that party's economic circumstances and
reasonable expectations established during
marriage be considered. CR.S. 14-10114(l)(b).
5. Divorce <3=»237
In determining maintenance wife was
entitled to, trial court should have considered unfairness which may have results
ed when wife sacrificed her own educational goals to support her spouse through
school. C.R.S. 14-10-114.
Fischer, Howard & Francis, Steven G.
Francis, Fort Collins, for petitioner.
Terry T. Olar, pro se.
Robert T. Hinds, Jr. & Associates, P.C.,"
Linda Daley, Littleton, Colorado Women's
Bar Ass'n, Linda Christenson, Denver, for;
amici curiae Colorado Bar Ass'n and Colorado Women's Bar Ass'n.
VOLLACK, Justice.
The issue presented in this case is whette
er an educational degree constitutes mark
tal property subject to division upon diss<H
lution of marriage, overruling Graham VA
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978)|
or in the alternative, if an educational d e |
gree is not marital property, whether thjj
wife was entitled to maintenance under t u |
facts of this case, including the contrib^
tions made by the wife towards her hus|
band's education. The court of appeal
held that the trial court did not abuse ita|
discretion by not awarding the wife mamtel
nance, because she failed to meet tES
threshold requirements of need set forth m
section 14-10-114(lXa) and (b), 6B C . R | |
(1987). In re Marriage of Olar,
^
64CA0S2S (ColoApp. Oct. IT, WSS> {*&$£
lected for publication). We affirm in part
reverse in part and remand the case for
further proceedings.
I.
The petitioner, Sally K. Olar (wife), and
the respondent, Terry T. Olar (husband),
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were married on September 5, 1970, and
separated on June 26, 1982. When the
couple separated, the wife was unaware
that she was pregnant with the couple's
only child. By the time that the decree of
dissolution was entered on December 23,
1983, the child born of the marriage was
eleven months old, and the wife was an
unemployed, full-time student living with
her parents in Munster, Indiana. The husband was living in Copeland, Texas, earning a gross salary of $35,000 per year as a
laboratory manager.
At the time of their marriage, the wife
had graduated from high school and the
husband was in his first year of undergraduate studies. During the twelve-year marriage, with the exception of one year in
which he worked full-time, the husband
was a full-time student, acquiring undergraduate and graduate degrees. For the
seven years prior to their separation in
June of 1982, the Olars resided in Fort
Collins, Colorado, where the husband attended Colorado State University (C.S.U.).
At the time of the permanent orders hearing on December 15,1983, the husband had
completed his doctoral dissertation and was
only required to present his work before a
dissertation committee to obtain the doctoral degree in physiology and biophysics.
Throughout the marriage, the wife worked
full-time, and at the time of separation she
was a bookkeeper with a gross income' of
$1,200 per month. The wife continued her
employment until June 15, 1983, with the
exception of nine weeks maternity leave,
until she moved to Indiana to commence
her full-time studies. She moved in with
her parents who provided her and the child
room and board with an agreed upon value
of $400 per month, which the parents advanced her as a loan to be paid back when
possible.
The husband's actual educational costs
were financed by a combination of veteran's benefits for his past military service,
tuition waivers, student loans, fellowships,
and graduate student stipends. In the late
1970's, the husband also received in excess
of $8,000 as an inheritance from his father
and this sum was co-mingled with the assets of the parties, some of it going for a

down-payment on a mobile home in which
the couple lived until their separation.
Throughout their marriage, the parties acquired little in the way of marital assets.
According to the wife, during the years
1979 to 1982 her income totaled $47,398
and the husband's income totaled $26,628.
The marital property consisted of two motor vehicles, furniture and miscellaneous
property, a mobile home worth approximately $10,000, and at the time of dissolution, a savings account containing $1,100.
Both parties had debts from credit cards
and the husband had student loan debts of
approximately $5,400.
The wife filed for dissolution of the marriage in January of 1983 in Larimer County
District Court At the dissolution hearing,
the wife claimed that she was entitled to
maintenance which would represent compensation for her working full-time
throughout the marriage to assist in providing almost a complete doctoral education
for her husband. The wife claimed that
she had an agreement with her husband
whereby he would support her during her
efforts to achieve a college education for
herself after his education was completed.
She had an expert testify as to the value of
a college education for her, comparing
what she could expect to earn as a high
school graduate and a college graduate.
The wife did not specifically argue that the
husband's graduate degrees were marital
property and did not offer testimony on the
potential worth of his degrees if discounted
to present value, or the amount that she
contributed to his education.
The husband claimed that there was no
formal agreement between the parties that
he would finance her education. He argued that his education was not marital
property under Colorado law, and that the
wife was not entitled to maintenance because she was capable of supporting herself. The custody of the minor child was
not at issue and was awarded to the wife
subject to reasonable and liberal visitation
rights for the husband.
The trial court held that the wife was not
eligible for maintenance because she failed
to establish the threshold of need neces-
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sary to justify such an award under section
14-10-114, 6B C.R.S. (1987). The court
found that the wife was capable of supporting herself and although she had a young
minor child to care for, nothing suggested
that the child required her mother's fulltime presence at home. The trial court
ordered the husband to pay to the wife
$350 per month as child support As to the
marital property, the court ordered that the
proceeds of the sale of the mobile horns,
totalling $4,914.60, and the savings account
of $1,100 should be combined, and the wife
should receive the sum of $5,000, with the
balance going to the husband. The court
noted that this was not an equal distribution, but stated that this award was in
keeping with dictum contained in Graharn
v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75
(1978)/ and would go towards assisting the
wife in continuing her education while
working part-time. The court specifically
held that the education of the husband was
not maritai property, and for this reason9
found that the student loans of the hus*
band, likewise,' were not marital obligations, and ordered that the husband assume those debts without contribution
from the wife.

429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), which held that an
educational degree is not marital property.
This reconsideration is based upon the recognition of the harsh and often unfair outcome in a dissolution proceeding where one
spouse has postponed his or her own career
and educational goals to support and contribute to the career and educational goals
of the other spouse. The pursuit of advanced educational degrees and professional training often results in a deferral of
earning capacity by the spouse who receives that educational degree or advanced
training at the expense of the current standard of living of the couple. When a couple collectively works towards the attainment of an advanced educational degree or
career goal, there is an expectation of a
higher standard of living in the future. If
a dissolution of the marriage occurs just as
the graduate degree is attained, or the
career goal achieved, or just subsequent to
the attainment of the goal, the spouse that
contributed to and supported the other
spouse has his or her expectations of the
higher standard of living frustrated, and as
a result of the collective sacrifice and deferment of acquiring other possessions, is
left in a position where there is little marital property to divide. The contributions to
the other spouse's education or career
goals are often made at the expense of the
supporting spouse's own education or ca;
reer goal The supporting spouse is^left
without the resources to recover fronv the
years of deferring the acquisition of prop-?
erty and security. It is with the recogru^
tion of this potential for injustice that we
examine the status of an educational degree in the context of the dissolution of a
marriage.

The wife appealed the judgment to th$
court of appeals, claiming that the trial
court erred in denying her maintenance
because she failed to satisfy a threshold
requirement of need. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court, stating that "[a]
trial court may use an award of mainteN
nance as a tool to balance equities and
compensate a spouse whose work has en%
abled the other spouse to obtain an ed^
cation, so long as the spouse seeking mains
tenance meets the statutory threshold rev
quirements of need set forth v\
§ 14-10-114<lXa) and (b), C.R.S." The
In considering the status of an educationcourt of appeals held the trial court did not al degree in the dissolution of a marriage^
abuse its discretion in finding that the wife we do not work on a clean slate. In Grar
failed to establish the requisite need.
ham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75
(1978), we held that an educational degree
IL
is not marital property within the meaning
We granted certiorari to reconsider our of section 14-10-113(2), 6B C.RJ3. (198TV
decision in Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. which states that "[f]or purposes of this
1. In Graham, we stated that the contribution of
a spouse to the education of the other spouse
could be taken into consideration by the court

when dividing marital property. 194 Cola at
433, 574 ?2d at 7S.
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article only, 'marital property* means all
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:"
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for
property acquired prior to the marriage
or in exchange for property acquired by
gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a
decree of legal separation; and
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties.
In applying this definition to an educational degree, we have stated:
An advanced degree is a cumulative
product of many years of previous education, combined with diligence and hard
work. It may not be acquired by the
mere expenditure of money. It is simply
an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition
of property. In our view, it has none of
the attributes of property in the usual
sense of that term.
Graham, 194 Colo, at 432, 574 P.2d at 77.
Our position in Graham is followed by
the majority of jurisdictions to address this
issue. E.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d
1145 (Alaska 1987); Wisner v. Wisner, 129
Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (App.1981); In re
Marriage of Sullivan, 134 CaLApp.3d 634,
184 CaLRptr. 796 a9&)T..i^te4'-37 CaL
3d 762, 209 CaLRptr. 354, 691 P i d 1020
(1984) (statute amended to provide for the
community to be reimbursed for community contributions to education of a party);
Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So.2d 146 (FULApp.
1983); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128
IlLApp.3d 234, 83 IlLDec 425, 470 N.E.2d
551 (1984); Archer r. Archer, 803 Md. 347,
493 A.2d 1074 (1985); Drapek v. Drapek,
399 Mass. 240, 503 N J2.2d 946 (1987); Ru2. The O'Brien decision is based on portions of
the New York Equitable Distribution Law which
provides that a court consider the efforts one
spouse has made to the other spouse's career.
See N.YJ)oraJleLLaw § 236(BX5) (McKinney
19__). The analysis in O'Brien is illustrative of
the equitable concerns of the working spouse
who contributes to the other spouse's career,
however, it has a limited application beyond
New York.

ben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733
(1983); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N J. 488,
453 A.2d 527 (1982); Hodge v. Hodge, 513
Pa. 264, 520 A.2d 15 (1986); Wehrkamp v.
Wehrkampf 357 N.W.2d 264 (S.D.1984);
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah
App.1987). Contra, O'Brien v. O'Brien,
66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.
2d 712 (1985).*
The doctrine of stare decisis imposes
upon us a duty to exercise extreme care in
overruling settled law. Creacy v. Industrial Common, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384
(1961). On the other hand, "[a] rule directed to the disposition of property in a dissolution proceeding can only be as sound as
the economic reality which it attempts to
service." In re Marriage of Grubb, 745
P.2d 661, -664 (Colo.1987). In Grubb, we
reconsidered the status of pension plans as
marital property and found that our prior
case law, which rejected the concept of
pension plans as marital property, did not
adequately account for the true nature of
retirement plans. We recognized that retirement benefits were a form of deferred
compensation for consideration for past
services performed by an employee and
constituted part of the compensation
earned by the employee. Id. at 664. Educational degrees are very different in nature from pension plans. While a pension
plan is difficult to place a value upon, it is
possible. We find that the value of an
educational degree is too dependent upon
the attributes and future choices of its
possessor to be fairly valued.
[1] Other courts have noted the difference between professional licenses or degrees and vested but unmatured pension
plans. The Maryland Court of Appeals
noted that whfle pension rights constitute a
current asset which the individual has a
contractual right to receive, the future enOne commentator also argues that a spouse's
professional degree and license should be considered a career asset to be divided, and provides a clear picture of the surprising injustice
which resulted from the institution of the nofault divorce law in the United States. LWeitzman. The Divorce Revolution 124-29 (1985).
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hanced income resulting from a profession- bution of one spouse to the education of
al degree is a "mere expectancy." Archer the other spouse. Id. For this remedy, we
v. Archer, 493 A.2d at 1079, citing Deering look to section 14-10-114, 6B C.R.S. (1987),
v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 which sets forth the standards for award(1981) (case holding a vested but unma- ing maintenance.
tured pension right is marital property).
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that
III.
"[a] professional license or degree repre[3] Under Colorado's maintenance statsents the opportunity to obtain an amount
ute,
maintenance is available only if properof money only upon the occurrence of highty
is
insufficient to provide for the financial
ly uncertain future events. By contrast,
needs
of the spouse. In re Marriage of
the vested but unmatured pension at issue
Jones,
627 P.2d 248 (Colo.1981). In this
in Kikkert [v. Kikkert, 88 N J. 4, 438 A.2d
case,
the
accumulated marital property was
317 (NJ.1981)], entitled the owner to a
insufficient
to fairly compensate the wife
definite amount of money at a certain future date." Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 531. for her contributions and expectations in
The Mahoney court further stated that the husband's educational degree. How"[v]aluing a professional degree in the ever, the trial court determined that the
hands of any particular individual at the wife was not entitled to maintenance bestart of his or her career would involve a cause she was capable of supporting hergamut of calculations that reduces to little self, and therefore failed to establish "the
more than guesswork." Id. at 532. We threshold necessary to justify an award of
agree with this analysis, and therefore maintenance." In our view, the trial
reaffirm our holding in Graham, holding court's holding does not adequately adthat an educational degree is not marital dress the unfairness which resu)ts when
one spouse sacrifices his or her own eduproperty.
cational goals to support his or her spouse.
[2] In Graham we stated, "(a] spouse
Such an interpretation is not required by
who provides financial support while the
section 14-10-114, 6B C.R.S. (1987). Subother spouse acquires an education is not
section (1) provides that a court may grant
without a remedy." 194 Colo, at 433, 574
maintenance to either spouse if it finds that
P.2d at 78. Here, it is the adequacy of the
the spouse seeking maintenance:
remedy with which we are concerned The
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including
contribution of one spouse to the education
marital property apportioned to him, to
of the other spouse may be taken into
provide
for his reasonable needs; and
consideration when marital property is di(b) Is unable to support himself through
vided. Id., citing Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo.
appropriate employment or is the custodiApp. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973). This remedy
an of a child whose condition or circumis effective only if sufficient marital propstances make it appropriate that the cuserty has been accumulated by the parties
todian not be required to seek employduring their marriage. In Graham, and
ment
outside the home.
the case at bar, the parties were divorced
shortly after the husband acquired his de- Once the court deems it just to award a
gree. The situation in which the dissolu- spouse maintenance, the court considers all
tion of marriage occurs before the benefits relevant factors including: thefinancialreof the advanced degree can be realized, and sources of the party seeking maintenance;
where no marital property is accumulated, the time necessary to acquire sufficient
requires us to look to another remedy for education or training to enable the party
the inequity that results for the working seeking maintenance to find appropriate
spouse. Another option mentioned in Gra- employment and that party's future earnham was an award of maintenance as a ing capacity; the standard of living estabneed is demonstrated The trial court lished during the marriage; the duration of
could make an award of maintenance based the marriage; the age and condition of the
on all relevant factors including the contri- spouse seeking: maintenance; and the abili-
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ty of the spouse paying maintenance to
meet his or her needs. § 14-10-114(2), 6B
C.R.S. (1987). In consideration of whether
to award maintenance, the trial court applies a two-part test evidenced by the statute. First, the trial court must determine
whether a spouse is entitled to maintenance
under section 14-10-114(1). Second, the
trial court determines the amount of maintenance to be awarded once entitlement has
been established. In setting the amount of
maintenance, the trial court considers various factors including the standard of living
established during the marriage.
As interpreted by the trial court, the
threshold of need required by section 1410-114(1), evidenced by the requirement
that the spouse seeking maintenance have
insufficient property to provide for his
"reasonable needs" and be "unable to support himself through appropriate employment," is a high threshold requiring a
spouse to establish that he or she lacks the
minimum resources to sustain human life.
The phrases "reasonable needs" and "appropriate employment" need not be viewed
so narrowly.
In Graham, we stated that one of the
remedies available to the working spouse,
where no marital property was accumulated, is an award of maintenance if "a need is
demonstrated." 194 Colo, at 433, 574 ?J2d
at 78. In In re the Marriage of McVey,
641 P.2d 300,301 (Colo.App.1981), the court
of appeals stated that "a trial court may
use an award of maintenance as a tool to
balance equities and compensate a spouse
whose work has enabled the other spouse
to obtain an education; however, this tool
is available for use only where the spouse
seeking maintenance meets the statutory
threshold requirements of need." (Emphasis added). This "threshold of need" was
not defined in McVey, but appears to have
incorporated the concept of the minimum
3. The Utah Court of Appeals noted the rigidity
of the Interpretation of the "reasonable needs"
requirement of section 14-10-114, noting that in
cases such as Graham, "where divorce occurs
shortly after the degree is obtained, traditional
alimony analysis would often work hardship
because, while both spouses have modest Incomes at the time of divorce, the one is on the
threahol/f nf m demificant incr****

in earninc*.

requirements to sustain life This interpretation does not give sufficient weight to the
word "reasonable" contained in the phrase
"reasonable needs/' 3 The determination
of what a spouse's "reasonable needs" are,
is dependent upon the particular facts and
circumstances of the parties' marriage.
See Moss v. Moss, 190 Colo. 491, 549 P.2d
404 (1976) (in the award of alimony, each
case depends on its own particular facts
and circumstances and an award of alimony in gross is not unacceptable per se).
[4] The second factor to be considered
in deciding whether a spouse is entitled to
maintenance is whether the spouse is able
to find "appropriate employment" for his
or her support § 14~10-114(l)(b). In the
interest of fairness, the determination of
what constitutes "appropriate employment" under subsection (b) requires that
the party's economic circumstances and
reasonable expectations established during
the marriage be considered. In In re Marriage of'Angerman, 44 Colo.App. 298, 612
P.2d 1166 (1980), the court of appeals affirmed the award of maintenance to the
wife in the sum of $200 per month while
the wife was matriculating in a master's
degree program for music The trial court
found that the parties had intended that
"appropriate employment" for the wife
meant a career in opera or in the teaching
of music, and that the wife's employment
as a keypunch operator was only a temporary position "dictated by the financial
needs of the husband's education." Id. 612
P.2d at 1167.
[5] The word "appropriate" is defined
as "specially suitable" or "proper." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
106 (1969). The word "appropriate" limits
the otherwise harsh results of denying a
spouse maintenance if any kind of employment is attainable. The employment must
be suited to the individual, including that
Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so the other could attain a degree is precluded from enJoying the anticipated dividends the degree will
ordinarily provide.... In such cases, alimony
analysis must become more creative to achieve
fairness, and an award of 'rehabilitative' or 'reimbursement' alimony, not terminable upon re*
marriage, may be appropriate." Petersen v. Petin
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individual's expectations and intentions as
expressed during the marriage. The consideration of the parties' reasonable expectations and intentions gives full meaning to
the phrase "appropriate employment."
Any statement or intimation to the contrary in our prior decision in Graham and
contained in the court of appeals' decision
of McVey is hereby expressly disapproved.
We think it appropriate for the trial court
to reconsider the award of maintenance.4
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' holding that an educational degree
was not marital property, but reverse the
judgment and remand the case to the court
of appeals with directions to return the
case to the district court for further proceedings as to the issue of maintenance.

Richard J. QUICKER,
Complainant-Appellant,
v.
COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION and American V Mueller, Division of American Hospital Supply Corporation, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 86CA1070.
Colorado Court of Appeals,
Dhr.II.
July 9, 1981
Employee fOed complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission alleging dis4. Other courts have considered the problem of
how to fairly compensate m working spouse who
has supported the other spouse while he or she
obtains a professional degree. One jurisdiction
has created what is known as "reimbursement
alimony which awards maintenance to the supporting spouse in an amount to equal the money spent by the supporting spouse towards the
education. Aiahoney v. Aiahoney, 91 NJ. 488,
453 JL2d 527 (1982). Another court held that
the supporting spouse was entitled to restitution
of the money spent towards the attainment of
the other spouse's degree in order to prevent
unjust enrichment of the student- spouse. See
Hubbard v. Hubbard. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979).
We recognize that our approach to compensat-

crimination by his employer in connection
with his discharge. The complaint was dismissed by the Commission, and employee
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sternberg, J., held that (1) six-month limitations
period applicable to civil rights claims began to run on date employee was notified
of discharge, not subsequent date of his
actual separation; (2) running of limitations period would be equitably tolled by
employer's failure to give employee proper
notice of his rights under civil rights laws;
and (3) allegations concerning employer's
discriminatory refusal to transfer employee
to another job also tolled limitations period.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Limitation of Actions <3=»58(1)
Six-month limitations period for filing
charge of discriminatory or unfair employment practice with Civil Rights Commission
began to run on date employee was given
notice of his discharge, which constituted
allegedly discriminatory act, not date of his
actual separation from employment C.R.
S. 24-34-403.
2. Limitation of Actions «==104!A
Running of six-month limitations period applicable to employee's discriminatory
discharge claim was equitably tolled based
on employer's failure to give employee no:
tice of his statutory rights under state civil
rights statute; employer failed to furnish
salesman who maintained office within his
home required poster or any other notice of
his rights as required by state civil rights
laws. C.R.S. 24-34-403.
ing a spouse for his or her support of the other
spouse in the attainment of an educational degree is to a certain extent limited by the statutory framework contained in the Uniform Dissolution of a Marriage Act. Other courts, inter-'
preting their own statutory provisions regarding
maintenance, have held that a demonstrated
capacity of self-support on the part of the sup*
porting spouse is but one factor to be considered in the awarding of maintenance, recognizing that a spouse who is capable of supporting someone through school will In most cases
be capable of supporting him or herself after
the marriage is dissolved. See Washburn v.
Washburn, 101 Wash.2d 168, 677 P.2d 152
(1984).
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missing from his lot. Shortly thereafter,
the petitioner DeJclef was observed in possession of the vehicle. It had been painted
black, the back seats wore missing, the
radio had been replaced and the vehicle
serial numbers had been removed from the
front of the windshield.
Delclef was charged in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City with theft in violation of
§ 342 of Art. 27 in the form of indictment
prescribed by § 344(a); it was alleged that
on April 20, 1982, Delclef
"did unlawfully steal property and services, of Netelers Used Cars, John Ensweler Agent, Finksburg, Maryland, of
the value of more than $300.00 current
money, to wit: One 1971 Volkswagon
bus, VlN #2212136295, in violation of
Article 27, Section 342 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland, contrary to the form
of the Act of Assembly, in such case
made and provided, and against the
peace, government and dignity of the
State."
Delclef moved to dismiss the indictment
on the ground that it failed to allege the
elements of the offense and adequately to
inform him of the charge against him. The
court denied the motion. Delclef thereafter filed a motion for a bill of particulars,
demanding, among other things, that the
State set forth "the exact way and manner
in which the defendant was allegedly involved and exactly how he actually committed such acts in . . . said indictment." The
State refused to furnish the particulars on
the ground that it had already provided
Delclef with the functional equivalent of
tne particufars througn pretn'af dYscovery.
The trial court declined to order the State
to furnish the particulars. On the same
date, defense counsel agreed that he had
received the "functional equivalent" of the
demanded particulars through pretrial discovery. Delclef was tried and convicted by
a jury for theft.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the conviction in an unreported opinion. It
noted that under § 342 of Art. 27 "theft" is
a single crime, its five subsections delineat-
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injr manners or methods by which the
crime may be committed. It reasoned
therefore, that the effect of the indictment
wus to charge theft by any or all of the
five methods. It concluded that there is no
constitutional requirement that the meajw
by which an offense is committed be set
forth in the indictment. With regard to the
demanded particulars, the court noted that
Delclef was bound by the admission of his
attorney that, in actuality, he had received
the "functional equivalent" of a bill of particulars and consequently the trial court's
denial did not constitute reversible error.
II
In Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 493 A.2d
J0f>2 I19S5) we found no merit in an identical constitutional challenge to the statutory
form of charging document for the crime
of theft, as authorized by § 344(a) of Article 27. For reasons set forth in that opinion, we affirm the judgment.
JUDGMENT
COSTS.

AFFIRMED,

WITH

COLE, Judge, concurring.
I concur in the result in this case for the
reasons stated in my concurring opinion in
Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 342, 493 A.2d
1062, 1071 (1985) (Cole, J., concurring).
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303 Md. 347
Jeanne P. ARCHER
v.
Thomas P. ARCHER,
No. 153, Sept Term, 1984.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
June 12, 1985.

The Circuit Court, Prince George's
u'nty, James Magruder Rea, J., held in
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divorce action that a medical degree or
license was not marital property, and the
wife appealed. Certiorari was granted prior to consideration of appeal by intermediate appellate court. The Court of Appeals, Muq>hy, C.J., held that: (1) medical
degree and license were not marital property, and (2) chancellor was empowered to
take into account such matters as husband's earning capacity in making alimony
award.
Affirmed.

1. Divorce e=252.3(l)
A professional degree or license does
not possess any of the basic characteristics
of property with the ambit of marital property as defined under § 8-201(e) of the
Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Law. Code, Family Law, § 8-201(e).
2. Divorce <S=>252.3(1)
Husband's medical degree and license
were not marital property. Code, Family
Law, § 8-201(e).
3. Divorce <s=237
Under § 11-106 of the Family Law
article [Code, Family Law, § 11-106], chancellor in divorce action was empowered to
take into account such matters as husband's earning capacity in making an alimony award.
4. Divorce <S=>237
Any income actually earned as a result
of one spouse's acquisition of a professional degree/license, together with sacrifices
of other spouse toward its attainment, are
factors which may be considered by the
court in making alimony award.

Allen J. Kruger, Laurel (Kristen I.
Schoeck and Goldman, Nichols, Kovelant,
Hurtt & Kruger, Laurel, on the brief), for
appellant.
Paul S. Warshowsky, Columbia (Levan,
Schimel, Richman & Belman, P.A., Columbia, on the brief), for appellee.
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Argued before MURPHY, CJ. f SMITH,
ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY and
McAULIFFE, J.I., and \V\ ALBERT MENCHINE, Associate Judge of the Court of
Special Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.
MURPHY. Chief Judge.
The question presented is whether a
medical degree and license to practice medicine obtained by a spouse during marriage
constitutes "marital property" within the
contemplation of the Property Disposition
in Divorce and Annulment Law (the Act),
Maryland Code (1984), § 8-201(e) of the
Family Law Article; that section provides:
"(1) 'Marital property' means the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or
both parties during the marriage.
(2) 'Marital property' does not include
property:
(i) acquired before the marriage;
(ii) acquired by inheritance or gift of a
third party;
(iii) excluded by valid agreement; or
(iv) directly traceable to any of these
sources."
I
Jeanne (Appellant) and Thomas (Appellee) Archer were married on August 6r
1977. At that time, Thomas had just completed his first year of medical school.
Jeanne, having completed two years towards an undergraduate degree, discontinued her studies to work full time. She
continued to work after the birth of the
Archers' two children in 1981 and 1982.
During the marriage, Thomas attended
medical school for three years, obtained his
medical degree and license and completed
two years of his residency. The United
States Navy paid Thomas'-medical jschooL.
expeTfses, together with a tax-free stipend
of approximately $500 per ~ mlontK7~tTi~^ex-'
change for Thomas' four-year commitment
to serve the Navy upoir^faoTuation. In
addition to the stipend,"Thomas'"earnings
during the marriage consisted of approximately $1,500 each summer from work
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done while in medical school and $lf>,(KK) to
years of his residency requirement.

m

The Archers were temporarily separated
for most of 11)79 and were permanently
separated in October of 1982. They were
divorced by decree of the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County on July 12, 1984;
the decree awarded Jeanne custody of the
two children, child support of $250 per child
per month and alimony of $100 per month
for a period not to exceed one year. The
decree also required Thomas to maintain
medical and life insurance for the benefit
of the two children.
The question of whether Thomas' medical degree and license constituted marital
property for purposes of making a monetary award to Jeanne under § 8-205(a) of
the Family Law Article was separately considered. That section provides that after
the court determines "which property is
marital property, and the value of the marital property, [it] may grant a monetary
award as an adjustment of the equities and
rights of the parties concerning marital
property, whether or not alimony is awarded." In determining the amount and method of payment of a monetary award, the
court is enjoined by § 8~205(a) to consider
each of ten specified factors, including "the
contributions, monetary and nonmonetary,
of each party to the well-being of the family"; "the economic circumstances of each
party at the time the award is to be made";
"how and when specific marital property
was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property"; and "any other factor that
the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair
and equitable monetary award." Section
8-205(b) permits the court to reduce to
judgment "any monetary award made under this section, to the extent that any part
of the award is due and owing."
The trial court (Rea, J.) held that a medical degree or license wa3 not marital property under the Act and thus denied
Jeanne's prayer for a monetary award. In

so holding, the court adopted the reasoning
of the Colorado Supreme Court in its determination of a similar issue in In re Marriage, of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d
75, 77 (1978):
"An educational degree, such as an
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even
by the broad views of the concept of
'property.' It does not have an exchange
value or any objective transferable value
on an open market. It is personal to the
holder. It terminates on death of the
holder and is not inheritable. It cannot
be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed,
or pledged. An advanced degree is a
cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined with diligence
and hard work. It may not be acquired
by the mere expenditure of money. It is
simply an intellectual achievement that
may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has
none of the attributes of property in the
usual sense of that term."
Jeanne appealed, contending that a medical
degree/license is marital property under
the Act and, as such, subject to equitable
distribution upon divorce by a monetary
award. We granted certiorari, 302 Md.
409, 488 A.2d 500 (1985), prior to consideration of the appeal by the intermediate appellate court to consider this issue of first
impression in Maryland.
II
The provisions of the Act, together with
its underlying history, have been extensively considered in a number of our recent
cases. See, e.g., Schweizer v. Schweizer,
301 Md. 626, 484 A.2d 267 (1984), and cases
cited at 629, 484 A.2d 267. It is sufficient
here to note that the Act indicates that
nonmonetary contributions within a marriage should be recognized in the event
that a marriage is dissolved; that a spouse
whose activities do not include the production of income may nevertheless have contributed toward the acquisition of property
by either or both spouses during the marriage; that when a marriage is dissolved,
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the properly interests of the spouses
should be adjusted fairly and equitably,
with careful consideration given to both
monetary and nonmonetary contributions
made by the respective spouses; and that
the accomplishment of these objectives necessitates that there be a departure from
the inequity inherent in Maryland's old "titie" system of dealing with the marital
property of divorcing spouses.

Jeanne maintains that the definition of
"marital property"—"all property, however
titled, acquired ... during the marriage"—
must be liberally construed to effect its
broad remedial purposes and that the term
therefore
encompasses
nontraditional
forms of "property" such as a medical degree or license. She recognizes, however,
that of the twenty-four jurisdictions which
have considered the matter, courts in all
I. Jones v. Jones. 454 So.2d 1006 (Ala.Civ.App.
1984); Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346. 661 P.2d
196 (1982); Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333. 631
P.2d 115 (1981); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 134 Cal.
App.3d 634, 184 Cal.Rptr. 796 (1982). superseded
on other grounds, 37 Cal.3d 762. 209 Cal.Rptr.
354. 691 P.2d 1020 (1984); Aufmuth v. Aufmuth,
89 Cal.App.3d 446. 152 Cal.Rptr. 668 (1979).
overruled on other grounds. In re Marriage of
Lucas, 27 CalJd 808. 166 Cal.Rptr. 853. 614 P.2d
285 (1980); Todd v. Todd. 272 Cal.App.2d 786.
78 Cal.Rptr. 131 (1969); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429. 574 PJd 75 (1978); Wright
v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803 (Dcl.Fam.Ct.1983);
Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So.2d 146 (Fia.App.1983);
Severs v. Severs, 426 So.2d 992 (Fla.App.1983);
In rt Marriage of Weinstein, \1% lU.App.3d 234,
83 Ill.Dcc. 425. 470 N.E.2d 551 (1984); In re
Marriage of Goldstein, 97 IU.App.3d 1023. 53
Ill.Dcc. 397. 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); In re Marriage of McManama, 179 Ind.App. 513. 386
N.E.2d 953 (1979). vacated on other grounds,
272 Ind. 483. 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980); In re Mar*
riage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa
1978); Inman v. Inman. 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky.
1982); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa. 309 N.W.2d 755
(Minn.1981); Ruben v. Ruben. 123 N.H. 358.
461 A.2d 733 (1983); Lynn v. Lynn, 91 NJ. 510.
453 A.2d 539 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91
NJ. 488. 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Muckleroy v.
Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14. 498 P.2d 1357 (1972);
Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, App.Div.. 486 N.Y.
S.2d 338 (1985); O'Brien v. O'Brien. 106 App.
Div.2d 223. 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985); Conner v.

but two jurisdictions have uniformly held
that a professional degree or license is not
marital property subject to equitable division.1 Virtually all of these courts, consistent with the rationale advanced by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of
Graham, supra, have held that an advanced degree or professional license lacks
the traditional attributes of "property," being neither transferable, assignable, devisable, nor subject to conveyance, sale, pledge
or inheritance. Some courts, by way of an
additional reason for concluding that a degree/license is not marital property, have
held that such items are too speculative to
value.2 Other courts have said that efforts
to characterize spousal contributions as an
investment or commercial enterprise deserving of recompense demean the concept
of marriage.3 Still other courts have found
that the future earning capacity of a degree or license-holding spouse is personal,
a mere expectancy and a post-marital efConner, 97 App.Div.2d 88. 468 N.Y.S.2d 482
(1983); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 App.Div.2d 153.
452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); Conteh v. Conteh, 117
Misc.2d 42. 457 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1982); Pacht v.
Jadd, 13 Ohio App.3d 363. 469 N.E.2d 918
(1983); Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App.2d 164. 428
N.E.2d 445 (1980). later proceeding. 12 Ohio
App.3d 69. 465 N.E.2d 1353 (1983); Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979); Lehmicke v.
Lehmicke,
Pa.Supcr.
. 489 A.2d 782
(1985); Hodge v. Hodge. — Pa.Supcr. — . 486
A.2d 951 (1984); Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357
N.W.2d 264 (S.D.1984); Saint-Pierre v. SaintPierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.1984); Frausto v.
Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis.2d 44. 296 N.W.2d 761
(1980). superseded by statute, In re Marriage o(
Lundberg, 107 Wis.2d 1. 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982);
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo.
1984).
2.

Todd v. Todd. 272 Cal.App.2d 786. 78 Cal.Rptr.
131 (1969); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 III.
App.3d 1023. 53 Ill.Dcc. 397. 423 N.E.2d 1201
(1981); Lynn v. Lynn. 91 NJ. 510. 453 A.2d 539
(1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488. 453
A.2d 527 (1982); Pacht v. Jada\ 13 Ohio App.3d
363. 469 N.E.2d 918 (1983); Saint-Pierre v.
Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.1984).

3. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 134 Cal.App.3d 634. 184
Cal.Rptr. 796 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91
NJ. 488. 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Lesman v. Lesman. 88 A.D.2d 153. 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982).
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fort—not divisible as "marital property." 4
And some other courts, in declining to find
that a graduate degree or professional license is marital property, express the view
that such items are best considered when
awarding alimony. s
Notwithstanding the overwhelming number of jurisdictions which hold that a degree or license is not marital property,
Jeanne urges adoption of a minority view
advanced by an intermediate appellate
court in Michigan and a trial court in Massachusetts, both holding that a professional
degree or license is marital property.
Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich.App.
258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983); Reen v. Reen,
8 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) 2193 (Mass.Prob. and
Fam.Ct Dec. 23, 1981).* In Reen, the
court held, without elaboration, that a husband's license to practice orthodontia constituted marital property.
Woodworth
held that a husband's law degree, earned
during marriage, was marital property. In
rejecting the majority view, the court held
that the fact that an educational degree or
license does not conform with traditional
property concepts—not being transferable,
assignable nor subject to sale, conveyance
or pledge—was outweighed by the need to
achieve the "most equitable solution" when
one spouse sacrifices and works for the
benefit of the other who pursues a professional degree and enhances his earning capacity. 337 N.W.2d at 335. That marriage
is not a commercial enterprise or investment from which dashed expectations or
efforts ought to be recompensed was, in
the Michigan court's opinion, merely a
4. In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 III.App.3d
234, 83 III.Dec. 425. 470 N.E.2d 551 (1984); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind.App. 661. 365 N.E.2d 792
(1977); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488. 453
A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien. 106 App.
Div.2d 223. 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985); Conner v.
Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88. 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1983);
Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250
(S.D.1984); Frausto v. frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656
(Tcx.Civ.App. 1980).
5.

Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333. 631 P.2d 115
(1981); Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, App.Div., 486
N.Y.S.2d 338 (1985); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106
App.Div.2d 223. 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985); Conteh v. Conteh, 117 Misc.2d 42. 457 N.Y.S.2d 363

characterization of "marriage while it endures"; it failed, the court said, to focus
upon dissolution of the marriage and how
best to compensate, not for a failed expectation, but for one spouse's share of the
fruits of a degree which she helped the
other earn. Id, at 336. The view that
valuation of a degree is too speculative to
constitute marital property was also rejected, it being concluded that courts have
been adept at calculating future earnings
in a number of contexts, such as personal
injury, wrongful death and workers' compensation cases. Id. Lastly, the view that
the non-degree spouse's contributions are
best considered when awarding alimony
was also rejected; the court reasoned that
the purpose of alimony was for spousal
support, involving a variety of factors in
the determination of whether alimony
should be awarded, including financial condition and the ability to be self-supporting.
In the case of a spouse who has worked
and supported the other spouse through
graduate school, the court said that the
former will usually be capable of self-support. Moreover, as Michigan courts have
discretion to terminate an alimony award
upon remarriage of the spouse who is
awarded alimony, the court concluded that
the award of alimony was not an adequate
means for recognizing the contributions of
a spouse who has helped the other through
graduate school.
The effect of Woodworth in Michigan is
by no means clear. More recently, the
issue of whether a professional degree is a
(1982); Pacht v. Jada\ 13 Ohio App.3d 363. 469
N.E.2d 918 (1983); Lira v. Lira. 68 Ohio App-Zd
164. 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980). later proceeding, 12
Ohio App.3d 69. 465 N.E.2d 1353 (1983); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Ops.2d 458. 185 N.E.2d
773 (1961); Hodge v. Hodge. — Pa.Super. — .
486 A.2d 951 (1984).
6. Jeanne also relies on two New York trial court
cases to support the contention that a professional degree or license is marital property. Wc
note, however, that on appeal the judgments
were reversed in both cases. See Kutanovski *
Kutanovski, App.Div.. 486 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1985):
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Mtsc.2d 233. 452 N.Y.
S.2d 801 (1982).
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marital property asset has generated a
split of opinion among Michigan's intermediate appellate courts. Olah v. Olah, IM.5
Mich.App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984), rejecting Wood worth, held that an educational degree is unique to its possessor and
lacks any of the typical attributes of property, even when interpreted in its broadest
sense. In Wailing v. Watling, 127 Mich.
App. 624, 339 N.W.2d 505 (1983), the court
concluded that the wife had been sufficiently compensated for her contributions towards her husband's dental degree while in
his last year of school, having received the
benefits of a nineteen-year marriage and
having received contributions from the husband for all but the last year of her education towards an advanced degree.
Our cases have generally construed the
word "property" broadly, defining it as a
term of wide and comprehensive signification embracing " 'everything which has exchangeable value or goes to make up a
man's wealth—every interest or estate
which the law regards of sufficient value
for judicial recognition.'"
Deering v.
Deering, 292 Md. 115, 125, 437 A.2d 883
(1981); Diffendall v. Diffendall, 239 Md.
32, 36, 209 A.2d 914 (1965). In Bouse v.
Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d 767
(1942), we said that the word "property/*
when used without express or implied qualifications, "may reasonably be construed to
involve obligations, rights and other intangibles as well as physical things." "Goodwill," for example, has been characterized
as a legally protected valuable property
right. Schill v. Remington Putnam Co.,
179 Md. 83, 88-89, 17 A.2d 175 (1941)
In Deering, we recognized a spouse's
pension rights to be a form of marital
property subject to equitable distribution.
292 Md. at 128, 437 A.2d 883. In that case,
involving consolidated appeals, appellant
wives appealed from decrees which denied
them any monetary award based on their
husbands' pensions which were unmatured,
fully vested pension rights based on obligatory contributions deducted from their pay.
Id. at 118, 120, 437 A.2d"883. Citing Weir
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r. Weir, 173 NJ.Super. 130, 413 A .2d 638
(1980) and /// re Marriage of Brown, 15
Cal.3d MS, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2<1 561
(1976) (on banc), wo concluded that a
spouse's pension rights, "to the extent accumulated during the marriage," constitute
a form of "marital property" subject to
distribution. 292 Md. at 128,437 A.2d 883.
In so holding, we noted that regardless of
the type of retirement plan, vested or unvested, noncontributory or contributory,
the critical issue was "whether a property
right has been acquired during the marriage and whether equity warrants its inclusion in the marital estate in light of its
limitations." Id. at 127, 437 A.2d 883 (citing Weir, supra, 413 A.2d at 640). We
said that as
" 'pension benefits represent a form of
deferred compensation for services rendered, the employee's right to such benefits is a contractual right, derived from
the terms of the employment contract.
Since a contractual right is not an expectancy but a chose in action, a form of
property, . . . an employee acquires a [judicially recognized] property right to pension benefits when he enters upon the
performance of his employment contract.' " Id. at 127, 437 A.2d 883 (citing
Brown, supra, 126 Cal.Rptr. at 637, 544
P.2d at 565).
[1] While, as earlier indicated, we have
in some contexts construed the term "property" in a broad sense, there is nothing in
the Maryland Act to suggest that the General Assembly intended that a medical degree or license, earned during marriage,
would constitute "marital property" subject to equitable distribution upon divorce
by a monetary award. We therefore hold,
in accordance with the majority view, that
a professional degree or license does not
•possess any of the basic characteristics of
property within the ambit of marital property under § 8-201(e) of the Act. While
pension rights, as in Deering, constitute a
current asset which the individual has a
contractual right to receive, such rights are
plainly distinguishable from a mere expectancy of future enhanced income resulting
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from a professional degree. The Utter is
but an intellectual attainment; it is not a
present property interest. It is personal to
the holder; it cannot be sold, transferred,
pledged or inherited. It does not have an
assignable value nor does it represent a
guarantee of receipt of a set monetary
amount in the future, such as pension benefits. Quite simply, a degree/license does
not have an exchange value on an open
market. In re Marriage of Graham, supra, 574 P.2d at 77. At best, it represents
a potential for increase in a person's earning capacity made possible by the degree
and license in combination with innumerable other factors and conditions too uncertain and speculative to constitute "marital property" within the contemplation of
the legislature. See also Aufmuth v. Aufmuth, 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 152 Cal.Rptr. 668
(1979), overruled on other grounds, In re
Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal.3d 808, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 853, 614 P.2d 285 (1980); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill.App.3d 234, 83
Ill.Dec. 425, 470 N.Ed.2d 551 (1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527
(1982). Moreover, as Dewitt v. Dewitt, 98
Wis.2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980), makes
clear, income earned after the marriage is
dissolved as a result of the degree/license
would in no event constitute "marital property" within the definition of that term in

IV
[3] Jeanne does not challenge the
amount of her alimony award and we do
not, therefore, consider its adequacy in the
circumstances of this case. We note that
under § 11-106 of the Family Law Article,
the chancellor was empowered to take into
account such matters as the husband's
earning capacity in making an alimony
award. Specifically, § 11-106 enjoins the
chancellor to consider a number of enumerated factors "necessary for a fair and equitable award" including, among others,
"the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the
family"; "the ability of the party from
whom alimony is sought to meet that party's needs while meeting the needs of the
party seeking alimony"; and "the financial
needs and financial resources of each party."

7. Questions relating to the equitable division of
a professional degTee or license have been the
subject of numerous law review articles. See
Fitzpatrick and Doucette. "Can the Economic
Value of an Education Really be Measured? A
Guide for Marital Property Dissolution." 21
J.Fam.L. 511 (1982-33); Krauskopf. "Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal
Protection for the Marital Investor in Human
Capital,- 28 Kan.L.Rev. 379 (1980); Loeb and
McCann, "Dilemma v. Paradox: Valuation of An
Advanced Degree Upon Dissolution of a Marriage," 66 Marq.L.Rev. 495 (1983); Moore.
"Should A Professional Degree be Considered A
Marital Asset Upon Divorce?", 15 Akron LRcv.
543 (1982); Raggio. "Professional Goodwill and
Professional Licenses as Property Subject to Distribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage." 16.
Number 2, Fam.L.Q. 147 (1982); "Equitable Distribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two Theories Toward Compensating Spousal Contributions." 49 Brooklyn L.Rcv. 301 (1983); Com-

ments. "Division of Marital Property on Divorce: What Does the Court Deem 'Just and
Right?". 19 Hous.L.Rev. 503 (1932); Notes,
"Domestic Relations: Consideration of Enhanced Earning Capacity of Recently Educated
Spouse in Divorce Settlements," 17 Suffolk U.L
Rev. 901 (1983); Comment. "For Richer or
Poorer—Equities in the Career—Threshold. NoAsset Divorce." 58 Tul.L.Rev. 791 (1984); The
Supporting Spouse's Rights in the Other's Professional Degree Upon Divorce," 35 U.Fla.LRev.
130 (1983); "A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution Proceedings," 56
Wash.L.Rcv. 277 (1981); "Family Law: Ought a
Professional Degree Be Divisible As Property
Upon Divorcer, 22 Wm. & Mary L.Rcv. 517
(1981). See also 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 898 (1983); Annot.. 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294
(spouse's professional degree or license as marital property for purposes of alimony, support
or property settlement).

§ 8-201(e). since it would not have been
acquired during the marriage.
(2] The cases thus lead inexorably to
the conclusion that the trial judge in this
case correctly found that Thomas' medical
degree and license were not encompassed
within the legislatively intended definition
of marital property in the Maryland statute. See n. 1, supra, at 1077.7
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[ t] We share Thomas' view that if public policy dictates that some economic compensation he made to a spouse who makes
monetary and nonmonetary contributions
to the other spouse's acquisition of a professional degree/license, equitable results
can be achieved under § 11-106. Indeed,
this section permits the chancellor to consider the circumstances surrounding the
acquisition by one spouse of a professional
degree/license, as well as that spouse's
potential income. Any income actually
earned as a result of one spouse's acquisition of a professional degree/license, to-
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gether with the sacrifices of the other
spouse toward its attainment, are factors
which may, and presumably were m this
case, considered by the court in making its
alimony award to Jeanne.
DECREE AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.

